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Abstract 
In today’s production agricultural sector, managing risk is essential to insuring the 
economic well being and sustainability of successful enterprises.  Considering the 
inherent risks present in today’s agricultural arena, risk management has become the 
central focus of discussions for policy makers and producers alike.  Therefore the 
objective of this research paper is to examine the impact a whole-farm adjusted gross 
revenue insurance risk management program (AGR-Lite) has on reducing farm income 
variability using historical farm level data for Southeast Kansas farms.     
 A panel data set of actual farm level income data was compiled to evaluate the 
impact of AGR-Lite on farm income variability for 219 Southeast Kansas farms.  
Although actual income tax records were not available annual data over the period 1993 
to 2005 from the Kansas Farm Management Association was used to reproduce the 
essential information a farm manager would need from IRS form 1040 schedule F and 
inventory records to purchase AGR-Lite (Langemeier, 2003).  Income distributions for 
each farm from 1999 to 2005 were calculated for two strategies; the farm manager did 
not insure and the manager insured each year using AGR-Lite as a stand-alone product.  
The AGR-Lite insurance strategy assumed a 75% coverage level and 90% payment rate.  
The income distributions were compared using three premium scenarios. 
In general, the results of this study reveal participation in the AGR-Lite program, 
in most instances, reduced standard deviation, Coefficient of Variation (CV), and 
Downside Risk (DR).  Additionally average minimums and Certainty Equivalents (CE) 
  
were increased with the product.  The following results reflect application of Actuarially 
Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI), which is believed to reflect 
actual market performance.  Additionally the following reflects results using Net Farm 
Income (NFI).  Results reveal that purchasing AGR-Lite reduced standard deviations 
7.01%, 11.34%, 0.29%, and 2.53% for total, crop, livestock, and dairy farms assuming 
AFARI.  However beef farms were the lone category to sustain a 0.81% standard 
deviation increase.  Despite reductions in absolute variability, relative risk (CV) 
increased 18.94%, 17.12%, 53.84%, and 3.19% for total, livestock, beef, and dairy.  Crop 
farms were the only category to generate a CV reduction (9.52%).  Under AFARI crop 
farms generated the largest minimum increase, reducing downside risk, by 69.97%.  For 
total and dairy farm categories average minimums increased 62.93% and 0.60%.  The 
remaining farm categories, livestock and beef, yielded 65.07% and 57.03% reductions to 
average minimum.
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
In today’s production agricultural sector, managing risk is essential to insuring the 
economic well being and sustainability of successful enterprises.  Despite the inherent 
and inescapable presence of risk in agriculture, some risk is manageable.  Risk 
management is not addressed as a single solution nor does it operate with defined set of 
procedures that inoculates a farm against risk.  In this uncertain and unpredictable 
environment in which farm managers and policy makers operate, mechanisms employed 
to mitigate risk must continually undergo modifications as the face of agriculture 
continues to change.  Farm managers purchase crop and livestock insurance as a means 
of insulating themselves from environmental and economic shocks, predominantly 
related to production, price, and revenue variability.  Yield variability exists due to the 
presence and uncertainty in weather, diseases, insects, and other pests, which 
subsequently triggers volatility in market prices (Gray, Richardson, and McClaskey, 
1995).  In addition to environmental factors, shocks to market supply and demand, both 
domestically and internationally, create heightened volatility in market prices.  Given the 
previous scenario and the inherent inelastic demand of agricultural products, risk 
associated with price is further exacerbated.  Historically crop and livestock insurance 
has provided valuable risk management by transferring production risk to insurance 
providers who are reinsured by the Risk Management Agency (RMA).  Government 
programs implemented through the Farm Service Agency (FSA) provide a stabilizing 
mechanism and limit the degree and severity to which producers experience variability in 
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farm prices, yields/production, and income.  Gray, Richardson, and McClaskey contend 
the transfer of risk to government stems primarily from, “the inherent instability of farms 
prices and income” which have been the leading motivators in justifying government 
intervention (1995).   
According to the Insurance Information Institute, “crop insurance has become the 
largest single source of financial protection to farmers”, which in 2005 insured nearly 250 
million acres (2006).  As legislation begins for the 2007 Farm Bill, many economists 
anticipate a transition from the traditional income enhancement approach to one focusing 
on and promoting risk management.  Government spending on U.S. farm programs has 
shifted from primarily price supports to one focusing on risk management.  In the future 
we can expect to see a greater reallocation of government spending toward programs 
targeting risk management. 
1.2 History of U.S. Crop and Livestock Insurance Program 
The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), an organization within the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), first debuted following ratification of 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.  Their objective aimed to devise and implement 
an organization which promoted improvement of the agriculture sector through 
development of crop insurance.  Furthermore the objective was to reduce individual 
losses associated with unavoidable perils through an actuarially sound risk management 
program.  The Crop Insurance Act of 1980 set out to coordinate a partnership between 
private and public sectors.  This partnership eventually led to the expansion of numerous 
county crop programs implemented through the private sector.  It was through this 
partnership which allowed for the development of an efficient and effective program.  
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From 1981 to 1990 insured acres soared from a reported 45 million to 101 million 
attributed to cheaper insurance as a result of subsidies.  Despite such success, disaster 
assistance ballooned in the 1980’s attributed to severe droughts in ’81, ’88, and ’89.  
Even with efforts to eliminate disaster payments congress has continually provided 
disaster assistance to farmers with recent notable outlays in 2003 and 2004.  It was the 
Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 which mandated participation for eligibility for 
additional government payments (i.e. deficiency payments).  Farmers were now offered 
the option of a catastrophic insurance coverage for a minimal administrative fee.  
Congress’s goal for insurance to become the primary vehicle for providing assistance to 
farmers, away from ad hoc disaster assistance, was slowly becoming a reality as 
participation rates reached all time highs.  More recently, under the provisions of the 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996, RMA was assembled 
to execute and supervise programs authorized under FCIC.  According to RMA, their 
mission is to, “Promote, support, and regulate sound risk management solutions to 
preserve and strengthen the economic stability of America’s agricultural producers 
(RMA, 2005).”  As of 2003, 22 RMA reinsured crop insurance plans existed, covering 
over 100 commodities and insuring 218 million plus acres.  According to the RMA 
website, in 2005, just over 16.4 million acres were insured in Kansas, accounting for 
nearly 71% of total acreage committed to field and miscellaneous crops. 
1.3 Yield Based Contracts 
Yield based contracts dominated the insurance industry until the early 1990’s.  
Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) more recently referred to as APH, the longest 
running insurance design, provides comprehensive coverage of unavoidable perils and 
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other losses including but not limited to, costs associated with prevented planting, 
replanting, and late planting.  These contracts provide protection for individual 
commodities.  MPCI covers nearly 70 commodities with coverage levels from 50% to 
85% with payout elections of 55% to 100% of expected market price.  Indemnities are 
issued when harvested yield falls below the yield guarantee, determined by the producers 
Actual Production History (APH).  APH is computed as a per acre average yield using a 
minimum of 4 and maximum of 10 consecutive crop years of past yields for the insured 
commodity.  When less than four years of actual, temporary, and/or assigned yields are 
unavailable transitional yields are used in calculating average or approved APH yields.  
Low yields can be replaced with 60% of the transitional yield or farmers may select 
“yield cups” to limit reduction in the APH as result of multiple year losses.  The yield 
guarantee is derived from the product of APH and producer chosen coverage level.  
Another yield based contract, Group Risk Plan (GRP), is a management tool 
which determines losses based on a county index, irrespective of individual yields.  GRP 
was introduced with hopes of addressing the inherent problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard present in current insurance programs.  Features of GRP include less 
paperwork, lower loss adjustment expenses, and lower overall administrative costs.  
When actual county yield of the insured commodity, published by National Agricultural 
Statistics Service (NASS) and approved by RMA, falls below the trigger yield, 
indemnities are issued in accordance with producer’s elected coverage level ranging from 
70% to 90% in 5% increments and selected protection level.  The trigger yield or 
coverage level is derived by multiplying expected county yield and producer chosen 
coverage level.  Protection level for GRP, selected by the producer, is equated by 
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multiplying the percent revenue coverage, 60% to 100%, and maximum dollars of 
protection per acre.  Maximum dollars of protection is derived from the product of 
expected county yield, GRP price, and 150%. 
1.4 Revenue Based Contracts 
Up until the early 1990’s, FCIC had sufficiently covered yield risk for many crops 
(under MPCI policies), however products addressing or associated with price risk did not 
exist.  Federally insured crop programs endured a series of changes including the 
introduction of insurance designs protecting producers from low prices, low yields, or a 
combination of the two.  Revenue insurance designs enabled producers to manage price 
and yields through the guarantee of a predetermined revenue level.  Consistent with yield 
based designs, the following programs provide protection for individual commodities.  
Income Protection (IP) and Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) were introduced in 1996 with 
Revenue Assurance (RA) debuting in 1997.  Collectively these policies protect producers 
against revenue deficiencies attributed to unfavorable prices and yields.  IP, developed by 
the USDA and based on APH, protects producers from reductions in gross revenue and 
distributes indemnities when gross revenue falls below the revenue guarantee.  The 
product of APH yield, base market price, and coverage level, equates a producer’s 
revenue guarantee.  Producers can elect coverage levels from 50% to 75% in 5% 
increments.  Individual gross revenue equals harvest or actual yield times harvest price.  
Developed by American Agrisurance, CRC protects against low yields and low 
prices or a combination of the two.  Following CRC provisions, indemnities will be 
disbursed when gross revenue falls below the revenue guarantee.  The final revenue 
guarantee is calculated by multiplying producer APH by selected coverage level by the 
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higher of harvest price (which reflect market conditions at harvest time) or base price 
(determined prior to insurance purchase).  Given the previous provision, CRC provides 
producers with upside as well as downside price protection.  Coverage levels range from 
50% to 85% in 5% increments.  The producer’s gross revenue to count equals the actual 
harvested yield multiplied by harvest price. 
Iowa Farm Bureau developed RA, which similar to alternative revenue insurance 
designs, protects producers against unfavorable market prices and production 
shortcomings.  Indemnities are received when the dollar value of production falls below 
the revenue guarantee.  Per-acre revenue guarantee is the product of APH, higher of base 
price or harvest price, and the selected coverage level.  Producers can select from a range 
of coverage for approved average yield from 65% to 85% in 5% increments.  Following 
harvest, revenue to determine any payments is simply yield per acre multiplied by fall 
harvest price.  
In 1999, Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP), recognized as the revenue 
component of GRP, debuted protecting producers on the basis of expected county gross 
revenue per acre of the insured commodity, irrespective of individual gross revenue.  
Producers receive indemnities when actual county gross revenue, computed by the 
product of actual county yield and harvest price, falls below some predetermined trigger 
revenue.  Individual trigger revenue is equated by multiplying expected price, expected 
yield, and coverage level (ranging from 70% to 90% in 5% increments) of the insured 
commodity. 
Introduced in 1999, Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) became the first revenue 
product insuring a percentage of average gross revenue for the entire farm.  Currently 
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AGR is available in 18 states across the U.S however USDA has frozen further expansion 
of AGR.  AGR provides coverage under one policy for multiple agricultural 
commodities.  Motivation for AGR was to provide insurance based on current and 
historical tax records, specifically Schedule F 1040 filings or equivalent tax forms.  With 
the use of federal tax records, RMA believes this approach will “reinforce program 
credibility by using IRS forms and regulations to ensure compliance (RMA, 2003).” 
1.5 Livestock Insurance 
The Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) of 2000 gave the green light to 
develop federally reinsured livestock products.  Prior to the enactment of ARPA, 
livestock remained a sector effectively excluded from RMA risk management programs 
specifically insurance.  November 15, 2001 marked FCIC approval of federally reinsured 
livestock products known as Livestock Risk Protection (LRP) for swine, fed cattle, and 
feeder cattle.  The basis of LRP is to protect producers against falling market prices, 
below some predetermined coverage price.  Key features of LRP include coverage levels 
ranging from 70% to 95% of expected ending value and the flexibility to purchase 
insurance coinciding with individual marketing periods and number of actual insured 
livestock.  Indemnities are paid when actual ending value, a weighted average price of the 
insured livestock, reported by Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), falls below the 
chosen coverage price.  Taking expected ending value, reported daily on the RMA 
website, and multiplying by producer chosen coverage percentage, establishes a coverage 
price protecting producers on a dollar per cwt basis. 
Livestock Gross Margin (LGM) protects against producer shortcomings in gross 
margin which is simply livestock market value minus feed costs.  Available coverage 
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levels range from 80% to 100% in 5% increments.  Producers receive indemnities equal 
to the difference, between actual gross margin and guaranteed gross margin if positive.  
Actual gross margin is the product of total target marketings and actual gross margin of 
the insured livestock.  Gross margin guarantee is derived by the product of expected total 
gross margin and chosen coverage level.  Multiplying target marketings, as determined 
by the producer, by expected gross margin per livestock unit for each month and 
summing the values, equates expected total gross margin.  Expected gross margin per 
livestock unit is established by subtracting expected feed cost, specified under LGM 
provisions, from the product of expected marketing month price, reported by CME, and 
marketing weight of the insured livestock. 
1.6 Whole-Farm Revenue Insurance 
In 2003, Adjusted Gross Revenue-Lite (AGR-Lite) was introduced.  Designed 
with the parent program (AGR) in mind, this insurance program has a more simplified 
design continuing revenue protection for the whole-farm for all crop and livestock 
enterprises.  AGR-Lite was first developed by the Pennsylvania Department of 
Agriculture and for 2007 is available for sale in 28 states (AK, AZ, CO, CT, DE, ID, KS, 
MA, MD, ME, MN, MT, NC, NH, NJ, NM, NV, NY, OR, PA, RI, UT, VA, VT, WA, 
WI, WV, and WY).  Figure 1.1 illustrates those states which are approved to sell AGR-
Lite.   
To encourage participation, maximum total liability approved for AGR-Lite for 
insurance year 2006 was increased from $250,000 to $1,000,000.  However, liability is 
still substantially less than the maximum liability currently offered by AGR ($6,500,000).  
One other distinctive feature of AGR-Lite was the elimination of the livestock restriction.  
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AGR limits the maximum share of livestock and livestock product revenue in the 
guarantee to 35% and AGR-Lite does not.  Table 1.1 provides a comparison of the AGR 
and AGR-Lite programs.  For further information on AGR and AGR-Lite refer to the 
following RMA websites: 
¾ http://www.rma.usda.gov/pubs/2003/PAN-1667-06rev2.pdf 
¾ http://www.rma.usda.gov/pubs/2003/PAN-1667-07.pdf 
When comparing alternative insurance designs, AGR-Lite may be used as a 
standalone product or as an umbrella (wrap around) policy allowing producers to use 
AGR-Lite in conjunction with alternative crop insurance designs, excluding AGR.  
Farmer paid premiums for AGR-Lite will be reduced when producers purchase additional 
insurance products, which reduce total liability.  However, a producer may not 
accumulate indemnities from all insured products in excess of the total value of their 
losses.   
Limitations of AGR-Lite specify that a qualifying person can generate no more 
than 50% of their total revenue from commodities purchased for resale.  An example 
would be the purchase of grapes to be converted into wine.  Potato revenue must not 
exceed 83.35% of their revenue stream.  It is important to note the resale limitation does 
not apply to commodities purchased for further growth, such as stockers, cattle 
backgrounded, and fed cattle. 
Producers are able to select from three coverage levels (65%, 75%, and 80%) of 
average gross revenue with an indemnity payment rate of 75% and 90%.  For 2006 
virtually all producers will qualify for 65% and 75% coverage levels with a one 
commodity requirement.  To qualify for higher coverage levels (80%), producers must 
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indicate on their intended agricultural commodity report that at least three agricultural 
commodities will be produced whose expected income will be greater than or equal to 
that determined by the diversification formula.  The intended agricultural commodity 
report will be submitted at the beginning of each eligible insurance year and details the 
commodity, expected acreage, yield, expected value, and total value.  The policy also 
requires that qualifying persons submit a minimum of five years of continuous, verifiable 
tax records for the same entity, preferably Schedule F 1040 filings or equivalent tax 
forms to document historical revenue and expenses.   
To encourage participation in AGR-Lite RMA pays 59%, 55%, and 48% of the 
total premium for coverage levels of 65%, 75%, and 80% respectively.  Calculations for 
revenue guarantee are derived from the lesser of the 5-year average gross revenue based 
on tax returns or the expected farm income times the producer’s elected coverage level 
percentage.  When a producer realizes a shortfall in gross revenue, below the guarantee 
level, an indemnity is paid based on the producers selected payment rate percentage. 
AGR-Lite provides protection for otherwise uninsurable commodities such as 
organic and direct marketed production; provides farm operations with a bottom line 
from severe economic loss; provides individual protection based on personal yield, price 
history, plus low price protection; and finally it may provide an alternative for farms with 
reduced APH caused by multiple years of crop losses. 
AGR-Lite possesses great potential in filling the voids or gaps in the current FCIC 
product line as this product caters to small, diversified, livestock, and specialty crop 
firms.  Despite such potential, the market for AGR-Lite in approved states has struggled 
as the following will illustrate.  In 2003 74 policies were sold with subsequent year sales 
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of 88 in 2004, 162 in 2005, and an unofficial 348 in 2006.  Refer to Figure 1.2 for a 
breakdown of crop insurance activity for 2005 production year.  Furthermore Table 1.2 
provides a numerical summary of liability by insurance design.  Reasons or speculations 
for such stagnant sales include the initial maximum liability of $250,000 which has since 
been raised to $1,000,000.  Furthermore, in a statement by Keith Collins, Chief 
Economist at the USDA argues that poor participation levels may be attributed to, “the 
learning curve of a financial product as compared to a production agricultural type of 
insurance product, as well as the cost of delivery (2005).”  Since its debut in 2003, AGR-
Lite has undergone several revisions and in light of recent complaints, will continue to do 
so. 
1.7 Research Objective 
According to NASS census data for 2002, Kansas’s top six commodities (by 
production value) account for $8.65 billion or 98.8 percent of the state’s agricultural 
production.  However, only one of these commodities is currently insurable: Grains, $2.1 
billion attributing to 24 percent of Kansas’s agricultural production.  The uninsurable 
commodities in the top six (by production value) are cattle and calves, $5.7 billion; hogs, 
$297.5 million; milk and other dairy, $248.5 million; hay and other production, $225 
million; and nursery and greenhouse, $55.5 million.  These uninsurable commodities 
account for $6.55 billion or over 74 percent of agricultural production currently without 
risk protection.  These statistics further substantiate the need for analysis of AGR-Lite in 
Kansas agriculture. 
Given the previous statistics, the objective of this research is to establish the 
impact of participation in AGR-Lite for SE Kansas farms on income variability.  
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Potential risk reduction associated with AGR-Lite will also be estimated.  Five categories 
of farms are used to examine the impact of AGR-Lite on adjusted gross revenue to count 
(AGRC) and net farm income (NFI) variability.  Categories used for analysis include all 
farms, crop farms, livestock farms, beef farms, and dairy farms.  The farms were placed 
into each category if they averaged 50% or more of total income from crop, livestock, 
beef, or dairy over the 13 years.  The Kansas Farm Management Association (KFMA) 
data was used to compile 13 years (1993-2005) of continuous farm level data that was 
used to evaluate participation in AGR-Lite.  The primary objective of this study evaluates 
individual farm performance assuming farms participated in AGR-Lite.  A more detailed 
and specific list of objectives for this study follow: 
1. Establish an area of study, study period,  and compile a panel data set of 
farm level data 
 
2. Determine farm type categories for analysis. 
3. Summarize the trend in the data for selected income variables. 
4. Formulate a mathematical representation of the AGR-Lite policy. 
5. Define procedures to estimate actuarially fair premiums that correspond to 
the policy. 
 
6. Identify risk analysis procedures and statistics for comparison including 
standard deviation, Coefficient of Variation (CV), minimums, maximums, 
Downside Risk (DR), and Certainty Equivalents (CE). 
 
7. Identify data limitations that caused revision of the procedures to calculate 
the income distributions with and without participation in AGR-Lite. 
 
8. Estimate gross and net income distributions with and with out the AGR-
Lite policy under three premium calculation procedures. 
 
9. Compare the previously identified statistics from the estimated 
distributions to determine the overall impact of AGR-Lite by farm 
category as well as Value of Farm Production (VFP) levels for crop farms, 
over all farms and farms with claims. 
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1.8 Chapter Outline 
An outline describing the remaining contents of the thesis will follow.  Chapter 2 
reviews prior literature which has analyzed many of the current Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation programs and their effectiveness at mitigating risk.  Chapter 3 describes the 
data, methods, and assumptions used to conduct the analysis.  Chapter 4 presents the 
results of the analysis.  A brief summary of findings, research limitations, discussion of 
future research and concluding comments are presented in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 1.1  States approved to sell AGR-Lite for 2007 
 
Note:  Shaded states indicate areas in which AGR-Lite has been approved for sale.
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Table 1.1  Comparison between AGR and AGR-Lite policies 
AGR* AGR-Lite
Maximum Liability $6,500,000 $1,000,000
Animal and Animal Product Limit 35% N/A
Purchased For Resale1 <50% <50%
Coverage Level (%)2 65, 75, 80 65, 75, 80
Payment Rate (%) 75, 90 75, 90
Government Subsidy (%)3 48, 55, 59 48, 55, 59
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR), Adjusted Gross Revenue-Lite (AGR-Lite)
3Government subsidy levels are 48%, 55%, and 59% for coverage levels of 80%, 75%, and 65% respectively
*AGR is currently unavailable in Kansas and will not be available in the succeeding crop year
1Producer must not generate more than 50% of gross income from resale commodities.  This does not include 
commodities purchased for further growth.
2There are minimum commodity requirements for each of the coverage level percentages.  Each commodity must 
generate a percentage of the total revenue stream.  Refer to RMA fact sheets for further information.
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Figure 1.2  Percent of dollar coverage across federally insured designs for 2006 
GRIP - Group Risk Income 
Protection
11%
GRP - Group Risk Plan
2%
Livestock Gross Margin 
(LGM) & Livestock Risk 
Protection (LRP)
0%
Revenue Insurance1
47%
Other Products2
13%
APH - Actual Production 
History
26%
AGR - Adjusted Gross 
Revenue
1% AGR-Lite - Adjusted Gross 
Revenue-Lite
0%
 
Source:USDA, RMA at http://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/sob/current_week/insplan2006.pdf and http://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/sob/current_week/lpi_insplan2006.pdf 
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Table 1.2  Summary breakdown of liability by insurance design for 2006 
Insurance Plan Liability
AGR - Adjusted Gross Revenue $293,767,147
AGR-Lite - Adjusted Gross Revenue-Lite $57,072,794
APH - Actual Production History $12,950,628,237
GRIP - Group Risk Income Protection $5,733,025,928
GRP - Group Risk Plan $1,051,980,975
Livestock Gross Margin (LGM) & Livestock Risk Protection (LRP) $189,561,978
Revenue Insurance1 $23,466,898,287
Other Products2 $6,331,318,483
Total $50,074,253,829
1Other Products Include: Aquaculture Dollar (AQU), Avacodo Revenue Coverage (ARC), Dollar Plan (DOL), Indexed APH 
(IAPH), Income Protection (IP), Indexed IP (IIP), Pecan Revenue (PRV), Tree Based Dollar Amount (TDO), Yield Based Dollar 
Amount (YDO)
2Revenue insurance combines liability from Revenue Assurance (RA) and Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC).  
Source: USDA, RMA at http://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/sob/current_week/insplan2006.pdf and 
http://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/sob/current_week/lpi_insplan2006.pdf
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CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Exploring the use of crop insurance as a risk management instrument and its 
significance in the agricultural industry has been widely researched.  With concerns from 
taxpayers regarding the costs of such safety net programs and increasing levels of 
subsidization, there has been a renewed interest in evaluating performance of insurance 
designs and their effectiveness as risk reducing mechanisms.  Section 2.2 and 2.3 review 
literature focused on performance of revenue based, as well as individual and area yield 
designs using farm level performance measures.  Section 2.4 reviews literature 
conducting cross comparison analysis between yield and revenue based schemes.  Each 
section will provide detail on the methods employed in capturing the effectiveness and 
efficiency of federally endorsed insurance mechanisms and discuss significant findings of 
each. 
2.2 Revenue Based Designs 
Prior to presenting literature which analyzed revenue based designs, the following 
section discusses an article  from Dismukes and Coble (2006) which contends revenue 
insurance may be more effective in risk management compared to alternative methods. 
 Since introducing revenue based designs in 1996, participation has surpassed 
yield based designs covering over 57% of insured acreage.  Figure 2.1 illustrates the 
transition from traditional yield based coverage to revenue based from 1996 to 2006.  
One key driver contributing to increased participation has been government subsidized 
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premiums.  According to Dismukes and Coble (2006) government paid subsidies for 
revenue insurance in 2006 totaled $1.8 billion, exceeding producer paid premium by 
$400 million.  Revenue insurance provides coverage for intra-season not inter-season, 
thus guarantee levels will more accurately reflect market conditions, ultimately limiting 
the presence of market distortion.   
Unlike yield based designs, revenue oriented programs, according to Dismukes 
and Coble (2006), can be more effective as an income stabilizer due to the inherent 
characteristics of the design.  First, it provides protection from loss in revenue rather than 
price or yield.  Secondly revenue based designs are larger in scope in that dissimilar from 
individual designs, which only provide protection for individual segments of agriculture, 
revenue insurance establishes a common denominator regardless of farm composition.   
Despite attractive features detailed above, Dismukes and Coble (2006) contend 
revenue insurance likely fails to offer “adequate coverage” as perceived by policy 
developers and farmers.  First, unlike yield insurance, revenue products combine risks 
associated with yield and price, and given the highly negative correlation observed with 
price and yield; revenue insurance offsets the risks resulting in less variability leading to 
less frequent and often smaller indemnities.  As such, producers often prefer purchasing 
separate insurance protection.  Secondly, insurance often requires the insured to absorb a 
portion of the loss which, again, leads to the notion of “inadequate coverage” because the 
full value exceeds the coverage level.  Lastly, is a problem that has confounded many, 
multiple year declines in income, to which individual and whole-farm products alike have 
failed to address.  Multiple year declines have become the central source of contention 
for farmers and policy makers alike. 
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Gray, Richardson, and McClaskey (1995) investigated and compared the 1990 
Farm Program, supporting agricultural prices through deficiency payments, acreage 
reduction, set-asides, and CCC loans, to two alternative schemes separate from the 1990 
Farm program which proposed the following; 1) eliminate deficiency payment programs, 
federal crop insurance, and disaster assistance programs, 2) retain CCC non-recourse 
loans and Farmer-Owned reserve, and 3) eliminate all forms of acreage reduction or set-
asides.  These alternative schemes, developed by an Iowa Farm Bill Study Team, were 
called Revenue Assurance (RA) and protected producers through a guarantee of normal 
gross revenue at 70% and 90% coverage levels.  These three alternative designs were 
then evaluated and compared for their effectiveness in stabilizing producer revenues and 
total government expenditure. 
Producer gross return and government expenditure distributions were estimated 
through simulation models for each of the designs using eight representative farms across 
the nation.  Estimated probability distributions enabled the authors to quantify producer 
support, stabilization, and government expenditures across programs.  Producer gross 
revenue distributions were determined through Monte Carlo simulation.  Ten years of 
national yield data were extracted to derive random national yields.  In this study RA 
assumed protection for the whole farm, thus the process accounted for cross crop 
correlations within farms.  Furthermore, simulations to derive correlations between 
national and producer yields where conducted via multivariate normal random generation 
(Gray, Richardson, and McClaskey, 1995).  These results were then entered into a pricing 
formula which established a national average price.  Taking national average price, 
multiplying by national yields, equated marketplace gross revenue.  To quantify total 
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benefits from each design, gross revenue guarantee was computed, multiplying the five 
year moving average of price and yield for each crop, summing the observations, and 
multiplying by producer chosen coverage level (70% or 90%).  Probability distributions 
were derived through 100 iterations for producer gross revenue and government 
expenditures. 
Their findings suggested that across alternative designs, the 1990 farm program 
supported mean producer revenues higher in comparison to RA designs.  Support for 
mean producer revenue, assuming 90% coverage were comparable to the level supported 
by the 1990 farm program.  Further, Gary, Richardson, and McClaskey contend the 1990 
farm program to be more effective in income stabilization when price variability 
constituted the principal risk confronted by the producer.  On the contrary, RA provided 
greater income stabilization when primary revenue risk faced by producer was yield 
variability.  When analyzing administrative costs, the 1990 farm program constituted the 
largest administrative outlay with 90% and 70% RA following respectively.  Nationally, 
Gray, Richardson, and McClaskey argue, producers located in the Great Plains region 
(growing wheat and rice) suffer considerably under RA due to limited exposure to yield 
variability, resulting from irrigation and ample rainfall, and on average receive most if 
not all income support through components of the 1990 farm program.  As for regions in 
the southeast and corn belt, comprised of mainly feed grain producers specifically 
soybeans and non-irrigated cotton, will benefit under the RA scheme, as producers 
receive little benefit from the 1990 farm program specifically soybean producers who 
received no income support under the 1990 farm program. 
  22
Hennessy, Babcock, and Hayes (1997), following the debut of revenue insurance, 
explored the effects of alternative revenue insurance designs to the 1990 commodity 
program, and no program alternatives.  Specifically they investigated the effects of 
acreage allocations, administrative or government costs, and producer welfare across 
alternative policies using a representative corn and soybean farm from Sioux County 
Iowa. 
Revenue insurance programs are broken down into individual and portfolio; then 
further characterized by farm or county level.  These designs were then evaluated against 
one another for their resulting effects.  The following comparisons were analyzed; 
revenue insurance to price and crop insurance; crop specific to portfolio designs 
employing state contingent approach; 1990 farm program to a no program alternative; 
crop specific to portfolio revenue insurance designs; and farm level revenue insurance to 
the 1990 farm program.  Monte Carlo simulation with 5,000 iterations was used assuming 
prices follow a log-normal distribution and yields follow a beta distribution.  The final 
analysis compared alternative revenue insurance designs for individual versus portfolio.  
Additionally producer risk preferences were assumed to be constant absolute risk 
aversion. 
Results suggested two important findings, first, offering revenue insurance with 
75% coverage reduced government expenditures to a fraction of that under the 1990 farm 
program; and secondly, results were conclusive that revenue insurance offered greater 
protection and increased benefit irrespective of upfront expenditures.  Additional findings 
suggested revenue insurance generated greater returns to society in comparison to the 
1990 farm program.  Furthermore, certainty equivalent returns (CERs), which measured 
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the certain return (assuming zero-risk) a producer would trade for a larger return 
associated with some risk.  Under farm and county level revenue insurance designs, 
assuming 100% coverage, CERs exceeded those relative to the 1990 farm program 
suggesting increased producer welfare or expected income.  Government expenditures 
were the highest under farm level crop specific revenue insurance with 100% coverage; 
however alternative revenue insurance designs and coverage cost less than that under the 
1990 farm program. 
In 2000 Miller, Coble, and Barnett investigated and compared the effectiveness of 
a multi-crop insurance design to individual yield and revenue insurance designs for a 
representative Mississippi farm.  They attempted to formulate a model guaranteeing 
aggregate gross revenue from multiple enterprises.  Cotton, soybeans, and wheat were the 
commodities selected for analysis.  Ten combinations in total were analyzed, three 
assumed 100% acreage devoted to each crop, with the remaining seven being divided 
across the three commodities (i.e. 50-50-0, 33-33-33, ect.). 
Probability distributions were formulated, through re-sampling, via non-
parametric bootstrap simulation.  County yield and historical prices from 1956-1998 were 
obtained from NASS.  Before modeling the effectiveness of multi-crop revenue designs, 
equations were formulated to capture the yield variability across enterprises, and are as 
follows: 
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jR  are predicted county and mean county yields for crop j, and 
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residuals for the respective crop (Miller, Coble, and Barnett, 2000).  To complete the 
yield simulation, farm yield deviations were equated, and following simplification, are 
equated as: 
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where fsy  is the simulated yield for farm f, 
C
sR  is the simulated county yield,  
fd  is the 
mean difference of yield of farm f from county yield, and fte  is the residual for farm f in 
year t.  Price yield relationships were equated to complete the final component required 
to conduct the multi-revenue simulation.  Price relationships were also calculated for 
each crop.  The subsequent equation is associated with crop i: 
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where 1isP  is the simulated price of crop i at harvest, 
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ˆ  is the county yield for commodity i divided by the predicted 
county yield for commodity i in year t, and pitε  is the residual.  Using equations (2.1) and 
(2.3), the following revenue simulation is derived: 
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where fsMREV  is the sum of revenues from multiple crops for farm f, iA  is acres planted 
of commodity i. 
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Using a non-parametric approach, risk reduction gains were analyzed and 
compared for Mississippi producers under yield, single crop revenue, and multi-crop 
revenue insurance designs.  Certainty Equivalents (CE) were calculated, which again 
indicate the amount a producer would accept in lieu of some uncertain amount, and used 
to compare alternative insurance schemes.  CE were calculated as followed: 
(2.5) 1,)()1( 1
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where srCE  is the simulated CE with a risk aversion coefficient r , and )( srUE  is a 
constant relative risk aversion utility function and was calculated as follows: 
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where sω  is the initial wealth and W  is the ending wealth. 
Under each scenario, CE increased compared to the baseline scenario of 
production assuming no insurance.  In some instances individual designs reported greater 
CE values than multi-crop designs, however Miller, Coble, and Barnett argue individual 
designs triggered indemnities with greater frequency compared to multi-crop schemes.  
All three insurance designs effectively eliminated the lower tails of revenue distributions; 
however, of alternative insurance schemes, multi-crop designs generated the smallest 
probability of low revenues. 
In 2004 Gray et al. analyzed the 2001 farm program and crop revenue coverage 
(CRC) for what, if any impacts individual and combined mechanisms impose on the 
distribution of returns to land.  Specifically two scenarios were analyzed, first, market 
returns combined with three other programs, Agricultural Market Transaction Act 
(AMTA) payments, Marketing Loan Payments (MLP), and Marketing Loss Assistance 
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(MLA) payments and secondly market returns augmented by AMTA, MLP, MLA, and 
CRC (Gray et al. 2004).  Returns were evaluated for an Indiana crop farm operating a 
50/50 rotation of corn and soybeans.  
Conducting a stochastic simulation, multivariate distributions were derived for 
corn and soybean prices simulated in a multivariate lognormal distribution, corn and 
soybean yields simulated in a multivariate empirical distribution, and cumulative farm 
income simulated from a multivariate normal distribution.  Using a budgeting model, 
distributions were derived under each scenario then compared against one another for 
their relative impact on returns to farm land.  Additional criteria used in measuring 
impacts of alternative government payment mechanisms on the distribution of returns to 
land were certainty equivalents (CE).  CE were calculated as follows: 
(2.7) ωωρ ρ −+−= − )1/(1)]()1[( XEUCE  
where ρ  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, EU  is the expected utility associated 
with a given return, X , and ω  is the initial wealth (Gray et al. 2004).  Assuming the 
power utility function form U  follows: 
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and X~  was derived 
(2.9) ωωρ ρ −+−= − )1/(1)]()1[(~ XEUX  
Cash prices were procured from Indiana Agricultural Statistics Service with futures 
prices compiled from Chicago Board of Trade.   
In comparing the two scenarios, average return to land per acre without CRC was 
$80.50 and $79.39 after CRC was included in the risk reducing portfolio.  To reconcile 
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the $1.11 difference (which reflected the cost of insuring) in average returns to land, 
including CRC increased the bottom dollar return from $39.49 (without CRC) to $68.65, 
a near $30 difference; and reduced the standard deviation from $46.61 to $41.73.  
Furthermore, an increase from 0.99 to 1.40 (with CRC) in skewness established the 
effectiveness of CRC in mitigating downward risk.  For the simulated results, CE values 
suggested producers with greater risk aversion gained considerably compared to those 
associated with less risk aversion.  For example, under scenario one, with no insurance 
assuming MLA payments, a producer with relative risk aversion of 0 observed a CE 
value of $16.92/acre, whereas producers with relative risk aversion 5 reported a CE value 
of $34.89/acre.  Thus, risk reduction under MLA was more beneficial to producers with 
greater risk aversion.  In the aggregate, producers receive greater benefits with increased 
risk aversion.  Gray et al. contend that MLA, MLP, and AMTA, adequately removed the 
risk present in farming.  With the addition of CRC, values were slightly higher, 
insinuating greater risk reduction; however the increase is minimal suggesting that 
previous programs removed a significant portion of farm related risk.  More importantly, 
this research claimed that net benefits from CRC are lessened with participation in 
additional government programs. 
2.3 Yield Based Designs 
Patrick and Rao (1989) examined the impact MPCI imposed on performance of 
hog –crop farms in Central Indiana.  Farms were categorized by debt to asset (D/A) 
ratios, low, medium, and high with corresponding levels of 20%, 40%, and 70% 
respectively.  To reflect greater yield variability experienced by farmers relative to 
county yields, CV were increased by 25%, 50%, and 100% of mean yields.  Additional 
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scenarios analyzed whether or not a producer purchased MPCI, and the impacts on after-
tax net present value of family withdrawals and change in net worth (ANPV), present 
value of ending net worth of solvent iterations (PVNW), probability of net worth gain 
(probability PVNW is greater than initial wealth) ( %NWG), and probability of survival 
(firm remains solvent for 10 year period) (%SUR).  Three scenarios (MPCI assuming 
1986 feedgrain and wheat program; a combination of MPCI, 1986 feedgrain and wheat 
program, and off farm income; or no coverage from either program) were selected and 
explored for the effects of increased yield variability on selected performance measures 
of farrow to finish hog-crop farms.  Farms were further classified as having average gross 
farm income from $100,000 to $249,999, operated 360 acres, of which 160 is owned and 
200 crop shared, and selected from corn, wheat, soybeans, or a combination of any sort. 
Similar to Schumann et al. (2001), FLIPSIM was employed to investigate the 
impacts of various insurance designs.  According to Patrick and Rao (1989), FLIPSIM is 
a recursive simulation model which incorporated an assortment of variables, including 
crop mix decisions, financial management, and marketing.  Crop yield and prices were 
generated from multivariate normal distributions. 
The first scenario analyzed the impacts of MPCI assuming 1986 feedgrain and 
wheat program.  This scenario suggested that purchasing MPCI would in fact reduce the 
mean value of ANPV and PVNW under all D/A groups.  Thus, participating in MPCI 
reduced ANPV which corresponded to a reduction in net farm income.  Farm 
survivability remained 100% for medium and low D/A groups.  For MPCI and no 1986 
feedgrain and wheat program, performance measure values were collectively worse than 
when augmented by the 1986 feedgrain and wheat program.  Here again farms in the low 
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to mid D/A groups had 100% survivability.  Under almost every scenario ANPV and 
PVNW were reduced when farmer purchased MPCI.  The last scenario which included 
MPCI, 1986 feedgrain and wheat program, and off-farm income, suggested that an 
additional $12,000 of off-farm income increased ANPV, PVNW, %NWG, and %SUR 
under 40 and 70 percent D/A positions.  Similar to previous results, ANPV and PVNW 
were reduced under 40% and 70% D/A with off-farm income and CV increases.  Patrick 
and Rao concluded that for a diversified farm, as used in the study, MPCI played a trivial 
role in risk management due to areas of low yield variability, as is the case for Indiana 
hog-crop farm.  In addition, participation in MPCI reduced net farm income and PVNW 
under a high D/A group; however engaging in MPCI yielded a positive response, albeit 
net farm income still declined, yet at a much smaller percentage.  It is under the medium 
D/A group which MPCI participation has the potential to be effective.  These groups 
benefited from increased liquidity, increased %NWG, and higher mean ANPV and 
PVNW values, especially under increased CV.  Patrick and Rao contend that MPCI is an 
effective risk management tool for producers with medium D/A levels or high D/A levels 
with off farm income, primarily those with greater yield variability. 
Miranda (1991) reevaluated area yield crop insurance, first promoted by Halcrow 
in 1949, questioning the effectiveness of the design in reducing yield risk with individual 
yield design comparisons.  Furthermore, an investigation was conducted which analyzed 
variation across producers and techniques to optimize coverage under area yield designs.  
Recall that under the area yield scheme, producers will receive indemnities when area 
yield falls below some predetermined critical yield.  Miranda discussed the theoretical 
aspect of area yield insurance, then, applied this framework through farm level data from 
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102 western Kentucky soybean farms.  Although he provides no economic analysis, his 
discussion specifically addresses the effectiveness of these designs in yield risk reduction.  
He also contributed a theoretical approach which was used in other crop insurance 
analysis. 
To test the effectiveness of an area yield design, Miranda developed a model to 
measure the correlation between an individual farmer’s yield and area yields: 
(10) iiii εμγβμγ ~)~(~ +−+=  
where iγ~  is the individual farm yield, iμ  is historical average farm yield, 
2
~/)~,~( γσγγβ ii Cov= ; γ~  is the area yield;  μ  is the average area yield; and iε~  is the 
nonsystematic component.  iβ , which has a central tendency to one, established whether 
or not area yield designs were risk reducing.  The greater the iβ  the higher the probability 
area yield designs were risk reducing.  Furthermore if iβ  is greater than some 
criticalβ , cβ , area yield is deemed risk reducing.  cβ  were calculated as follows: 
(11) 
)~,~(*2
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where n~2σ  is the variance of the indemnity under area yield insurance (Miranda, 1991). 
Individual yield risk, according to Miranda, can be decomposed into systematic 
and unsystematic components.  Factors which affected producers in a selected area are 
captured within the systematic component while nonsystematic components are the 
residuals.  Individual yield insurance is plagued by inherent problems of moral hazard 
and adverse selection.  Thus, Miranda asserted, individual yield insurance is less effective 
due to such steep deductibles.  Area yield insurance, on the other hand, is more effective 
as problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are limited.  Results suggested that on 
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average area yield designs offer greater yield risk protection compared to individual yield 
contracts.  Additional results suggested, percent yield variability reduction under 
individual yield, full coverage area yield, and optimal area yield coverage designs are 
30.8, 22.4, and 39.1 respectively.  Individuals with the highest β  coefficients sustained 
the greatest risk reduction under optimal area yield coverage, whereas those producers 
associated with the highest yield variances observed the largest reduction when an 
individual yield design was purchased. 
Also in 1991, Carriker et al. explored and compared the effectiveness of 
individual versus area yield designs and examined if any reduction existed in the 
variability of yield-equivalent and gross income.  Farm level yield data for 98 dryland 
corn farms and 38 dryland wheat farms from south central and northeast Kansas 
respectively, were analyzed.   
Distributions for yield-equivalents and income were estimated for five alternative 
risk management designs (individual and area yield insurance, optimal coverage area 
yield insurance, and disaster assistance for farm and area yield) to evaluate their risk 
reduction effectiveness.  Coefficient of Variation (CV) statistics were computed for yield-
equivalents and gross returns for both commodities, across all farms, under each safety 
net alternative, then compared to the baseline of yield equivalents and gross returns 
assuming no insurance or disaster assistance.  Cross comparisons allowed them to capture 
the realized reduction across safety net designs in reference to yield equivalents and gross 
returns.  As effective as CV statistics are, they were limited by the expected value-
variance criteria, thus Carriker et al. employed second-degree stochastic dominance 
  32
which enabled the comparison of possible incomes across strategies, identifying which 
designs offered the greatest overall benefit to producers. 
Under yield-equivalent variability, individual yield insurance proved most 
effective in reducing variability, averaging 41.9% to 48.7% across corn and wheat 
respectively.  Optimal coverage area yield insurance was the second most effective plan 
whereas disaster assistance designs failed to provide effective risk reduction for yield-
equivalent.   
Despite less relative risk associated with gross income, individual farm yield 
insurance without government payments yielded the highest average reduction, 19.8% 
and 47.1% for wheat and corn farms respectively.  Farm yield disaster assistance, less 
effective than individual farm yield insurance, yielded a 26.9% and 2.8% reduction on 
corn and wheat farms respectively.  As expected, when insurance designs were 
augmented by deficiency payment programs, variability in gross income was 
considerably less than under insurance alone. 
Stochastic dominance analysis found individual farm yield insurance was 
preferred for risk averse wheat producers; however corn producers were indifferent 
between farm disaster assistance and individual farm yield insurance, without the 
presence of deficiency payments.  Alternatively, when deficiency payments were used in 
conjunction with insurance, both corn and wheat producers equally prefer individual farm 
yield insurance. 
In 1993 Williams et al. studied two crop insurance designs, two disaster assistance 
designs, crop insurance with a government commodity program design, and a 
government commodity program for their respective effectiveness at risk reduction 
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associated with net returns.  Farm level data from 45 southcentral wheat and sorghum 
grain producers and 36 northwest wheat producers in Kansas were used to conduct the 
analysis.  Unlike the study conducted by Miranda (1991), Williams et al. addressed net 
returns and government program effects.  They also studied the effectiveness of these 
programs across alternative risk aversion coefficients and subsidized levels, dissimilar 
from Carriker et al (1991). 
Analysis for net returns under alternative safety net schemes and various risk 
attitudes were conducted via stochastic dominance.  More specifically Williams et al. 
used stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF) criteria which analyzed the 
net return distributions for each scheme and allowed the ordinal ranking of alternative 
designs based on producer preference.  Net return distributions were generated from price 
and yield data from 1978-1987, converted to constant 1990 dollars with USDA index.  
Whole-farm risk aversion coefficients were used to appraise net returns for farms in 
southcentral and northwest Kansas. 
In 1990 dollars per acre, government commodity program (GCP) and disaster 
assistance both individual (DIS) and area (ADIS) generated the highest mean average net 
returns.  Furthermore these strategies provided the lowest relative variability, measured 
by coefficient of variation statistics, compared to alternative strategies.  Stochastic 
dominance results suggested (GCP + DIS) and (GCP + ADIS) were dominated the least 
number of times by alternative schemes across various risk categories in southcentral and 
northwest farms.  As risk preferences encountered greater risk aversion, specifically 
moderate to strong, GCP + CI had the largest impact on southcentral grain sorghum 
farms.  Assuming moderate risk aversion, individual strategies were evaluated and 
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compared against one another.  GCP + ACI were preferred for grain sorghum, and wheat 
and grain sorghum combinations for southcentral and northwest wheat over GCP + CI on 
78%, 66%, and 47% of the farms respectively.  GCP + CI were selected on 36% of 
southcentral wheat farms as opposed to 33% who selected GCP + ACI.  The final SDRF 
analyzed GCP + CI versus GCP + ACI with varied subsidization levels (10%, 20%, and 
30%) to establish the preferred strategy.  When both policies assumed total cost (no 
subsidization) GCP + CI was the preferred product for all regions and risk aversion 
categories with the exception of those growing wheat in southcentral Kansas with 
moderate risk aversion.  With increased subsidization GCP + ACI became the preferred 
design across most regions and risk aversion categories.  For moderately and strongly risk 
averse grain sorghum producers in southcentral Kansas, GCP + CI was the dominant 
product selected regardless of the increased subsidization of GCP + ACI. 
More recently Atwood, Watts, and Baquet (1996) explored profitability, capital 
structure, and financial longevity for High plains wheat producers, and what, if any 
impacts alternative federal programs imposed on financial measures.  Consistent with 
previous studies was the use of portfolio risk management and analysis focused on 
intermediate to long-run solutions.  This study selected three federal crop insurance 
programs to analyze (no insurance, MPCI, and MPCI with actuarially fair premiums) and 
three price support programs (no price support, declining price supports, and constant real 
price supports). 
Assuming an individual maximized the expected terminal net worth, subject to 
financial constraints, stochastic dynamic programming incorporating risk associated with 
yield, price, and financial was employed for this study.  Estimated yield and price 
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distributions were constructed using 73 years of annual wheat prices compiled by the 
Montana Agricultural Statistics Service. 
Results are presented and broken down into four key findings which will be 
discussed in turn.  First, actuarially fair insurance imposes little impact on viability of the 
individual firm.  Increases in subsidization will likely extend the survivability of the 
individual firm as producers are more inclined to engage in adverse selection.  Secondly, 
producers will select insurance over price supports when the loading charge is less than 
five percent.  Loading charges refer to additional amounts included in the base premium 
calculation and can include any costs deemed necessary to arrive at an actuarially sound 
premium.  Furthermore, Midwest states realized increased sensitivity to nonactuarial 
loading as many producers chose to diversify their risk reducing portfolios by increasing 
the number of entities.  Thirdly, similar to Williams et al. and Carriker et al., crop 
insurance and price supports are substitutes in risk reduction.  If price support programs 
exist, MPCI imposes minimal impacts on firm survivability.  Lastly, a producer is more 
equipped to service increased debt loads with the presence of insurance, meanwhile 
observing very little change in risk exposure. 
In 1998 Wang et al. measured the performance of individual yield and area yield 
insurance designs.  Specifically they analyzed farmer participation and welfare using an 
expected utility framework.  Farmer welfare is defined as, “a willingness to pay measure, 
calculated as the amount of sure income that must be provided to the farmer in the case 
where no risk management instruments are available, in order to generate the same level 
of expected utility achieved under optimal use of the specified risk management portfolio 
(pp. 812)”.  Similar to other studies, Wang et al. included portfolio management in which 
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producers were able to participate in alternative risk management strategies including but 
not limited to futures and options.  Analysis of a portfolio framework is important as 
these options influence a producers’ decision to participate in a given insurance design.    
Using a representative corn farm in Iowa, stochastic simulation and numerical 
optimization were employed to analyze risk management behavior.  Two periods, 
planting and harvesting, were incorporated into the model, the first captured the selection 
of risk management decisions while the latter determined profit.  Farmers were assumed 
to maximize expected utility of profits which were derived via von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function (u(.) represents the income from an uncertain prospect) 
which assumed constant relative risk aversion 
(12) ∫∫ ∞∞ Ω00 )/,()];,([max dpdyypgxypux π  
where )(⋅u  is an increasing and concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, 
)(⋅π is a per acre profit function, p is a random price vector, y  is a random yield vector, 
x  denotes a portfolio of risk management instruments, and ( )Ω⋅ /g  is the joint density 
for prices and yields conditioned on Ω , a set of information available when x  is chosen 
(Wang et al. 1998).  Price and yield distributions were estimated through a bivariate 
ARCH model which used weekly cash and future prices (May 1989 to April 1994) 
compiled by the Agricultural Extension Service at Iowa State University.  Joint 
distributions were formulated for harvest cash price, futures price, individual farm yield, 
and county yield and forecasted for the 1994 -1995 crop year. 
Individual farm yield crop insurance yielded higher efficiencies in managing yield 
risk compared to area yield designs, attributed mainly to inherent problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard.  Such problems lead to increased premium loading, whereas 
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area yield designs historically experience fewer problems with moral hazard and adverse 
selection, thus resulted in lower premium loading and a more actuarially sound premium.  
When confronted with high levels of yield basis risk, individual yield designs are 
preferred as producers were able to manage yield risk with greater efficiency relative to 
area yield designs.  Yield basis risk is defined as, “the less-than-perfect correlation 
between the individual farm yield and the area yield index (Wang et al. pp 808).”  
Premiums were found to have influenced the efficiency and effectiveness of an insurance 
design.  Results suggested a negative correlation with individual designs; as premiums 
decrease, performance of individual designs increased vis-à-vis area yield.  Given the 
previous conditions, area yield designs outperformed individual designs when premium 
loading exceeded 35% and trigger yields were eliminated.  Under an actuarially fair 
premium assuming no trigger yield constraints, individual yield contracts were the 
preferred choice attributed exclusively to yield basis risk inherent in area yield designs. 
2.4 Cross Comparison Insurance Designs 
Schumann et al. (2001) explored alternative safety net programs, prescribed by 
FCIC, and analyzed economic impacts on Southern producers.  Catastrophic (CAT) 
coverage, MPCI, Whole Farm Revenue Program (WFRP), and Farm and Ranch Risk 
Management (FARRM) accounts were incorporated in a simulation model developed by 
Richardson and Nixon (2000), Farm Level Income and Policy Simulation Model 
(FLIPSIM).  Under the Tax Relief Act of 1998, FARRM allowed the deferment of taxes 
up to 20 percent of net income for up to five years.  If selected, a portion of income was 
deposited in an interest bearing account for a maximum period of five years.  Over the 
course of time producers could make withdrawals to level income distribution in 
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unfavorable years.  FLIPSIM permitted simulation of a diverse crop selection across 
insurance schemes including performance variables which assisted in capturing the 
economic impacts of respective designs. 
Safety net designs were evaluated for fourteen grain, cotton, and rice farms, 
procured from the Agricultural and Food Policy Center (AFPC) from 2000 to 2005.  
Texas Northern Plains, Central Missouri, and South Carolina were selected as 
representative grain farms; cotton producers were comprised of Texas Southern Plains 
and Tennessee farms; and Texas and Arkansas were representative rice farms.  Prior to 
conducting the analysis Schumann et al. (2001) created a series of assumptions; 
producers in 1996 are assumed to have 20% debt; prices, yields, and policy values used 
in the simulation were assembled from 1996 to 1999; and farmers used no risk 
management strategy over those years.  Ten years of historical yields for representative 
areas were simulated in multivariate empirical distributions to establish a benchmark or 
baseline. 
Evidence suggested that six of the seven safety net designs increased net cash 
farm income (NCFI) and sustained or improved standard deviations relative to the 
benchmark.  Keep in mind this study analyzed safety net programs with premiums 
excluded, thus the following analysis will present income increases as a result of 
insurance participation.  Furthermore, the nature of insurance is to serve as a risk 
management tool not an income generating instrument.  South Carolina grain farms NCFI 
benchmark was $311,550, under MPCI 75% coverage, NCFI increased to $350,860.  
WFRP with 90% coverage followed closely, generating $350,270.  Tennessee grain 
farms enjoyed the most considerable increase under WFRP at 90% level which increased 
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NCFI from a $41,050 base to $160,300.  Across selected farms, WFRP 90% coverage 
yielded the greatest average increase in NCFI, followed closely by MPCI with 75% 
coverage. 
Another financial measure, equity position of representative farms, was percent 
change in Real Net Worth (RNW).  Results coincided with those of NCFI in that each 
safety net increased RNW vis-à-vis the baseline.  WFRP with 90% coverage generated 
the greatest benefit, slightly more than MPCI with 75% coverage. 
The final evaluation analyzed certainty equivalents (CE) which measured the 
value at which a risk averse producer required compensation to accept the average NCFI 
baseline, and forgo participation in alternative safety net designs.  Consistent with 
previous conclusions, WFRP 90% coverage and MPCI 75% coverage generated the 
highest values, indicating these safety nets were perceived as possessing the greatest 
benefit to producers.  Alternative policies of WFRP 80% coverage, MPCI 65% coverage, 
and MPCI 50% coverage varied depending on farm composition.  Whether a producer 
selected MPCI or WFRP greatly depends on farm structure, number of farm enterprises, 
safety net coverage levels, size of farm, and income level (Schumann et al., 2001).  
FARMM accounts were not mentioned in the results simply due to their negative impact 
on net income stream.  We would expect FARMM accounts to perform poorly; ultimately 
as farmers’ increase deposits NCFI will decline.  Similar results were discovered by 
Llewelyn et al. (2003) which explored the impact of FARMM accounts on net income 
and variability in a more detailed framework. 
Using 9 years of continuous farm level data, Llewelyn et al. conducted an analysis 
using SAS and Microsoft Excel to analyze the impacts of FARRM accounts.  As 
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expected when a farmer removes a percentage of income and makes a deposit into a 
FARRM account, net income declines.  However, deposited income increased the farms 
cash asset value.  As a whole, FARRM accounts decreased net income variability 
analyzed through standard deviations.  Removing crop insurance effects suggested crop 
insurance participation increased net income and reduced overall variability with and 
without FARRM account use.  Coefficient of variation statistics were derived under each 
scenario, the lowest values were associated with those producers engaged in FARRM 
accounts and crop insurance.   
In 2003, Schnitkey, Sherrick, and Irwin used net costs, values-at-risk (VaRs), and 
certainty equivalent returns (CERs) to evaluate alternative crop insurance mechanisms 
and their impact on producer gross revenue with consideration for various levels of 
coverage and yield variability.  Products evaluated include APH, RA with base price 
option (RABp), RA with harvest price option (RAHp), GRP, and GRIP.   
Gross revenue distributions, totaling 26, were generated for each of the available 
coverage levels, 65% to 85% in 5% increments for APH, RABp, and RAHp and 70% to 
90% in 5% increments for GRP and GRIP for a representative Illinois corn farm for the 
2000 production year.  Based on previous research and preliminary simulations, Weibull 
distributions were selected for analysis.  Price distributions were formulated assuming a 
lognormal distribution.  County level corn yields were compiled from NASS from 1972 
to 2002.  In an attempt to accurately capture true variability of farm yields, 4,417 farms 
were analyzed from the Farm Business Farm Management data set and used to rescale the 
distributions.  Lastly, distributions were compiled allowing for correlations between 
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variables.  Specifically correlation distributions were generated for farm to county yield 
and harvest price to yield. 
As expected, net costs were higher under farm-level products compared to that of 
county-level products and are sequenced from least to most expensive, GRIP, GRP, 
RABp, RAHp, APH.  Evaluation of CERs reveals that on average Illinois farmers 
classified with relatively low risk aversion will select county-level designs, whereas farm 
level designs were preferred when pooled by relatively high risk aversion.  Under VaR 
measures, results suggested that VaR.05, (which equals 5% VaR with insurance product 
minus 5% VaR with no insurance) demonstrated the greatest change from the base of 
$238.  For example, RAHp yielded a $24.47/acre increase from the VaR.05 base of $238, 
which conveyed substantial risk reduction.  Furthermore, positive VaR values indicated 
the insurance design increased revenue at a determined level.  So, VaR.05 referred to 
revenue on the cumulative distribution with a 5% probability, constituting an event with a 
relatively low likelihood of occurrence.
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Figure 2.1  Acres insured under yield and revenue insurance designs from 1996 to 2006 
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Table 2.1  Summary of findings from literature review 
Author Results
Patrick and Rao (1989)
MPCI may play a limited role in risk management of diversified farms in areas of relatively low yield variability.  Effectiveness of MPCI depends 
heavily on the financial position of the firm and the extent of yield variablilty.  MPCI possesses greater potential as a risk management tool for 
medium debt farms vis a vis those categorized as high and low.
Miranda (1991)
On average area yield designs offer greater risk protection compared to individual designs.  Optimal area yield coverage provided greater percent 
yield variablility reduction at 39.1%.  Producers associated with the highest yield variances recieved greater yield risk reduction under individual 
designs.
Carriker et al. (1991)
Individual farm yield insurance proved most effective in yield variability reduction for both corn and wheat farms.  Gross income variability with 
and without deficiency payments provided the greatest benefit through individual farm yield insurance designs compared to no coverage for both 
corn and wheat farms.  Stochastic dominance analysis confirmed the effectiveness of individual farm yield insurance.
Williams et al. (1993)
Disaster assistance designs (which come at no cost to producers) were preferred to crop insurance for wheat and sorghum grain producers across 
various degrees of risk aversion.  Individual crop insurance designs were preferred to area yield, however depending on the risk source, a producer 
may select area yield over individual.  Individual yield insurance was preferred for producers growing grain sorghum and wheat in southcentral and 
northwest Kansas, areas associated with higher yield risk.
Gray, Richardson, and McClaskey (1995)
1990 Farm Program supported revenues at the highest levels, and were most effective when the principal risk source was price variability.  This 
program also generated the largest administrative cost.  RA provided greater stabilization when the primary revenue risk source was yield 
variability
Atwood, Watts, and Baquet (1996)
Analyzed farm price support and crop insurance programs.  Price supports and crop insurance are substitutes in risk reduction.  Due to 
subsidization, insurance has an impact on firm survivability.  Producers select insurance over price supports when loading charges are less than 5%. 
Insurance participation increased as producers ability to service debt increased.
Hennessy, Babcock, and Hayes (1997)
Revenue insurance at 75% provided comparable coverage relative to the 1990 commodity program, however at a fraction of the 1990 commodity 
program cost.  Revenue insurance generated greater returns confirmed through CERs.
Wang et al. (1998)
Examined relative performance of individual and area yield designs.  Individual farm yield designs are better suited at managing farm yield risk 
relative to area yield designs.  In addition producers who face relatively high levels of yield basis risk find greater risk reduction under individual 
designs compared to area yield.  
Miller, Coble, and Barnett (2000)
All three insurance designs (multi-crop revenue, single crop revenue, and yield insurance) effectively eliminated the lower tails of revenue 
distributions; however, of alternative insurance schemes, multi-crop designs generated the smallest probability of low revenues.  Single revenue 
designs resulted in the largest average CE increases, however rather marginal compared to the multi-crop design.  This due to single crop 
generating claims more frequently compared to multi-crop.
Schumann et al. (2001)
Most safety net designs provided risk reduction and income support.  WFRP 90% coverage generated the largest benefit for income and risk 
reduction in 10 of the 14 farms.  Subsequently MPCI at 75% and 65% coverage provided the second and third highest levels.  MPCI benefits 
producers income and lowers risk moreso when in the presence of increased subsidization.  WFRP has potential to generate considerable benefits to 
producers especially with low premiums.
Schnitkey, Sherrick, and Irwin (2003)
Farm level revenue insurance designs effectively eliminated low revenues in low probability events.  However events which occur with inreased 
regularity may prefer county designs instead.  County level products were preferred by producers with less risk aversion and a desire for increased 
returns.
Gray et al. (2004)
Average return per acre was less when CRC included.  However bottom dollar return increased considerably and abosulte variability (standard 
deviation) was reduced.  The 2002 Farm Program reduced a significant portion of farm related risk.  CRC sustains greater benefits when used 
individually.
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CHAPTER 3 - Data and Methodology 
3.1 Overview 
A panel data set was compiled to evaluate the impact of Adjusted Gross Revenue-
Lite (AGR-Lite) on adjusted gross revenue to count (AGRC) and net farm income (NFI) 
variability for 219 Southeast (SE) Kansas farms.  Beginning in 1993, continuous farm 
level data for 219 farms was assembled through the 2005 production year.  This data was 
obtained from the Kansas Farm Management Association (KFMA) data set (Langemeier, 
2003).  The following section (3.2) describes the study area and provides some 
descriptive summary statistics about the data.  Section 3.3 provides an overview of the 
AGR-Lite product.  Furthermore this section discusses the sources of income and 
expenses used to derive AGR-Lite.  Section 3.4 provides the mathematical derivation of 
AGR-Lite corresponding to contract guidelines and procedures.  Subsequently section 3.5 
outlines the methods of analysis used to evaluate AGR-Lite.  To conclude, section 3.6 
discusses the limitations faced and reveals the necessary assumptions to proceed with 
analysis of AGR-Lite. 
3.2 Study Area 
Kansas is divided into 6 Kansas Farm Management Association districts 
(Northeast, Southeast, North central, South central, Northwest, and Southwest) (Figure 
3.1).  Southeast Kansas was selected as the region to use for analysis as it has the greatest 
diversification within farms.  Southeast Kansas is comprised of 20 counties.  
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Figure 3.1  Map of study area 
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The number of farms within these counties range from 4 to 20 (Appendix C).  In total 219 
farms remained in the data set after farms with incomplete data were dropped.  Data was 
screened to eliminate farms with negative values for Allowable Farm Income (AFI), 
Allowable Expenses (AE), Prepaid Expenses (PE), and Accounts Receivable (AR).  
Additionally, farms exceeding maximum liability per coverage level and payment rate 
were eliminated.  Farms with negative category income were also eliminated.  Farms 
were categorized into five groups; all farms, crop farms, livestock farms, beef farms, and 
dairy farms.  Farm category placement was determined by computing the proportion of 
income from each category (crop, livestock, beef, and dairy) relative to total income for 
each year from 1993 to 2005.  If the average over the 13-year period was 50% or greater 
for either crop, livestock, beef, or dairy they were placed in the respective category.  This 
criterion identified 126 crop farms and 93 livestock farms which include beef, dairy, 
swine, poultry, sheep, or any other animal.  There were 64 beef farms and 13 dairy farms 
totaling 77.  It is evident that the sum of beef and dairy farms is less than 93.  This 
discrepancy results from 16 farms failing to achieve the 50% income threshold from beef 
or dairy alone.  However, the combined income from all potential livestock income 
resulted in greater than 50% of their aggregate income.  Therefore they were placed in the 
livestock category. 
 Figure 3.2 illustrates the trend in income for the 219 farms from 1993 through 
2005.  The chart illustrates the average income generated from crop, livestock, beef, and 
dairy sources for all farms from 1993 through 2005.  Figure 3.3 illustrates the trend in 
AFI, NFI, Value of Farm Production (VFP) from 1993 to 2005.  AGRC is illustrated 
beginning in 1999.  During the period of analysis, 1999 to 2005 AFI, NFI, VFP, and 
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AGRC trended upward with the exception of 2002 (Figure 3.3).  Over the 13-year period 
the average acres, irrigated and dry combined, ranged from 792 to 946, with a consistent 
acre increase from year to year.  Average irrigated acres over the 1993 to 2005 horizon 
were minimal ranging from 6 to 13.  Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics (farm 
numbers, total acres, AFI, NFI, AE, AGRC, VFP, Crop Income (CI), Livestock Income 
(LI), Beef Income (BI), Dairy Income (DI), and Total Income (TI)) by category over the 
1993 to 2005 period.
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Figure 3.2  Summary of income by category for 219 SE Kansas farms from 1993 through 2005 
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Figure 3.3  Summary of AFI, NFI, VFP, and AGRC for 219 SE Kansas Farms from 1993 through 2005 
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics by farm category 
Total Crop Livestock Beef Dairy
Number of Farms 219 126 93 64 13
Total Acres1 866 1089 564 554 696
AFI2 $192,515 $183,613 $204,576 $173,221 $325,290
NFI3 $49,157 $50,044 $47,955 $40,602 $79,009
AE4 $171,322 $138,275 $216,097 $225,846 $242,741
AGRC5 $203,236 $192,445 $217,856 $185,560 $337,798
VFP6 $216,916 $222,867 $208,854 $181,297 $320,810
CI7 $120,771 $169,312 $55,007 $54,059 $66,658
LI8 $113,542 $32,571 $223,243 $226,508 $256,638
BI9 $82,563 $27,912 $156,607 $220,679 $8,489
DI10 $15,816 $890 $36,039 $2,016 $247,886
TI11 $234,313 $201,883 $278,250 $280,567 $323,296
5Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) reflects the average AGRC for each farm category over the 1993 to 2005 period
10Dairy Income (DI) reflects the average DI for each farm category over the 1993 to 2005 period
11Total Income (TI) reflects the average TI for each farm category over the 1993 to 2005 period
2Allowable Farm Income (AFI) reflects average AFI by farm category over the 1993 to 2005 period calculated using Equation 1 in the 
mathematical explanation.
3Net Farm Income (NFI) reflects the average NFI for each farm category over the 1993 to 2005 period calculated using Equation 22 in 
the mathematical explanation
4Allowable Expenses (AE) reflects the average AE for each farm category over the 1993 to 2005 period calculated using Equation 7 in 
the mathematical explanation
1Total acres indicates the average acres (dry and irrigated) for each farm category over the 1993 to 2005 period
6Value of Farm Production (VFP) reflects the average VFP for each farm category over the 1993 to 2005 period
7Crop Income (CI) reflects the average CI for each farm category over the 1993 to 2005 period
8Livestock Income (LI) reflects the average LI for each farm category over the 1993 to 2005 period
9Beef Income (BI) reflects the average BI for each farm category over the 1993 to 2005 period
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3.3 AGR-Lite Components 
3.3.1 AGR-Lite Overview 
AGR-Lite became the first insurance product guaranteeing adjusted gross revenue 
for the whole-farm.  Unlike existing insurance policies which establish individual 
commodities as the insurance unit, AGR-Lite identifies the whole-farm as the insurance 
unit.  Consistent with existing FCIC insurance products, AGR-Lite continues protection 
against losses sustained from market fluctuations, fire, wind, hail, and other unavoidable 
perils.  In providing a whole-farm guarantee, AGR-Lite expands the scope of crop 
insurance to include small diversified and/or specialized farms.  AGR-Lite became the 
first Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) program to provide coverage for crops, 
animals, and other uninsurable commodities under one insurance product by establishing 
revenue as a common denominator.  AGR-Lite has been labeled “non traditional” in the 
sense that producers historical schedule F tax records are used in the process of 
determining the revenue guarantee.  The amount of protection allotted is computed by 
multiplying the approved AGR by the selected coverage level and payment rate.  Farm 
managers can select from a range of coverage levels and payment rates, which are 
consistent with existing insurance contracts.  The approved AGR will be based on the 
lesser of the five-year average or indexed AGR (whichever is applicable) or the expected 
income for the current insurance year.  AGR-Lite was drafted to incorporate procedures, 
indexing and factoring, to account for expansion or contraction in farm size.  Indexing 
occurs for income and expenses and indicates farm expansion.  Factoring only occurs to 
expenses and may indicate expansion (to a lesser extent than indexing) or contraction.  
Additional features of AGR-Lite included government subsidization of premiums, 
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consistent with existing FCIC insurance products.  The extent of subsidization will vary 
with coverage level selection.  AGR-Lite also extends producers the option to 
enroll/purchase additional insurance products which lower total liability that result in a 
reduction to producer paid premium.  With the ability of farm managers to shift income 
from year to year, accrual adjustments are used during the claim submission process to 
ensure income is assigned to the year in which it was generated.  Following the necessary 
adjustments producers will receive an indemnity when AGRC for the insurance year falls 
below the guaranteed level. 
3.3.2 AGR-Lite Critical Values 
The income measure used for AGR-Lite is linked to IRS 1040 Schedule F or 
equivalent tax forms.  Values for AGR-Lite are drawn directly from those items reported 
on the following 2006 Schedule F form 1040.  A discussion of the variables included in 
the calculation of AFI, defined by the contract, follows in the next section of the paper.  
Subsequently the paper identifies the variables used in computing AE and other critical 
parts of the insurance plan.
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Allowable Farm Income 
AFI, by definition, includes any income generated from the production of 
insurable commodities less any added value due to post production activities, which the 
contract refers to as incidental to the business of farming.  Added value created during the 
stage of production, as a result of post production activities, increases the value of the 
commodity, is not covered under AGR-Lite.  Incidental post production activities 
constitute activities which are normally performed to prepare a commodity for its normal 
condition for market.  Such activities may include but are not limited to sorting, washing, 
packing, grading, that does not alter the physical nature of the commodity which 
producers are required to report to the IRS.  Activities such as canning or freezing alter 
the physical state of the agricultural commodity, which increases the value of the 
commodity, are considered not incidental to the business of farming.  This added value 
created through non-incidental activities will not be covered under the AGR-Lite policy.  
For example, a grape grower who produces wine from grapes would not report income 
obtained through wine sales.  Income received from the sale of wine, resulting from a 
value added process, does not constitute AFI and thereby not covered by AGR-Lite.  
Whereas income generated from the marketing of grapes would be considered AFI.  
Producers will only report income defined by the contract corresponding to the items 
below taken from IRS Schedule F Form 1040.  It is important to note the discussion of 
allowable items below correspond to individuals filing on a cash basis.  Alternatively, if 
filing using the accrual method, appropriate items can be found on page two of Schedule 
F form 1040.  If inclusion of income other than that defined as AFI is found on the AFI 
worksheet, Figure D.1 in Appendix D, prior to the insurance year, the corresponding 
  56
amounts will be deducted for AGR-Lite calculations.  If such income is found following 
the closing date, the individual’s contract will be terminated effective the date of notice.   
Eligible Income Items 
The calculation of AFI includes items 3, 4, 5b, 7a, 7c, and 10 from Schedule F 
form 1040.  Line 3 of Schedule F reports the sales of animals and agricultural 
commodities purchased for resale obtained from subtracting Line 2 (cost basis of animals 
and agricultural commodities purchased for resale) from Line 1 (sales of all animals and 
agricultural commodities purchased for resale).  Income generated from the sale of 
agricultural commodities including animals, produce, and grains, located on Line 4, will 
be included in calculating AFI.  Line 5b of schedule F reports all cooperative 
distributions directly related to the sales of agricultural commodities.  Any income 
reported as such is considered AFI.  Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) loans (Line 
7a of Schedule F) which were received from production placed under loan that the 
insured elected to report are considered AFI and will be included.  Furthermore 
individuals will include the taxable amount of forfeited CCC loans, Line 7c of Schedule 
F in the AFI calculation.  Finally, other income, Line 10 of Schedule F, is considered 
AFI.  Income qualifying as other income may include income generated from bartering, 
bypassed acreage payments received by the insured in accordance with a contract 
specifying payment to the insured for forgoing harvest of the commodity, payments 
received to forgo the production or harvest of an agricultural commodity through 
diversions, and set-asides. 
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Ineligible Income Items 
Ineligible income, which is thereby excluded from AFI calculations, includes 
federal or state fuel tax credits and refunds, cooperative dividends, custom hire (machine 
work), agricultural program payments (Loan Deficiency Program (LDP) payments, 
Direct Payments, Counter-Cyclical Program payments, Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP) payments, Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) payments, Farm 
Service Agency (FSA) loans, Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP) 
payments, ad hoc disaster assistance, Marketing Loss Assistance (MLA) payments).  
Figure D.4 in Appendix D reveals which payments to include in AFI calculations.  
However, it is important to note this is not an exhaustive list.  Other sources considered 
ineligible income include crop insurance payments, net gain from commodity hedges, 
animals for sport and show, timber, forest, and forest products. 
Allowable Expenses 
In addition to maintaining thorough income records, farm managers must also 
maintain accurate expense documentation.  Although AGR-Lite guarantees gross income, 
expenses are referenced in downsizing farm scenarios and monitored to prevent moral 
hazard.  Moral hazard occurs when the presence of insurance alters the expected loss of a 
given event.  These records will be referenced as part of claim submission procedures to 
analyze the insured’s expense activity within a production year.  If expense activity 
appears inconsistent or abnormal there will be resulting implications to the guarantee 
level.  A discussion of those items considered AE follows.  Again, refer to the 2006 
Schedule F form 1040 above to locate the AE items.  Additionally Figure D.2 in 
Appendix D presents a form to assist in documenting the necessary items to include in 
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AE calculations.  AE by definition includes expenses directly associated with the 
production and gross income from insurable commodities.  Conversely, indirect expenses 
include expenses which do not directly influence production or gross income.  Those 
expenses considered indirect to the farming operation, do not constitute AE and as such 
are excluded from the total.  Examples of these items, considered indirect, include 
employee benefits, interest expense, pension and profit-sharing, rent or leasing, and taxes.  
Furthermore, post production expenses are not considered AE and must be excluded.  
Costs associated with post production activities may include costs incurred as a result of 
processing, packaging, packing or any other post production activity.  The following 
items from IRS Form 1040 Schedule F will be used in deriving AE: 
Line 2  -  Cost basis or other basis of animals and other agricultural commodities 
that were bought for resale and sold during the tax year 
Line 12 –  Car and truck expenses 
Line 13 –  Chemical expenses 
Line 14 –  Conservation expenses 
Line 15 –  Custom hire (Machine Work) 
Line 16 –  Depreciation and section 179 expense deduction (include only the 
amount of depreciation allowed for animals) 
Line 18 –  Feed purchased 
Line 19 –  Fertilizer and lime expenses 
Line 20 –  Freight and trucking expense 
Line 21 –  Gasoline, fuel, and oil expense 
Line 22 –  Insurance (other than health) 
Line 24 –  Labor hired (less employment credits) (exclude share holder wages) 
Line 27 –  Repairs and maintenance 
Line 28 –  Seeds and plants purchased 
Line 29 –  Storage and warehousing 
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Line 30 –  Supplies purchased (Exclude those used in post-production value added 
operations such as processing, packing, packaging, ect.) 
Line 32 –  Utilities 
Line 33 –  Veterinary, breeding, and medicine 
Line 34 –  Other farm expenses (include only those expenses directly related to the 
production of agricultural commodities that the IRS allows the insured 
to report.) 
3.4 AGR-Lite Mathematical Derivation 
The following equations outline the mathematical derivation of the AGR-Lite 
contract.  These equations have been constructed to conform to AGR-Lite handbook 
guidelines and procedures (USDA, 2007).  Subsequently, these equations were used to 
estimate AGRC and NFI distributions with and without participation in the AGR-Lite 
program as a stand alone product.  Figure 3.4 provides a flow chart to assist in visually 
understanding the AGR-Lite process.  Decision areas are marked with question marks 
and “yes” or “no” responses.  The flow chart closely parallels the following equations in 
a more simplified format.   
 
(1) AFIkj = ∑ Schedule F (3, 4, 5b, 7a, 7b, 10) 
AFIkj Allowable Farm Income for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
*Refer to the 2006 Schedule F form above for item description 
*Farm income from the production of insurable agricultural commodities minus 
added value for any agricultural commodity due to post-production operations 
such as processing, packing, packaging, etc. that the IRS requires producers to 
report. 
 
k Years; for k = -6,-5,-4,-3,-2 
*Individuals must produce 5 consecutive years of IRS 1040 Schedule F filings 
or equivalent tax forms beginning prior to the year immediately preceding the 
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insurance year.  (For 2007 insurance year, submit Schedule F filings for 2005, 
2004, 2003, 2002, and 2001) 
 
(2) AGRAkj = ∑−
−=
2
6
5/)(
k
kjAFI  
AGRAkj Adjusted Gross Revenue 5-Year Average for insurance year k = 0 for 
farm j 
 
(3) IITFkj = }000.1,)4/})800.0},200.1),/{({{(( 4
3
6
1 kj
k
jk AFIAFIMINMAXMAX ∑−
−=
+  
IITFkj Income Indexing Trend Factor for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
  *The annual indexing is capped (1.200) and cupped (0.800).  Refer to the 
example below for indexing AGR.  The resulting income indexing trend factor 
is cupped (1.000).  Values below 1.000 will not result in indexing and as such 
the guarantee will be based on the lesser of AGRA and EI. 
 
(4) IAGRkj = ),,)},,{(( 32 kjkjkjkjkjjkjk AGRAAGRAIITFAGRAEIAFIAFIMAXANDIF ×>−−  
IAGRkj Indexed Adjusted Gross Revenue for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
*If one of the two most recent tax year’s allowable income in the 5-year base 
period and the expected income for the current insurance year (Item 8, Intended 
Agricultural Commodity Report) in the Annual Farm Report exceeds the 5-year 
average the individual qualifies for indexing.   
 
EIkj Expected Income for year insurance k = 0 for farm j at time of 
application.  
*Expected Income reflects the expected income from commodities to be 
produced (Item 8 of the Intended Agricultural Commodity Report) in the Annual 
Farm Report, filed prior to each insurance year as part of the application 
process. 
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Year Income
2000 $130,000
2001 $165,000 1.269 $165,000/$130,000 = 1.269 (capped 1.200)
2002 $150,000 0.909 $150,000/$165,000 = 0.909
2003 $163,500 1.090 $163,500/$150,000 = 1.090
2004 $168,000 1.028 $168,000/$163,500 = 1.028
5-year average $155,300 1.057 (1.200+0.909+1.090+1.028)/4
Income Trend Factor 1.248 (1.057*1.057*1.057*1.057) = 1.248
Indexed Income ($155,300*1.248) = $193,852$193,852
Income Indexing Calculations
 
 
 
(5) AAGRkj = MIN(IAGRkj, EIkj) 
AAGRkj Approved Adjusted Gross Revenue for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
  
(6) AGRLkj = (AAGRkj x CLkj x PRkj) < MLkj 
AGRLkj Adjusted Gross Revenue Liability for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
CLkj Coverage Level (65%, 75%, 80% of adjusted gross revenue) selected 
by farmer for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
PRkj Payment Rate (75% and 90% for each coverage level) selected for 
insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
65/75, 65/90, 75/75, 75/90  Everyone Qualifies (One crop requirement) 
80/75, 80/90 Three crop requirement1 
 1To qualify for 80% coverage levels the individual must indicate on the Intended 
Agricultural Commodity report that at least three commodities will be produced 
whose income will result in a value greater than or equal to that determined by the 
diversification formula.  
 
MLkj Maximum Liability for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
 
Coverage Level Payment Rate Maximum Gross Revenue*
65% 75% $2,051,282
65% 90% $1,709,401
75% 75% $1,777,777
75% 90% $1,481,481
80% 75% $1,666,666
80% 90% $1,388,888
*Represents the maximum approved revenue for each coverage level and payment rate an individual may 
generate to be eligible for AGR-Lite due to the $1,000,000 maximum liability guarantee offered by the 
contract.  
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(7) AEkj = ∑Schedule F (12, 13,14,15,16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 
33, 34) 
AEkj Allowable Expenses (Schedule F)* for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
*Only expenses directly associated with the production of insurable agricultural 
commodities are allowable, indirect expenses must be excluded. 
*If individual qualified for indexing and the income trend factor was greater 
than one then expenses must be indexed accordingly as prescribed by the 
contract. 
*Refer to the attached Schedule F above for item description 
 
(8) AEAkj = 5/)(
2
6
∑−
−=k
kjAE  
AEAkj Allowable Expenses 5-Year Average for insurance year k = 0 for farm 
j  
 
(9) EITFkj = }000.1,)4/})800.0}200.1),/{({{((
3
6
4
1∑−
−=
+
k
kjjk AEAEMINMAXMAX  
EITFkj Expense Indexing Trend Factor for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
*The annual indexing is capped (1.200) and cupped (0.800). The resulting 
expense indexing trend factor is cupped (1.000).  Values below 1.000 will not 
result in indexing and as such the guarantee will be based on AEA.  Refer to the 
example below for indexing AEA. 
 
(10) IAEkj = ),,)},,{(( 32 kjkjkjkjkjkk AEAAEAEITFAGRAEIAFIAFIMAXANDIF ×>−−  
IAEkj Indexed Allowable Expenses for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
*If an individual performed income indexing, similar procedures must be 
implemented to 5-year average expenses (AEA).  IAE will be used conditional 
on the following provisions 1) income indexing was conducted and 2) 
conditions triggering “Factor Up” did not exist.  Refer to the example below for 
indexing and equation 11 which illustrates factoring up and down. 
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Year Expense
2000 $63,500
2001 $69,550 1.095 $69,550/$63,500 = 1.095
2002 $55,000 0.791 $55,000/$69,550 = 0.791(cupped 0.800)
2003 $72,000 1.309 $72,000/$55,000 = 1.309 (capped 1.200)
2004 $77,000 1.069 $72,000/$77,000 = 1.069
5-year average $67,410 1.041 (1.095+0.800+1.200+1.069)/4
Expense Trend Factor 1.174 (1.041*1.041*1.041*1.041) = 1.174
Indexed Expenses ($67,410*1.174) = $79,164$79,164
Expense Indexing Calculations
 
 
(11) FAEkj = )),/(),( kjkjkjkjkjkjkj IAEAGRAAAGRAEAAGRAAAGRIAGRIF ×>>  
Year Income Index Expenses
1 $140,000 $92,000
2 $165,000 1.179 ($165,000/$140,000) = 1.179 $100,000
3 $150,000 0.909 ($150,000/$165,000) = 0.909 $94,000
4 $163,500 1.090 ($163,500/$150,000) = 1.090 $99,900
5 $168,000 1.028 ($168,000/$163,500) = 1.028 $102,000
Index Trend Factor 1.222 ((1.179 + 0.909 + 1.090 +1.028)/4)^4
5-Year Average $157,300 $97,580
Intended Income $180,000
Indexed AGR $192,145
Approved AGR $180,000
Factor Ratio 1.144
Approved Expenses $111,662
*If the individual qualified for income indexing and the Indexed AGR (IAGR) > Approved AGR (AAGR) > 5-Year Average 
AGR (AGRA) the individual must "Factor Up" multiplying 5-Year average expenses(AEA) by the ratio (approved AGR 
(AAGR) / 5-Year average AGR (AGRA)) arriving at approved allowable expenses (AAE).
($180,000/$157,300) = 1.144
($97,580 x 1.144) = $111,662
Factor Up Example
 
FAEkj = )),/(,( kjkjkjkjkjkj AEAAGRAAAGRAEAAGRAAAGRIF ×<  
Year Income Expenses
1 $102,000 $99,000
2 $101,000 $94,000
3 $100,000 $95,000
4 $99,000 $85,000
5 $98,000 $82,500
5-Year Average $100,000 $91,100
Intended Income $85,000
Approved AGR $85,000
Factor Ratio 0.850 ($85,000/$100,000) = 0.850
Approved Expenses $77,435 $91,100*0.850 = $77,435
Factor Down Example
*If the approved AGR (AAGR) < 5-year average AGR (AGRA) the individual must "Factor Down" 
multiplying the 5-year average expenses (AEA) by the ratio (AAGR/AGRA) arriving at approved 
allowable expenses (AAE)  
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FAEkj Factored Allowable Expenses for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
  *AEA will be factored up or down conditional on the following provisions.  
When Indexed AGR (IAGR) > Approved AGR (AAGR) > 5-year average AGR 
(AGRA), AEA is “Factored Up” taking the product of AEA and the ratio of 
Approved AGR (AAGR) to 5-year Average AGR (AGRA).  When Approved 
AGR (AAGR) < 5-year Average AGR (AGRA), AEA is “Factored Down” by 
taking the product of AEA and the ratio of Approved AGR (AAGR) to 5-year 
Average AGR (AGRA) 
 
(12) AAEkj = FAEkj 
AAEkj Approved Allowable Expenses for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
 
Indemnity Calculation 
 
(13) PEPkj = (AEkj + ΔAPkj + ΔPEkj)/ AAEkj 
PEPkj Production Expense Percentage for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
ΔAPkj Change in Accounts Payable for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
*Accrual adjustments will occur in AE by the change (increase or decrease) in 
AP (ending – beginning accounts payable).  To ensure accurate allocation of 
expenses AP are added back.  When AP increases (goods and services received 
but not yet paid for) AE will increase by the net change.  Thus the associated 
costs are included in current insurance year. 
 
ΔPEkj Change in Prepaid Expenses for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
*Accrual adjustments will occur in AE by the change (increase or decrease) in 
PE (beginning – ending prepaid expenses).  To ensure the allocation of expenses 
to the applicable period PE are added back.  When PE increases (goods and 
services paid for but not yet received) AE will decrease because goods and 
services are deferred until the following period. 
 
(14) ERPkj = MAX (70% - PEPkj, 0) 
ERPkj Expense Reduction Percentage for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
*If Allowable Expenses (AE) for the insurance year are less than 70% of the 
Approved Allowable Expenses (AAE), the approved AGR (AAGR) will be 
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reduced 0.1% for each 0.1% the allowable expenses (AE) for the insurance year 
falls below 70% of the Approved Allowable Expenses (AAE). 
 
(15) ERkj = ERPkj x AAGRkj 
ERkj Expense Reduction for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
*If Allowable Expenses (AE) fall below 70% of Approved Allowable Expenses 
(AAE) (determined in equation 14), Approved AGR (AAGR) will be reduced 
(by ER), proportional to the reduction observed in AAE established for the 
current insurance year. 
 
(16) ADJAAGRkj = AAGRkj – ERkj 
ADJAAGRj Adjusted Approved AGR for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
*Approved AGR will be reduced by the value determined in equation 15, to 
reflect the proportional change in AAE.  This result will then be used in 
establishing the guarantee level. 
 
(17) AGRLIPkj = ADJAAGRkj x CLkj 
AGRLIPkj AGR Loss Inception Point for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
 
(18) AGRCkj = kjkjkjkjkjkjkjkj MOSPIKGCIIPNGCHNAPINARAFI +++++Δ+Δ+  
AGRCkj Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
AFIkj Allowable Farm Income for insurance year k = 0 for farm j at time of 
filing 
ΔARkj Change in Accounts Receivable for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
 *The adjustment is plus or minus the difference between the dollar amount of 
the beginning and ending accounts receivable. 
 
 ΔINkj Change in crop and livestock Inventory for insurance year k = 0 for 
farm j 
*The adjustment is plus or minus the change in value of the beginning and 
ending inventories for crops and livestock. 
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NAPkj Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program Payments for insurance 
year k = 0 for farm j 
NGCHkj Net Gain from Commodity Hedges for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
GCIIPkj Gross Crop Insurance Indemnity Payments for insurance year k = 0 for 
farm j 
  *Include payments from APH, CRC, RA, GRP, GRIP, LRP, LGM, Private Hail, 
Mortality or any other product offered under the authority of the ACT including 
applicable premiums. 
 
SPIKkj Sugarbeet – Payment in Kind for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
MOkj Marketing Orders – cranberry, tart cherries for insurance year k = 0 for 
farm j 
 
(19) RDkj = MAX(AGRLIPkj – AGRCkj, 0) 
RDkj Revenue Deficiency for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
 
(20) IDkj = RDkj x PRkj 
IDkj Indemnity Payment for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
 
(21) The following equations illustrate the methods used to calculate premiums and 
rates used to analyze AGR-Lite as a stand-alone product.  It is important to note 
these premium equations do not conform to those defined in the contract.  Refer 
to Appendix B to view the original premium equation.   
a. AFPFyj = 7/
2005
1999
∑
=y
yjID  
AFPFyj  Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm where y equals the years in 
which the farm enrolled in AGR-Lite for farm j 
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b. AFARyj = ∑∑∑∑
= == =
2005
1999 1
2005
1999 1
 / 
y
N
j
yj
y
N
j
yj AGRLID  
AFARyj Actuarially Fair Average Rate where y equals the years in which 
the farm enrolled in AGR-Lite and j equals 1 to N farms in the 
category 
 
c. AFARIyj = ∑ ∑∑∑
= = ==
2005
1999
2005
1999 11
 / 
y y
NI
j
yj
NI
j
yj AGRLID  
AFARIyj Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnity where y 
equals the years in which the farm enrolled (1999-2005) in AGR-
Lite, j equals the 1 to NI farms in the category. 
Note:  AFARI solely sums indemnities and liabilities from farms with 
claims.  Therefore NI is the number of farms with at least one indemnity 
 
(22) NFIyj = (VFPyj – COEyj – DPyj – AIEyj) - (CIPyj + CIPEyj – CIPByj) + CIEyj  
VFPyj Value of Farm Production for years y = 1999 to 2005 for farm j 
COEyj Cash Operating Expenses for years y = 1999 to 2005 for farm j 
DPyj Depreciation for years y = 1999 to 2005 for farm j 
AIEyj Accrued Income-Expense adjustment for years y = 1999 to 2005 
for farm j 
CIPyj Crop Insurance Proceeds for years y = 1999 to 2005 for farm j 
CIPEyj Crop Insurance Proceeds Ending value for years y = 1999 to 2005 
for farm j 
CIPByj Crop Insurance Proceeds Beginning Value for years y = 1999 to 
2005 for farm j 
CIEyj Crop Insurance Expense (accrual) for years y = 1999 to 2005 for 
farm j 
 
(23) NFIAGRyj = NFIyj + IDyj – (AFPFyj or AFARyj or AFARIyj)  
NFIAGRyj Net Farm Income from AGR-Lite for insurance year y = 1999 to 
2005 for farm j 
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(24) AGRCAGRyj = AGRCyj + IDyj - (AFPFyj or AFARyj or AFARIyj) 
AGRCAGRyj Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count from AGR-Lite for insurance 
year y = 1999 to 2005 for farm j 
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Figure 3.4  Flow chart of the AGR-Lite program 
AFI Allowable Farm Income AFI
AGRA 5-year Adjusted Gross Revenue
EI Expected Income
IAGR Indexed Adjusted Gross Revenue AGRA
AAGR Approved Adjusted Gross Revenue
AGRL Adjusted Gross Revenue Liability
AE Allowable Expenses Indexing?
AEA Allowable Expense 5-year Average YES NO
IAE Indexed Allowable Expenses
AAE Approved Allowable Expenses
ER Expense Reduction IAGR EI AGRA
ADJAAGR Adjusted Approved Adjusted Gross Revenue
AGRLIP Adjusted Gross Revenue Loss Inception Point
AGRC Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count
ID Indemnity Payment AAGR AAGR
AGRL AGRL
AE AE
AEA AEA
Check Conditions ? Check Conditions ?
IAE Factor Up AE AEA Factor Down AE
AAE AAE AAE AAE
AE for Current Year AE for Current Year AE for Current Year AE for Current Year
ER? ER? ER? ER?
(<70%) (<70%) (<70%) (<70%)
NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
AAGR ADJAAGR AAGR ADJAAGR AAGR ADJAAGR AAGR ADJAAGR
AGRLIP AGRLIP AGRLIP AGRLIP AGRLIP AGRLIP AGRLIP AGRLIP
AGRC AGRC AGRC AGRC AGRC AGRC AGRC AGRC
ID ID ID ID ID ID ID ID
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3.5 Procedures and Methods of Analysis 
3.5.1 Equation Explanations 
Prior to enrollment in AGR-Lite individuals must prove that they are “qualifying 
person.”  The AGR-Lite policy considers one “qualifying person” as long as the 
individual effectively demonstrates the following.   
First the individual must be engaged in the business of farming and derive income 
from agricultural commodities within approved AGR-Lite counties, (2) must be a 
U.S. citizen, (3) must file schedule F or equivalent tax forms, (4) file a federal 
income tax form for each year of AGR income and expense history for the same 
tax entity unless the entity changes, stop farming, or a successor farming 
operation changes entity (RMA, 2007).  
Assuming each individual complied with the provisions above, data were 
extracted from the KFMA data bank to generate critical values Allowable Farm Income 
(AFI), Allowable Expenses (AE), Change in Prepaid Expenses (ΔPE), Change in 
Accounts Receivable (ΔAR), Change in Inventories (ΔIN), and Net Farm Income (NFI).  
The procedures used are located in Appendix A.  These values were computed for each 
farm for every year from 1993 to 2005.  A spreadsheet was used to perform the essential 
calculations to generate distributions for indemnity payments, AFI, AGRC, and NFI with 
and without participation in the AGR-Lite program for production years 1999 through 
2005.  Two data sets were required to evaluate AGR-Lite.  The first data set, including 
years 1993 to 2005, was required to create farm categories and compile the necessary 
information to generate 5-year Adjusted Gross Revenue Average (AGRA) and AE from 
Equations 2 and 8.  A second data set, including years 1999 to 2005, was assembled to 
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include accrual adjustments (AR, IN, and PE) for product analysis and NFI to evaluate 
the impact of participation in AGR-Lite.  The following sections provide a detailed 
description of formulas used to assist in understanding the AGR-Lite program. 
Allowable Income 
Once the critical values were placed in a spreadsheet a series of equations 
followed to compute whether an individual received a claim.  Using AFI from each year 
beginning in 1993, AGRA from Equation 2 was derived for each year of insurance 
(1999-2005) using the base period.  Base periods were established using five consecutive 
years of AFI from Equation 1 beginning the year prior to the year preceeding the 
insurance year.  To illustrate, an individual insuring the 2007 production year derives 
AGRA from the base period beginning in 2005 proceeding back in time to 2001.  Using 
the base period, AGRA was equated by totaling AFI from each year and dividing by five 
(Equation 2). 
Indexing 
For operations exhibiting farm expansion, indexing will occur to ensure effective 
coverage of the farm.  Calculations are performed each insurance year to monitor the 
farm’s growth to determine whether adjustments are necessary.  Indexing occurs if the 
farm “qualifies.”  Using the example above, a farm will “qualify” if AFI from either of 
the two most recent years in the base period (2004 or 2005) and the Expected Income 
(EI) reported on the annual farm report, exceed AGRA (Equation 4).  Farm managers 
submit annual farm reports each year to indicate commodities to be produced, anticipated 
production, and the expected resulting income from each commodity (Figure D.3 in 
Appendix D).  If conditions warrant indexing, indicating the above circumstances were 
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satisfied, the following calculations are performed to reveal the extent with which the 
farm may adjust the guarantee.  Referring to the example in Equation 3, indexing occurs 
by taking the AGR from 2002 and dividing by the AGR from 2001 and rounded to three 
decimals.  Similarly, 2003 AGR is divided by 2002 AGR, then 2004 AGR is divided by 
2003 AGR, and finally 2005 AGR divided by 2004 AGR.  Throughout calculations it is 
important to note annual indexing is capped at 1.200 and cupped at 0.800.  Next the 
average of the previous ratios is calculated and raised to the fourth power to determine, 
what is referred to as, the indexing trend factor.  Similar to annual indexing, the indexing 
trend factor is cupped at 1.000.  If the indexing trend factor is greater than one (indicating 
growth), AGRA is multiplied by its corresponding indexing trend factor.  However, if the 
value is less than one indexing does not occur, hence there will be no resulting 
adjustment to AGRA.  Depending upon the scenario, the Approved Adjusted Gross 
Revenue (AAGR), from Equation 5, will be determined one of two ways.  First, assuming 
conditions for income indexing were satisfied, AAGR is based on the lesser of Indexed 
Adjusted Gross Revenue (IAGR) from Equation 4 or EI.  A second procedure, assuming 
income indexing conditions were not satisfied, will establish the guarantee based on the 
lesser of AGRA or EI.  However the guarantee is established, AGR-Lite selects the lesser 
of the two as a preventative measure against “over insuring.”  The AAGR will be used to 
establish contract liability and calculating the farmer premium. 
Coverage Levels and Payment Rates 
 Producers are able to select from three Coverage Levels (CL) (65%, 75%, and 
80%) with an indemnity Payment Rate (PR) of 75% and 90% of AGR.  Table 3.2 
summarizes coverage levels, payment rates, and limitations for the AGR-Lite policy.  For 
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each combination of CL and PR there is a corresponding maximum liability.  AGR-Lite 
liability (AGRL) is calculated by multiplying AAGR by the selected CL and PR 
(Equation. 6).  These maximum liabilities represent the maximum AAGR an individual 
may generate and remain eligible for AGR-Lite due to the $1 million maximum liability 
guarantee authorized by the contract.  Furthermore, eligibility for AGR-Lite is contingent 
on minimum commodity requirements authorized for available CLs.  Reducing the 
minimum commodity requirement to one ensures virtually all individuals “qualify” for 
65% and 75% coverage levels.  Eligibility for the 80% coverage level requires farm 
managers be engaged in the production of three or more commodities.  As such greater 
diversification of farm enterprises lends itself to increased protection or coverage. 
Table 3.2  Summary of protection levels and limits and government subsidy levels 
Coverage Level Payment Rate
Minimum # of 
Commodities1
Maximum Annual 
Income2
Government 
Subsidization
65% 75% 1 $2,051,282 59%
65% 90% 1 $1,709,401 59%
75% 75% 1 $1,777,777 55%
75% 90% 1 $1,481,481 55%
80% 75% 3 $1,666,666 48%
80% 90% 3 $1,388,888 48%
1Minimum # of commodities indicates the minimum number of commodites an individual must produce to be eligible for the 
corresponding coverage level and payment rate.  Additionally insureds must meet minimum income requirements.  To calculate 
minimum income requirements divide one by the number of enterprises and multiply by 0.333.  The resulting decimal will be 
multiplied by Approved Adjusted Gross Revenue (AAGR) to determine the minimum income requirement.  Commodity grouping is 
available for the 80% coverage level.
2Maximum annual income represents the maximum approved farm revenue for each coverage level and payment rate to remain 
eligible for Adjusted Gross Revenue-Lite (AGR-Lite) due to the $1,000,000 maximum liability allowed by the contract.  
Allowable Expenses 
Farm managers must maintain accurate records of expense activity throughout the 
insurance year.  Although AEs have no impact on determining the initial guarantee, as the 
contract guarantees gross income not net, expense records will be referenced during the 
claim filing process.  As discussed earlier, expenses are collected to prevent individuals 
from engaging in moral hazard.  Furthermore, under certain criteria, expense activity may 
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ultimately result in adjustments to the guarantee level.  Similar to AFI, a base period is 
established and used to derive 5-year Allowable Expense Average (AEA) from Equation 
8.  Consistent with AFI, the AE base period includes five years beginning the year prior 
to the year preceeding the insurance year (Equation 8). 
Indexing and/or Factoring 
Procedures used to determine Approved Allowable Expenses (AAE) for the 
current insurance year, in Equation 12, are dependent upon procedures applied to AFI.  
When conditions for income indexing are satisfied, one of two procedures will follow.  
First, an expense indexing trend factor will be calculated (following methods and 
procedures used for AFI), illustrated in Equation 10.  If conditions for income indexing 
were satisfied, AEA, from Equation 8, is multiplied by the resulting expense indexing 
trend factor, computed in Equation 10.  However, continuing with the assumption income 
indexing occurred, and IAGR (Equation 4) is greater than AAGR (Equation 5) which is 
greater than the AGRA (Equation 2), the individual “qualifies” for factoring up.  Refer to 
Equation 11 for the mathematical explanation of factoring up.  The factoring up 
procedure also accounts for farm expansion however, to a lesser degree than that by 
indexing.  Factoring up ensures a proportional adjustment in expenses (for expansion) 
consistent with those for income.  Factoring up recognizes the additional cost, incurred 
by an individual, required to generate an additional dollar of revenue.  Given the above 
scenario holds AEA is multiplied by the ratio of AAGR to AGRA (Equation 11).  Use of 
this calculation determines Factored Allowable Expenses (FAE) for the current insurance 
year.  Approved Allowable Expenses (AAE), from Equation 12, hinge on the conditions 
existing on the income side.  When conditions for income indexing are achieved, and 
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Equation 11 is not satisfied, AAE will be appraised at the resulting value from factoring 
up.  Otherwise AAE will be based on Indexed Allowable Expenses (IAE). 
Alternatively, in the absence of income indexing, expenses may be factored down 
proportionally to capture a reduction in farm size.  Here factoring down recognizes that 
as AFI declines so to should AE.  Procedures for factoring down are applied when AAGR 
is less than AGRA.  Given the previous condition, AEA is multiplied by the quotient of 
AAGR to AGRA (Equation 11).  In the absence of income indexing, and accounting for 
current conditions, AAE will be valued at either FAE or AEA.  Examples for indexing 
and factoring are illustrated with Equation 11. 
Indemnity Calculation 
If during production or harvest periods the farm manager suffers a loss in revenue 
to a given enterprise or enterprises, a claim may be filed.  Whether a claim results in an 
indemnity is computed using the following procedures.  The Production Expense 
Percentage (PEP) for the insurance year is calculated as a percentage of AAE by the 
summation of AE for the insurance year, change in Accounts Payable (AP), and change 
in Prepaid Expenses (PE) (Equation 13).  AP and PE are included to monitor expense 
activity of the firm.  These accrual adjustments ensure proper allocation of expenses to 
the year in which they are used to produce income.  Increases in AP, comparing 
December 31 to January 1 (ending –beginning inventories) (assuming calendar year 
filing), meaning an increase in inputs actually received but not yet paid for, results in an 
AE increase for the current insurance year by the net change.  PE, items that have been 
paid for but not yet received, will also result in adjustments to AE.  When PE increases 
(beginning - ending inventories) AE decrease by the extent of the change.  PEP, from 
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Equation 13, is used to determine whether an adjustment to AAGR ensues.  An Expense 
Reduction Percentage (ERP) is calculated by subtracting PEP from 70% (Equation 14).  
AAGR for the current year will be adjusted downward 0.1% for each 0.1% AE falls 
below 70% (Equation 15).  The resulting expense reduction (ER), from Equation 15, is 
subtracted from AAGR, resulting in an Adjusted AAGR (ADJAAGR) (Equation 16).  
Expenses in excess of 70% require no adjustment to AAGR.  When AAGR warrants 
adjustment the AGR Loss Inception Point (AGRLIP) requires recalculation by 
multiplying ADJAAGR by the elected CL (Equation 17).  Subsequently AGRC for the 
insurance year, derived in Equation 18, is computed and subtracted from the guarantee 
ultimately revealing whether the farm sustained a Revenue Deficiency (RD) (Equation 
19).  AGRC is calculated using the following items; AFI, ΔAR, ΔIN, Noninsured disaster 
Assistance Payments (NAP), Net Gain from Commodity Hedging (NGCH), Gross Crop 
Insurance Indemnity Payments (GCIIP), Sugarbeet Payment in Kind (SPIK), and 
Marketing Orders-cranberry and tart cherries (MO) (Equation 18).  Refer to Figure D.4 in 
Appendix D for a breakdown of these and other agricultural program payments.  
Furthermore Figure D.4 identifies which programs to include in calculating AGRA and 
which to include in determining AGRC against the guarantee.  NAP payments are 
excluded from AFI but included in AGRC.  GCIIP are also included in determining 
AGRC for the current insurance year.  These payments are included to prevent insured’s 
from “double dipping”, or collecting for the same loss twice.  Given an individual 
sustained a RD (Equation 19) an Indemnity (ID) is paid to the extent the payment rate 
allows, 75% or 90% of AAGR (Equation 20).   
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Premium Calculation 
To determine a net gain from AGR-Lite, corresponding premiums would need 
subtracting out.  The explanation that follows reflects the derivation of premiums used for 
this study.  Since this paper evaluates AGR-Lite as stand alone product, equations for the 
premiums used in the analysis are located in AGR-Lite mathematical derivation, 
Equation 21.  Three premium rates were calculated and used to conduct the analysis.  The 
first analysis calculated an Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) such that each 
farms annual premium was equal to the total indemnities over the seven year evaluation 
period, divided by seven (Equation 21a).  We assumed the farms would enroll in the 
program each year.  Equation 21b computes an Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) by 
dividing total indemnities over the seven year period by total liability for all farms over 
the seven year period.  This was performed for each farm category.  The average rate was 
then applied to each farm within the category it was derived from.  Notice in each of the 
equations there is no consideration given to government subsidization, liability from 
other insurance products, and administrative fees due to analysis of AGR-Lite as a stand-
alone program.  Thirdly, Equation 21c calculates an Actuarially Fair Average Rate for 
farms that received at least one Indemnity payment (AFARI).  This calculation was 
performed for each farm category by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for only 
those farms receiving at least one indemnity over the seven year period.  This rate was 
then applied to each farm in the entire category. 
A discussion of total farmer paid premium (TFPP) assuming AGR-Lite was used 
in conjunction with alternative insurance programs follows.  Derivation of TFPP, defined 
by the contract, is explained in Appendix B.  Assuming AGR-Lite is used in conjunction 
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with alternative programs, calculation of TFPP will follow.  Individuals can reduce the 
liability, which directly affects the premium paid, by the minimum of the total Liability 
from Other Insurance Products (LOIP) or 50% of AGRL (from Equation 6).  The 
resulting value is multiplied by the premium rate determined through RMA’s rating 
program.  Multiply the resulting value by one minus the government subsidy rate (SR) 
(59%, 55%, and 48%) for CL (65%, 75%, and 80%).  Each contract will also incur a $30 
administrative fee. 
3.5.2 Methods for AGR-Lite Analysis 
As previously mentioned, a panel data set was compiled from the KFMA data 
bank to analyze AGR-Lite and its impact on AGRC and NFI for 219 SE Kansas farms.  
To accurately evaluate the effectiveness of AGR-Lite income tax records from each farm 
would be required.  Although the KFMA data bank does not contain individual tax 
records annual farm level data from 1993 to 2005 was used to reproduce the information 
necessary to evaluate AGR-Lite. 
AGR-Lite was examined under six scenarios for its relative risk reduction using 
generated AGRC and NFI distributions with and without participation in the AGR-Lite 
program.  To do so analysis proceeded under the following assumptions; first, each farm 
qualified for AGR-Lite coverage; second, each farm would insure every year over the 
seven year period; and third, every farm would select 75% CL and 90% PR.  The first 
examines program performance assuming AFPF.  It is through actuarially fair premiums 
which allow comparison of risk reduction effectiveness of the program excluding 
administrative costs and subsidies (Williams et al, 1993).  A second analysis established 
premium rates using AFAR.  This scenario also excludes consideration of additional 
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administrative fees as well as corresponding government subsidization.  The final 
analysis computed AFARI for each farm category then applied the rate to the entire 
group.  Each premium rate calculation was imposed on each category (total, crop, 
livestock, beef, and dairy) to evaluate AGR-Lite performance.  Then each premium rate 
scenario was applied to only farms with claims to evaluate the impact under the 
assumption farms could perfectly adverse select.  In other words, what impact did AGR-
Lite have for farms that actually received claims. 
Crop farms were selected for further analysis by sorting them into farm size 
categories using Value of Farm Production (VFP).  Farms were assigned to one of four 
VFP categories; (1) less than $100,000, (2) $100,000 to $249,999, (3) $250,000 to 
$500,000, and (4) greater than $500,000.  Here again each VFP category was analyzed 
under each premium rate calculation.  Then the categories were examined with only 
farms which received at least one claim. 
Risk Analysis 
To measure the potential risk reduction from participation in AGR-Lite, means, 
standard deviations, minimums, Coefficient of Variation (CV) statistics, and Certainty 
Equivalents (CE) of the distribution of income measures with and without participation in 
AGR-Lite were generated and compared under AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI.  Downside 
Risk (DR) was also computed with and without participation in AGR-Lite for AFAR and 
AFARI.   
Risk can be assessed in numerous ways, but perhaps the most common method is 
through variability or dispersion of risk.  Variability can be assessed through ranges 
(minimum and maximum), standard deviation, and CV.  Standard deviations measure the 
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dispersion or volatility within a given distribution.  Furthermore, they indicate the 
probability a given outcome will deviate from a central tendency or mean.  Although 
standard deviations do present some perspective on the absolute variability for a given 
farm, when conducting cross comparison analysis of strategies with varying size means 
CV statistics are useful as they provide a relative measure of variability.  The CV 
criterion advises a decision maker to consider the relative amount of risk for a given 
strategy.  As such, decision makers with linearly risk averse behavior should select the 
alternative providing the smallest risk (standard deviation) relative to the expected return 
(mean), more simply the risk return trade off.  In this analysis the CV approach is 
preferred due to the range of mean AGRC and NFI across categories.  Additionally use of 
CV statistics allowed for measuring the relative difference between alternatives thereby 
revealing the relative reduction in AGRC and NFI from participation in AGR-Lite.  In 
generating CV statistics, farms were encountered with negative average NFI and AGRC.  
As a result negative CV statistics were obtained which for practical purposes cannot be 
interpreted.  Thus it was determined farms with negative values would be eliminated for 
reporting purposes.   
Certainty Equivalents (CE) 
Certainty equivalents were computed to compare AGRC with and without 
participation in the AGR-Lite program.  The alternatives with the largest CE are preferred 
to those will lower CEs.  Certainty equivalents reveal the dollar amount required by a 
farm manager to be indifferent between a certain value (mean of the distribution) and the 
risky strategy (in this case the variability in AGRC over the seven years).  For individuals 
classified as risk averse, CE will be less than the expected value (mean).  CEs were 
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generated assuming a logarithmic utility function which conforms to the following 
equation 
(3.1.1) ( )WU ln=  
where U is the utility and w denotes some initial level of wealth.  Table 3.3 provides a CE 
example calculation.  A logarithmic utility function was selected for its association with 
decreasing absolute risk aversion.  According to Hardaker, Hurine and Anderson, “most 
people will be decreasingly averse to risk if they grow richer (1997).”  Risk premiums 
can be calculated for each farm by subtracting the CE of the less preferred alternative 
from the CE of the preferred alternative.  The difference between CEs reflects the 
minimum dollar value a farm manager would need to receive to justify a switch to the 
less preferred alternative.  CEs were computed for each farm using AGRC, evaluated, 
and compared under AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI. 
For most applications a net measure is preferred when conducting risk analysis, in 
this case CE.  It was determined to proceed with CE analysis using AGRC instead of AFI 
for the following reasons.  Although use of a net figure is preferred for risk analysis, 
given the presence of negative NFI values, it was necessary to select a measure which 
closely paralleled NFI.  With numerous negative NFI observations, CE analysis would 
proceed with use of a gross measure (AFI or AGRC) to insure positive values.  Some 
previous literature (Carriker et al, Schnitkey et al, and Gray et al) have conducted risk 
analysis with the use gross receipts.  To obtain results that would in some way reflect 
NFI, correlation coefficients were computed between AGRC and NFI and AFI and NFI 
with and without adjustments.  Adjustments made to AFI, NFI, and AGRC consider 
premium costs, whether from AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI, and any indemnity payments 
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received by the farm.  Therefore correlations were calculated between measures using 
raw, or unadjusted values, and then computed by adding indemnity payments and 
subtracting corresponding premium costs.  Tables 3.4 and 3.5 reveal correlations between 
AGRC and NFI to be consistently higher as compared to those between AFI and NFI.  In 
most instances correlations decline when including adjustments from calculations.  When 
including adjustments a greater percentage of farms reported weak positive correlations 
ranging from 0.186 to 0.317 between AFI and NFI.  Correlations between AFI and NFI 
across categories ranged from -0.962 to 0.962 (very strong negative correlation to very 
positive correlation). 
Correlations between AGRC and NFI were consistently higher than those 
previously discussed, ranging from 0.490 to 0.586, indicating a moderate positive 
correlation.  The range of correlations across farms ranged from -0.745 to 0.995.  Also, 
farms with positive correlations increased for all categories ranging from 85% to 100%.  
As a result fewer farms reported negative correlations. 
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Table 3.3  Certainty Equivalent (CE) example calculation 
AGRC ln (AGRC)
1999 $49,436 10.81
2000 $18,312 9.82
2001 $59,230 10.99
2002 $35,821 10.49
2003 $41,950 10.64
2004 $43,211 10.67
2005 $27,072 10.21
Average ($39,290)1 (10.52)2
$36,962
ln($35,821) = 10.49
ln($41,950) = 10.64
ln($43,211) = 10.67
Calculation explanation
ln($49,436) = 10.81
ln($18,312) = 9.82
ln($59,230) = 10.99
2Average ln(AGRC) was computed by first taking the log of each AGRC from 1999 to 2005.  Then average 
ln(AGRC) over the years 1999 to 2005 {average(10.81, 9.82, 10.99, 10.49, 10.64, 10.67, 10.21) = 10.52}
ln($27,072) = 10.21
Certainty Equivalent (CE) =
1Average Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) was computed by averaging years 1999 to 2005 
{average($49,436, $18,312, $59,230, $35,821, $41,950, $43,211, $27,072) = $39,290}
 exponential(10.52) = $36,962
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Table 3.4  Correlation coefficients between AFI and NFI with and without adjustments by category 
All farms
Farms w/ 
claims All farms
Farms w/ 
claims All farms
Farms w/ 
claims All farms
Farms w/ 
claims All farms
Farms w/ 
claims
Total Farms 13 4 64 33 93 46 126 107 219 153
Average 0.317 0.238 0.229 0.316 0.255 0.299 0.229 0.186 0.239 0.219
Min -0.766 -0.384 -0.848 -0.848 -0.847 -0.847 -0.925 -0.925 -0.927 -0.927
Max 0.910 0.908 0.962 0.906 0.962 0.936 0.902 0.895 0.962 0.937
Number of Positive2 10 3 42 26 63 34 87 69 151 104
(76.92) (75.00) (65.63) (78.79) (67.74) (73.91) (69.05) (64.49) (68.95) (67.97)
Number of Negative3 3 1 22 7 30 12 39 38 68 49
(23.08) (25.00) (34.38) (21.21) (32.26) (26.09) (30.95) (35.51) (31.05) (32.03)
Total Farms 13 4 64 33 93 46 126 107 219 153
Average 0.349 0.339 0.199 0.255 0.250 0.289 0.355 0.333 0.311 0.320
Min -0.764 -0.378 -0.690 -0.690 -0.764 -0.690 -0.727 -0.727 -0.764 -0.727
Max 0.913 0.913 0.961 0.843 0.961 0.936 0.925 0.925 0.961 0.936
Number of Positive2 10 3 40 24 65 36 104 86 169 122
(76.92) (75.00) (62.50) (72.73) (68.89) (78.26) (82.54) (80.37) (77.17) (79.74)
Number of Negative3 3 1 24 9 28 10 22 21 50 31
(23.08) (25.00) (37.50) (27.27) (30.11) (21.74) (17.46) (19.63) (22.83) (20.26)
Note:  All farms reflects the correlations from all farms regardless of whether a claim was received.  Farms with claims reflects the correlations for only farms which received at least one claim.
 ---------------------------------------------Correlation between AFI and NFI without adjustments 4 ---------------------------------------------
 ---------------------------------------------Correlation between AFI and NFI with adjustments 1---------------------------------------------
TotalDairy Beef Livestock Crop
1Correlations between Allowable Farm Income (AFI) and Net Farm Income (NFI) with adjustments indicates AFI and NFI have been adjusted to include corresonding premium costs and indemnities
2Number of postive indicates the number of farms with postive correlation between AFI and NFI for each category with percentages in parentheses below
3Number of negative indicates the number of farms with negative correlation between AFI and NFI for each category with percentages in parentheses below
4Correlation between AFI and NFI without adjustments indicates the use of AFI and NFI values prior to consideration of corresponding premium costs and indemnities
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Table 3.5 Correlation coefficients between AGRC and NFI with and without adjustments by category 
All farms
Farms w/ 
claims All farms
Farms w/ 
claims All farms
Farms w/ 
claims All farms
Farms w/ 
claims All farms
Farms w/ 
claims
Total Farms 13 4 64 33 93 46 126 107 219 153
Average 0.490 0.586 0.512 0.481 0.515 0.510 0.545 0.515 0.530 0.510
Min -0.166 0.294 -0.551 -0.551 -0.551 -0.551 -0.745 -0.745 -0.726 -0.726
Max 0.944 0.944 0.958 0.946 0.958 0.946 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995
Number of Positive2 12 4 56 28 81 39 113 94 194 133
(92.31) (100) (87.50) (84.85) (87.10) (84.78) (89.68) (87.85) (88.58) (86.93)
Number of Negative3 1 0 8 5 12 7 13 13 25 20
(7.69) (0) (12.50) (15.15) (12.90) (15.22) (10.32) (12.15) (11.42) (13.07)
Total Farms 13 4 64 33 93 46 126 107 219 153
Average 0.522 0.693 0.593 0.637 0.589 0.659 0.697 0.693 0.651 0.683
Min -0.164 0.455 -0.183 -0.183 -0.409 -0.183 -0.369 -0.369 -0.409 -0.369
Max 0.952 0.952 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996
Number of Positive2 12 4 59 31 86 44 123 104 209 148
(92.31) (100) (92.19) (93.94) (92.47) (95.65) (97.62) (97.20) (95.43) (96.73)
Number of Negative3 1 0 5 2 7 2 3 3 10 5
(7.69) (0) (7.81) (6.06) (7.53) (4.35) (2.38) (2.80) (4.57) (3.27)
Note:  All farms reflects the correlations from all farms regardless of whether a claim was received.  Farms with claims reflects the correlations for only farms which received at least one claim.
Total
 ---------------------------------------------Correlation between AGRC and NFI with adjustments 1---------------------------------------------
 ---------------------------------------------Correlation between AGRC and NFI without adjustments 4 ---------------------------------------------
Dairy Beef Livestock Crop
1Correlation between Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) and Net Farm Income (NFI) with adjustements indicates AGRC and NFI have been adjusted to include corresonding premium costs and 
indemnities
2Number of postive indicates the number of farms with postive correlation between AGRC and NFI for each category with percentages in parentheses below
4Correlation between AGRC and NFI without adjustments indicates the use of AGRC and NFI values prior to consideration of corresponding premium costs and indemnities
3Number of negative indicates the number of farms with negative correlation between AGRC and NFI for each category with percentages in parentheses below
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Downside Risk (DR) 
Another measure, and possibly the most revealing, used to analyze risk reduction 
effectiveness of AGR-Lite was DR.  As the name would imply, DR reveals the maximum 
downside potential a given alternative or strategy exhibits relative to some pre-specified 
threshold.  In many respects DR establishes a safety first criteria for which a decision 
maker selects the strategy with the highest mean net return that fails to have a single 
outcome below some pre-specified level.  Although DR does not operate under the same 
assumptions, it does establish a pre-specified level for which to quantify DR.  For this 
analysis Family Living (FL) costs, using a Kansas state wide family living measure, were 
obtained to establish the pre-specified level.  This value was multiplied by the number of 
operators per farm to identify the threshold and then subtracted from NFI to assess DR. 
DR was calculated by subtracting Family Living Expense (FLE) from NFI with and 
without participation in AGR-Lite.  FLE was calculated by multiplying FL by the number 
of operators per farm.  DR was calculated using the following formula: 
(3.1.2) DR = NFI - FLE 
Results were computed and compared under AFAR and AFARI premium calculations.  
Table 3.6 provides an example for calculating DR. 
  87
Table 3.6  Downside risk (DR) example calculation 
NFI w/out 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite FLE1
DR w/out 
AGR-Lite
DR w/ 
AGR-Lite Change2
1999 -$21,802 $5,749 $31,258 -$53,060 -$25,509 $27,551
2000 $22,856 $20,112 $31,730 -$8,402 -$11,146 -$2,744
2001 $29,880 $27,236 $36,332 -$1,378 -$4,022 -$2,644
2002 $23,949 $21,183 $36,635 -$7,309 -$10,075 -$2,766
2003 $3,560 $835 $38,989 -$27,698 -$30,423 -$2,725
2004 $55,826 $53,105 $41,365 $24,568 $21,847 -$2,721
2005 $92,007 $88,932 $44,864 $60,749 $57,674 -$3,075
Average $29,468 $31,022 $37,310 -$1,790 -$236 $1,554
Note:  Downside Risk (DR) was calculated by subtracting FLE from Net Farm Income (NFI) with and without 
participation in AGR-Lite (DR = NFI - FLE) over the 1999 to 2005 period
2Change is the difference between Downside Risk (DR) w/ AGR-Lite and DR w/out AGR-Lite
1Family Living Expense (FLE) was calculated by multiplying the Kanasas average family living cost by the number of 
farm operators (family living cost x # farm operators)
 
3.6 Data Limitations and Assumptions 
Due to AGR-Lite procedures and filing processes, limitations were encountered 
and as such are addressed in the following paragraphs.  Limitations and assumptions for 
both income and expenses are addressed separately. 
Crop insurance indemnity payments, which may include payments from any of 
the following: APH, CRC, RA, GRP, GRIP, LGM, LRP, Private Hail and Mortality, or 
any product offered under the authority of the act in which an individual received 
proceeds from the contract are included in AGRC but are not in calculating AGRA.  
Although farm managers would likely enroll in alternative insurance products to 
supplement AGR-Lite the KFMA annual farm level data does not provide enough detail 
necessary to identify product specific purchases.  As such it was determined the product 
would be evaluated as a stand-alone.  Since this analysis evaluated AGR-Lite as stand-
alone other crop insurance proceeds were not included in the AGR derivation.  These 
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payments and their corresponding premiums were also excluded from the NFI 
calculations. 
Provisions of the AGR-Lite contract specify that certain agricultural program 
payments will be included for AGRA calculations but not for AGRC and vice versa.  
Agricultural program payments, which may include Loan Deficiency Payments (LDP), 
Production Flexibility Contracts (PFC), Direct and Counter-Cyclical Payments (DCP), 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), and Farm Service Agency (FSA) Loans are not 
included in calculating AGRA or AGRC.  Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program 
payments (NAP) are not included in AGRA calculations but are for AGRC.  Finally, 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) loans are included in both AGRA and AGRC 
computations.  Other payments used to calculate AGRA and AGRC include Surgarbeet – 
Payment in Kind and Marketing Orders – Cranberry and Tart Cherries.  Needing to 
include specific payments and exclude others, the KFMA data set does not provide the 
necessary data to report individual program payments.  Government payments are 
recorded in the KFMA data set however all realized payments are compiled into a single 
variable.  It is important to note that the allowable income measure, in the AGR-Lite 
policy, includes some payments while excluding others.  This includes the calculation of 
AFI in Equation 1 and income for AGRC in Equation 18.  Figure D.4 in Appendix D 
provides a complete listing of these program payments.  As Figure D.4 indicates, most 
government payments are omitted in the derivation of AFI and AGRC.  These payments 
are problematic in that we are unable to isolate NAP payments, Payment in Kind, 
Marketing orders, and CCC loans when deriving AFI or AGRC using KFMA data.  It 
was decided to exclude government payments from AGRA and AGRC calculations.  
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Therefore any agricultural program payments made, whether counting towards AGRA or 
AGRC, have been omitted from AGR-Lite calculations.   
When establishing the contract guarantee, it becomes conditional on 
circumstances outlined in the contract.  As discussed earlier the guarantee will be based 
on the lesser of AGRA, IAGR, or EI from the annual farm report.  Since the analysis uses 
historical data (1993-2005) we are unable to determine EI for succeeding years.  Hence, it 
was determined EI would equal AGRA.  This has potential to overestimate or 
underestimate payouts of AGR-Lite.   
Limitations also surfaced from an expense perspective.  Under the provisions of 
the contract producers are allowed to deduct depreciation and section 179 expense 
deductions not claimed elsewhere, however this value will reflect only depreciation 
realized for animals.  It is important to note that livestock depreciation is not recorded in 
the KFMA database, resulting in the inability to include such depreciation.  Therefore 
depreciation expense was not included in the derivation of AE.  Even so, in many cases 
animal depreciation is believed to be minimal. 
Given an individuals eligibility for a claim, precise adjustments occur prior to 
receipt of a claim.  The contract states raised cull cows intended for sale will be 
considered in AFI and will count towards AGRA.  Alternatively sales of cows and other 
capital assets (such as breeding livestock) are not included in AFI or AGRA.  This is 
problematic as KFMA data does not allow us to identify or link the corresponding costs 
associated with livestock sales in any given year.  Thus, sales of cows and other capital 
assets, such as breeding livestock have been excluded from AGR-Lite calculations.  
Given that, sales of livestock may not truly reflect that which is permitted by the contract. 
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As part of the indemnity calculation process PEP from Equation 13 is derived.  In 
accordance with contract filing procedures allowable expenses will be adjusted by the 
change in AP and PE.  Within the KFMA data bank, detailed data on AP are not collected 
and as such have been excluded from the calculation.  Therefore PE are the only accrual 
adjustment made to AE. 
Because of data limitations the calculation of total farmer paid premium (TFPP) 
was not performed.  One major limitation in deriving premiums was the inability to 
identify individual rates by farm.  Thus, it was determined AGR-Lite would be analyzed 
under three scenarios, AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI.  Accounting for AGR-Lite being 
analyzed as a stand-alone product the equation used to determine premiums from AFPF, 
AFAR, and AFARI do not conform to TFPP, defined in Equation 21, located in 
Appendix B.  Premiums under AFAR and AFARI were computed by multiplying the 
computed average rate by the corresponding farms liability.  As such liabilities from 
other insurance products have been eliminated from the equation.  This is, in part, due to 
data limitations, which result in the inability to isolate or identify which insurance 
products were purchased.  Without such information we are unable to extract the 
corresponding liability from respective contracts.  In addition government subsidization 
and administrative fees ($30) were eliminated to simplify the premium calculation.
  91
CHAPTER 4 - Results 
4.1 Overview 
AGR-Lite was examined under six scenarios for its relative risk reduction using 
AGRC and NFI distributions with and without participation in the AGR-Lite program.  
The first scenario examined program performance assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by 
Farm (AFPF) for all farms.  A second scenario evaluated AGR-Lite computing an 
Actuarially Fair Average Rate for all farms (AFAR) and applying it to all farms.  The 
third analysis used an Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
but applied the rate to all farms.  The final three scenarios are conducted in a similar 
fashion except the results for each scenario (AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI) exclude farms 
with zero claims.  By eliminating farms with zero claims, AGR-Lite was evaluated 
assuming only farms with claims purchased the product.  This analysis will reveal 
product performance under the assumption individuals could perfectly adverse select.  
These scenarios (AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI) will frame the analysis in that we would 
expect actual premiums to fall somewhere within the range of scenarios.  In each 
premium category a 75% coverage level and 90% payment rate was used.  Additionally, 
these six scenarios were applied to VFP categories for crop farms of less than $100,000, 
$100,000 to $249,999, $250,000 to $500,000, and greater than $500,000. 
Subsequent sections present and summarize the results obtained under each 
scenario for farm and VFP categories.  In total 219 farms in Southeast Kansas were 
selected for maintaining continuous farm level data from 1993 to 2005 that was useable 
for analysis.  Subsequent sections also present the results for 126 crop farms, 93 livestock 
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farms, 64 beef farms, and 13 dairy farms under each scenario.  In addition results will be 
presented for 33 crop farms with VFP of less than $100,000, 49 crop farms with VFP of 
$100,000 to $249,999, 38 crop farms with VFP of $250,000 to $500,000, and 6 crop 
farms with VFP of greater than $500,000. 
Refer to Appendix E for an explanation to assist in interpreting the results tables 
located at the end of Chapter 4.  This appendix provides a more thorough description for 
each row and column as well as methods used to compute each value. 
4.2 Total Results 
AFPF all farms 
Table 4.1 presents AGRC and NFI distributions summary statistics with and 
without participation in AGR-Lite including means, standard deviations, minimum, and 
maximum for all 219 farms in 20 counties in SE Kansas assuming AFPF.  Average AFPF 
paid by producers was $8,224, which computes the average for only farms which paid 
premiums (Table 4.64).  The maximum paid premium was $41,508.  Average AGRC and 
NFI for the 219 farms from 1999 to 2005 were $203,236 and $49,284 with corresponding 
ranges of $15,560 to $1,160,123 and -$19,073 to $414,205.  As expected, averages for 
AGRC and NFI under AFPF remain unchanged as a result of participation in AGR-Lite 
because indemnities equal premiums by farm.  Initial average standard deviations for 
AGRC and NFI were $64,803 and $41,280.  With participation in AGR-Lite, average 
standard deviations declined $6,424 and $2,843 respectively, a 9.9% and 6.9% decrease.  
Although AGRC contains greater absolute variability than NFI, CV statistics suggest 
otherwise.  Comparatively, CV indicates greater relative risk using NFI compared to 
AGRC with initial CVs of 0.33 and 1.63.  AGR-Lite generated a larger CV reduction for 
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NFI compared to AGRC.  Average CV reductions for AGRC and NFI were 0.05 and 
0.10.  Initial minimum observations for AGRC and NFI were $118,185 and -$6,631.  As 
expected AGR-Lite increased average minimums for AGRC and NFI, $16,333 and 
$6,904 respectively. 
Table 4.2 presents a summary of farm numbers, premium paid, liability, and 
average indemnity by frequency of claim for 219 farms.  Just over 30%, 66 of the 219 
farms, generated zero claims, indicating nearly 70% of farms received at least one 
indemnity over the seven years.  Furthermore 24% of farms generated a minimum of 
three claims.  The table provides a comparison of average paid premiums for AFPF, 
AFAR, and AFARI.  Additionally, actual premium rates were calculated for each 
frequency of claim by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for farms within each 
frequency.  As expected, farms with more frequent claims indicate greater risk, ultimately 
resulting in a heightened average premium rates relative to farms with less frequent 
claims.  For AFPF, average paid premium increases with increasing frequency of claim.  
Conversely, average paid premiums for AFAR and AFARI declined as frequency of 
claim increased.  These findings can be explained by two reasons.  First, using AFAR and 
AFARI the same rate was applied to every farm irrespective of a farms frequency of 
claim.  Secondly, average liability declines with increasing frequency of claims, thus by 
applying a constant percentage rate, it would naturally result in smaller premiums.  
Average liability was computed for each frequency of claim by averaging the liability 
across farms within each frequency.  Across frequency of claims average liability ranged 
from $67,798 to $144,011.  There is a definitive downward trend in average liability with 
increasing levels of frequency of claim.  Furthermore as average liability declines, with 
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increasing frequency of claims, absolute variability increases.  The breakdown of average 
indemnities by farm by year for frequencies 1 through 7 respectively were; $33,673, 
$23,414, $25,418, $27,766, $22,865, $18,343, and $23,156.  
AFPF farms with claims 
Table 4.3 reveals results for farms receiving at least one indemnity payment over 
the seven years assuming AFPF.  Excluding farms with zero claims, 153 farms remained 
with average AGRC and NFI of $182,736 and $46,247.  Average standard deviations 
declined by a greater rate, on average, $9,195 and $4,070 with participation in AGR-Lite 
compared to AFPF all farms.  By eliminating farms with zero claims, the remaining 
subset posted higher initial CV values, indicating greater relative risk compared to all 
farms.  However the average magnitude of change, occurring with AGR-Lite, was greater 
for farms with claims for AGRC and NFI.  Average minimums pre-AGR-Lite were lower 
with initial values of $92,742 and -$10,957 for AGRC and NFI respectively.  Results for 
farms with claims reveal a larger increase ($23,378) in average minimum compared to 
$16,333 for all farms.  By eliminating farms which received no claims, thus generate no 
impact to average minimum, it is expected the average minimum would increase relative 
to all farms.  Although farms with claims report an average minimum change roughly 
$3,000 higher than all farms, percent change proves otherwise, reporting an average 
percentage change 14 points lower than all farms.   
AFAR all farms  
A second scenario calculated an AFAR, dividing total indemnities by total 
liabilities for all farms.  The computed rate was then applied to all farms generating the 
results located in Table 4.4.  In doing so a 4.54% rate was applied which resulted in 219 
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farms paying an average $5,745 premium for AGR-Lite, which assumed it was a stand-
alone product without consideration to government subsidized premium or administrative 
fees, illustrated in Table 4.64.  Premiums ranged from $424 to $34,343.  Similar to AFPF 
results average AGRC and NFI went unchanged.  Again, establishing a rate which 
reflects the activity of all farms it makes sense, on average, mean AGRC and NFI remain 
unchanged.  However the minimum average of a single farm increased from an initial 
$15,560 to $21,002 for AGRC.  The average change in minimum average for an 
individual farm was -$30,602 while the maximum change was $30,961.  NFI minimum 
average, on the other hand, actually declined from -$19,073 to -$20,493 for NFI.  
Average standard deviations declined post AGR-Lite $6,424 and $2,879 for AGRC and 
NFI.  With comparable standard deviation reductions, CV reductions were virtually 
similar.  The magnitude with which average minimums increased were slightly higher 
compared to those from AFPF, with increases of $16,486 and $7,013 for AGRC and NFI. 
AFAR farms with claims 
Excluding farms with zero claims and maintaining AFAR (4.54%), the following 
reflects the results from 153 farms (Table 4.5).  These 153 farms paid, on average, $5,474 
for AGR-Lite (Table 4.64).  Pre AGR-Lite average AGRC and NFI remain constant at 
$182,736 and $46,247.  Applying AFAR, computed from all farms, average AGRC and 
NFI increased $2,750.  Mean income measures increase due to the elimination of farms 
receiving zero claims with reduced averages due to the associated cost of insurance.  
Following elimination of farms with zero claims, comparison of initial standard deviation 
reveals heightened absolute variability in AGRC ($66,144) however less for NFI 
($41,103).  Overall changes in average standard deviation were greater compared to all 
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farms, decreasing $9,142 and $4,087.  Additionally, reductions in relative risk declined 
further for AGRC to 0.08 and even greater for NFI (0.39).  Compared to AFPF, AFAR 
resulted in a similar reduction for AGRC and almost tripled the reduction for NFI.  As for 
average minimums, the 153 farms with claims sustained further increases, averaging 
$26,285 and $12,746 for AGRC and NFI.   
AFARI all farms 
An AFARI of 6.8% was computed using farms receiving a minimum of one 
indemnity over the seven year period (Table 4.64).  Summary results of AGRC and NFI 
distributions for 219 farms assuming AFARI are located in Table 4.6.  Initial average 
AGRC and NFI remained constant, however when applying the 6.8% rate, assuming 
AGR-Lite participation, overall average AGRC and NFI declined $2,886.  Application of 
AFARI, which reflects activity from only farms with claims (6.8%), exceeds the 4.54% 
AFAR.  That said a higher rate increases the average paid premium, causing farms 
without claims to incur steeper costs of insurance leading to an overall reduction in mean 
AGRC and NFI.  In comparison of results, the minimum average observation for AGRC 
increased to $20,606, which was smaller compared to AFAR.  Additionally NFI average 
minimum declined further, in comparison to AFAR, to -$21,206.  Absolute variability, 
using standard deviation, declined 9.9% for AGRC which parallels that from AFPF and 
AFAR.  NFI, however, reduced average standard deviation 7%, the largest relative to 
AFPF and AFAR.  Furthermore relative risk reduction for AGRC was equivalent in 
comparison to AFPF and AFAR.  Surprisingly, relative risk with participation in AGR-
Lite, increased for NFI from 1.29 to 1.53, which suggests the exact opposite from AFPF 
and AFAR.  This finding is attributed to an individual farm realizing a substantial 
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increase in relative risk.  Use of AFARI (highest premium) resulted in the greatest 
reduction in average NFI, drawing the average considerably lower in comparison to 
AFPF and AFAR.  With relatively unchanged standard deviations, it makes sense to see a 
sizeable increase in relative risk.  Upon removal of the individual farm, average relative 
risk for all farms indicates a reduction instead of an increase, consistent with AFPF and 
AFAR.  With AGR-Lite AGRC and NFI average minimums increased $13,666 and 
$4,173, the lowest reported increases comparing all scenarios (AFPF, AFAR, and 
AFARI). 
AFARI farms with claims 
Continuing with a 6.8% rate, the following results reflect farms receiving at least 
one claim (Table 4.7).  Pre and post AGR-Lite averages of AGRC and NFI remain 
unchanged at $182,736 and $46,247.  This was expected as the average rate was 
computed to reflect farms which received claims, thus with an actuarially fair rate, on 
average, premiums will equal indemnities.  Standard deviations declined on average 
$9,113 and $4,091 for AGRC and NFI respectively.  Interestingly, in a comparison 
excluding farms with zero claims, AFARI reported the smallest decrease in standard 
deviation for AGRC relative to AFPF and AFAR; however AFARI mounted the largest 
average reduction for NFI.  Consistent with previous findings, average relative risk 
reduction for AGRC was virtually unchanged from AFPF and AFAR.  NFI, on the other 
hand, reveals an increase in relative risk, the only increase compared to AFPF and 
AFAR.  Lastly, average minimums increased, on average, $23,600 and $10,041 for 
AGRC and NFI which ranked second to AFAR.  
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Summary of Total Farms 
Overall, results for NFI indicate for 219 farms, participation in AGR-Lite reduced 
standard deviations and relative risk for all farms and farms with claims.  However, 
AFARI resulted in increases in relative risk for NFI.  Average minimums increased under 
every scenario for all farms and farms with claims.  The impact of AGR-Lite on standard 
deviation, CV, and minimum was in most cases larger when excluding farms with zero 
claims, which is expected. 
4.3 Category Results 
4.3.1 Crop Farms 
AFPF all farms 
There were 126 crop farms with an average paid AFPF of $8,778 (average of 
farms with premiums) and a $41,508 maximum (Table 4.64).  Table 4.8 presents the 
summary statistics for AFPF results.  Average AGRC and NFI for the 126 crop farms 
were $192,445 and $46,005 with respective ranges of $15,560 to $1,034,902 and -
$10,968 to $264,961.  Average standard deviations were reduced with AGR-Lite, on 
average, $8,595 and $4,851 for AGRC and NFI.  CV statistics reveal AGRC contains less 
relative risk in comparison to NFI with initial values of 0.37 and 2.07.  With participation 
in AGR-Lite, average CV declined 0.06 and 0.16 for AGRC and NFI.  Initial average 
minimums were $98,362 and -$13,789.  Through AGR-Lite, average minimums 
increased 21.3% and 77.3% for AGRC and NFI.  These percentages equate to a $20,925 
and $10,653 increase. 
Table 4.9 presents the summary for 126 crop farms by frequency of claim.  
Assuming AGR-Lite participation for years 1999 through 2005 19 farms generated zero 
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claims.  The remaining 107 (85%) received at least one claim over the seven years.  
Compared to all farms, 33% of crop farms generated a minimum of three claims over 
seven years.  Consistent with the all farm category, average liability declined with 
increasing frequency of claim.  Furthermore, as claims became more frequent, mean 
standard deviation increased.  Average liability ranged from $48,850 to $132,069.  
Again, as expected, average AFPF increases with increasing frequency of claim.  AFAR 
and AFARI average premium paid declined as claims became more frequent.  Again 
considering application of constant rate and the decreasing average liability seen with 
increasing frequency of claim these results make sense.  Average indemnities per farm 
per year for frequencies 1 through 7 respectively were $33,689, $27,572, $26,848, 
$26,233, $20,381, $14,910, and $23,156. 
AFPF farms with claims 
Table 4.10 presents the summary results for an AFPF excluding farms with zero 
claims.  As a result 19 farms were eliminated, leaving 107 farms for analysis.  The 
average premium paid by the 107 farms was $8,788 (Table 4.64).  Average initial AGRC 
and NFI declined to $182,705 and $43,199 but remained unchanged as a result of 
participation in AGR-Lite.  Comparing initial standard deviations of AGRC and NFI, 
farms with claims exhibited less variability than the 126 total.  Furthermore the average 
reduction in relative risk remains unchanged from all farms.  When eliminating farms 
with zero claims, relative risk for NFI declined, on average, 0.20.  Consistent with 
previous findings, elimination of farms with zero claims improves average minimum 
increases for AGRC and NFI to $24,640 and $12,544.  Despite NFI generating a larger 
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increase overall in average minimum change, when computed as a percent the change 
was actually lower in comparison to all farms.   
AFAR all farms 
Dividing total indemnities by total liabilities, for 126 crop farms, resulted in an 
AFAR of 6.24%.  The corresponding results are located in Table 4.11.  The derived rate 
generated an average premium of $7,454 with a minimum of $655 and maximum of 
$45,721 (Table 4.64).  Average AGRC and NFI with and without participation in AGR-
Lite remain similar and unchanged from AFPF.  Comparing average standard deviation 
reductions with those of AFPF, reveals less of an improvement for AGRC but greater for 
NFI.  Relative risk reductions for AGRC were slightly higher compared to AFPF.  
Conversely, initial relative risk dropped to 1.49 compared to 2.07 for AFPF.  The average 
reduction in CV declined 0.04 for NFI, which was much less than the 0.16 for AFPF.  
AGR-Lite increased average minimum, on average, $21,212 and $11,024.  AFAR 
resulted in a greater improvement in average minimum for both AGRC and NFI 
compared to AFPF.  
AFAR farms with claims 
Eliminating farms with zero claims, 107 crop farms remained.  Applying the 
average rate (6.24%) computed above, the following reflects the results from those 107 
farms and are summarized in Table 4.12.  Using a 6.24% rate, mean paid premium was 
$7,358 with a $655 low and $33,008 high (Table 4.64).  Average AGRC and NFI 
increased $1,419 with AGR-Lite assuming AFAR.  Furthermore an individual farms 
minimum average improved to $20,707 for AGRC and -$7,170 for NFI.  Average 
standard deviation declined $10,002 for AGRC, which was less compared to AFPF.  
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However a $5,761 reduction in average standard deviation for NFI exceeded that for 
AFPF.  Initial and final CV values for AGRC replicate those from AFPF.  In using an 
ARAF these 107 farms generated the largest increase in average minimum across 
scenarios.  Average minimums for AGRC and NFI increased $26,308 and $14,255 
respectively.  
AFARI all farms 
In this scenario a rate was calculated using only farms with claims which resulted 
in an AFARI of 7.4%.  Results are summarized in Table 4.13.  Applying a 7.4% rate to 
126 crop farms, Table 4.64 summarizes the average paid premium ($8,892) with a 
minimum of $781 and maximum of $54,540.  This rate resulted in a $1,438 reduction in 
average AGRC and NFI.  This was expected due to the higher rate and the inclusion of all 
farms.  AGR-Lite reduced average standard deviation $8,527 for AGRC, the lowest 
reduction in comparison to AFPF and AFAR.  However the $4,948 average standard 
deviation reduction in NFI was the largest compared to AFPF and AFAR.  Results for 
CV remain similar to all scenarios.  Compared to AFPF and AFAR for NFI, initial 
relative risk was the lowest at 1.44.  Furthermore, AFARI corresponded with a relative 
reduction of 0.14, which ranked second behind AFPF.  Minimum averages improved for 
AGRC and NFI, albeit to a lesser degree in comparison to AFAR.  Differences in 
minimum average correspond to application of a higher rate, ultimately increasing the 
premium paid. 
AFARI farms with claims 
Using a computed rate of 7.4% of liability, 107 farms remained after excluding 
farms with zero claims.  Average premium paid ranged from $781 to $39,376 with a 
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$8,778 mean (Table 4.64).  These results are presented in Table 4.14.  The range of 
minimum and maximum average change for AGRC shrunk to -$27,701 to $24,222 for 
farms with claims from -$48,402 to $24,222 range from all farms.  These results are 
consistent with AFAR.  Farms with claims exhibited less initial variability and sustained 
larger increases compared to all farms.  In comparison, AFPF and AFAR reductions in 
standard deviation faired better for AGRC but worse for NFI with AFARI.  In addition to 
having the smallest initial CV (1.50), AFARI marked the largest average reduction (0.30) 
compared to AFPF and AFAR for NFI.  AGR-Lite’s impact on average minimum was 
greater for farms with claims compared to the entire sample.  Average increases in 
average minimum were $24,928 and $12,880 for AGRC and NFI, to which each ranked 
second to AFAR but ahead of AFPF. 
Summary of Crop Farms 
 For all farms and farms with claims for NFI, participation in AGR-Lite 
consistently reduced standard deviations and relative risk.  Average minimums benefited 
with participation in AGR-Lite with increases for all farms and farms with claims.  As 
expected, in most instances exclusion of farms with zero claims enhances the overall 
impact of AGR-Lite. 
4.3.2 Livestock Farms 
AFPF all farms 
There were 93 farms which averaged 50% or more of income from livestock over 
the 1993 to 2005 period.  Assuming indemnities equal premiums by farm, livestock farms 
paid on average $6,621 with a $121 to $28,383 range (Table 4.64).  A summary of results 
for AFPF are presented in Table 4.15.  As expected mean AGRC and NFI pre and post 
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AGR-Lite remain unchanged at $217,856 and $53,727.  With 93 farms, average 
reductions in standard deviations for AGRC and NFI were $3,334 and $121.  Standard 
deviation, as a percent of mean, reveals very little change for both AGRC and NFI.  
Average reductions were 0.03 and 0.01.  Average minimums for AGRC and NFI 
increased 6.5% ($9,508) and 64.5% ($1,980) respectively.   
Table 4.16 presents the summary by frequency of claim results for 93 livestock 
farms in SE Kansas.  Of the 93 farms, 47, or just over 50%, received zero claims.  In 
comparison to crop farms and all farms, just over 11% of livestock farms received three 
or more claims.  Within the table is a summary comparison of average paid premium for 
AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI.  Consistent with previous findings, average paid premium 
increases for AFPF as claim frequency increases, whereas average paid premium declines 
for AFAR and AFARI as claims became more frequent.  Average liability does not 
exhibit the similar downward trend that was observed for all farms and crop farms.  
However as claim frequencies increased fewer farms resided in higher frequency 
categories.  Average liability ranged from $72,152 to $166,190.  Consistent with crop and 
all farm categories, mean variability increased with increasing frequency of claim.  
Lastly, the average indemnity by farm by year for frequencies 1 through 6 respectively 
were $33,642, $11,916, $18,594, $36,196, $26,176, and $21,777. 
AFPF farms with claims 
Eliminating farms with zero claims, 46 livestock farms remained with an average 
paid premium of $6,621 (Table 4.64).  Premiums ranged from $121 to $28,383.  Average 
AGRC and NFI, for only farms with claims, were smaller in comparison to all livestock 
farms at $182,809 and $53,336 (Table 4.17).  Overall reductions in average standard 
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deviation more than doubled relative to all livestock farms, with reductions of $6,741 and 
$244 for AGRC and NFI.  Relative to all livestock farms, initial absolute variability for 
farms with at least one claim increased to $57,182.  Equally alike, initial relative risk 
adjusted higher to 0.33 and 1.18 for AGRC and NFI.  With that, farms with claims did 
realize greater reductions, however rather minimal at 0.06 and 0.03.  Moreover average 
minimum AGRC and NFI nearly doubled that for all farms with averages of $19,223 and 
$4,002.  Furthermore AGR-Lite increased the minimum average minimum, for one farm, 
from -$24,742 to $10,737 however, actually increased for NFI from -$76,207 to -
$76,290. 
AFAR all farms 
The following reflects the results from 93 livestock farms obtained using an 
AFAR (2.41%) calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for the 93 
farms (Table 4.18).  As such farmer paid premium ranged from $225 to $18,203 with a 
$3,275 mean (Table 4.64).  Give that, average reductions to standard deviations were 
comparable with AFPF for AGRC and NFI.  With identical initial CV for AGRC and 
NFI, average reductions increased to 0.04 and 0.08, relative to AFPF.  Average 
minimums increased as a result of AGR-Lite participation albeit to a greater extent for 
AGRC than NFI compared to AFPF.  Average increases were $9,542 and $1,921. 
AFAR farms with claims 
Excluding farms with zero claims average paid premium declined to $3,047 with 
a $316 to $18,203 range (Table 4.64).  Average AGRC and NFI declined from the all 
farm level to $182,809 and $53,336.  With a 2.4% applied rate mean AGRC and NFI, for 
46 farms, increased $3,574 (Table 4.19).  When including all farms, averages included 
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farms which paid a premium but received no indemnity.  As expected, farms with zero 
claims reduced average NFI by the premium cost.  When excluding those farms the 
AFAR underestimates the rate, thus farms with claims are paying less for the product 
which ultimately leads to an increase in averages.  Average standard deviations were 
reduced $6,748 for AGRC, which exceeded that for AFPF; however NFI average 
standard deviation declined $225, nearly $20 less than AFPF.  CV values indicate a 
greater reduction for NFI (0.32) than AGRC (0.08).  Both reductions surpass those 
assuming AFPF.  Increases in average minimum improved from AFPF, averaging 
$22,839 and $7,513 for AGRC and NFI.   
AFARI all farms 
Dividing the sum of indemnities by sum of liabilities, including only farms with 
claims, resulted in an AFARI of 5.2% (Table 4.64).  Operating on the applied the rate 93 
livestock farms paid, on average, $7,117 for AGR-Lite.  Paid premiums ranged from 
$489 to $39,559.  Initial mean AGRC and NFI were $217,856 and $53,727, located in 
Table 4.20.  By adding indemnities and corresponding premiums, these means declined 
$3,842.  Here again, application of a rate to all farms, exceeding AFAR (2.4%), which 
resulted from the use of only farms with claims (5.2%), it makes sense considering the 
higher costs of insurance.  Under AFARI AGRC ushered the largest reduction in average 
standard deviation relative to AFPF and AFAR.  Conversely AFARI resulted 
comparatively in the smallest reduction for NFI to AFPF and AFAR.  Participation in 
AGR-Lite reduced average minimum for AGRC by $5,738, the lowest increase compared 
to AFPF and AFAR.  In contrast, results indicate a reduction in average minimum from 
$3,067 to $1,071 for NFI. 
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AFARI farms with claims 
The following results reflect farms with claims with the assumption only farms 
receiving claims purchased AGR-Lite (Table 4.21).  Average premiums paid, which 
result from a 5.2% rate, ranged from $686 to $39,559 with a $6,621 mean (Table 4.64).  
Average AGRC and NFI for 46 livestock farms remained unchanged from initial values 
of $182,809 and $53,336.  The average reduction in standard deviation was highest for 
AGRC and lowest for NFI compared to AFPF and AFAR.  Second to AFAR, AGR-Lite 
reduced relative risk 0.07 and 0.20 for AGRC and NFI.  With AGR-Lite farms increased 
their average minimum $19,310 and $3,855 which, in comparison, rank second and third 
relative to AFAR and AFPF. 
Summary of Livestock farms 
 Participation in AGR-Lite consistently reduced absolute variability for all farms 
and farms with claims.  Relative risk, measure by CV, for the most part declined under all 
farms and farms with claims.  However, relative risk actually increased under AFARI for 
NFI for all livestock but not other categories.  Similar results were found in average 
minimum with consistent increases with participation in AGR-Lite.  The magnitude of 
change, observed in risk statistics, increased for farms with claims relative to all farms, 
which is expected. 
4.3.3 Beef Farms 
AFPF all farms 
Table 4.22 presents results from 64 beef farms assuming AFPF.  The associated 
cost of AGR-Lite, including only farms paying premiums, averaged $6,773 with a 
$27,182 maximum (Table 4.64).  Initial mean AGRC and NFI were $185,560 and 
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$47,284 with respective ranges of $21,555 to $980,749 and -$19,073 to $270,425.  
Average standard deviations for AGRC declined with participation in AGR-Lite on 
average $3,456.  Conversely, average standard deviation reported a $343 increase, on 
average, for NFI.  Through further investigation it appears as though participation in 
AGR-Lite does not necessarily impact the lowest income years.  In fact it was found that 
high years are receiving claims which, intuitively, contradict the perceived notion of the 
insurance principle.  Insurance acts as a mechanism to insulate individuals from severe 
economic loss.  However, given the nature of AGR-Lite, generating claims in what 
appear to be more favorable years, is quite possible.  Refer to Appendix F for an example 
illustrating an increase in standard deviation. 
Despite a $343 increase, CV, measuring relative variability, actually revealed a 
reduction of 0.01 for NFI.  This result also seems unlikely given the standard deviation 
increase and unchanged averages.  It appears the magnitude of CV reductions from farms 
with reductions exceed the increases observed from farms with increases, ultimately 
resulting in a reduction in CV.  These conflicting findings may also be attributed to the 
elimination of farms with negative CVs, which cannot be interpreted.  Average 
minimums increased, on average, 8.81% for AGRC and 57.46% for NFI.  Contradictory 
to expectations, average maximums increased, on average, $863 for NFI.  It is expected 
that the presence of insurance should decrease the maximum observation due to the cost 
of insurance.  Given increasing average maximums, which potentially create wider 
distributions, it is reasonable to conclude these shifts account for standard deviation 
increases. 
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Table 4.23 presents the summary by frequency of claim for 64 beef farms in SE 
Kansas.  Fewer than 50% of the 64 farms received zero claims, leaving 33 farms to 
generate at least one indemnity over the seven year period.  Average premiums for AFPF, 
AFAR, and AFARI corresponding to frequency of claim are summarized within the table.  
As claims became more frequent, average paid premiums under AFAR and AFARI 
deviate further relative to AFPF.  Average liability for the 64 farms by frequency of claim 
actually reveals an increase as opposed to the decrease seen in all farms, crop farms, and 
loosely in livestock farms.  For the most part mean variability increases the higher the 
frequency of claim.  Average indemnity per farm per year for frequencies 1 through 5 
respectively were $39,941, $11,460, $21,067, $7,574, and $26,176. 
AFPF farms with claims 
Upon elimination of farms with zero claims, 33 farms remained with mean AGRC 
and NFI of $161,763 and $46,276 (Table 4.24).  Under an AFPF, paid premiums reported 
a minimum and maximum of $163 and $27,182 with a mean of $6,773 (Table 4.64).  For 
33 farms, the average reduction in standard deviation nearly doubled for AGRC and NFI.  
Consequently the increase for NFI climbed to $665.  Here again, CV reports conflicting 
results as both AGRC and NFI sustain reductions in relative risk.  Participation in AGR-
Lite increased average minimums $19,728 and $3,308 for AGRC and NFI respectively.  
Again, AFPF for farms with claims reports and average maximum increase of $1,635, 
almost double that for all farms. 
AFAR all farms 
Dividing total indemnities by total liabilities, a 3.1% rate was computed and 
applied to all farms (Table 4.64).  As a result, 64 beef farms paid, on average, $3,493 
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with a $286 low and $21,486 high.  As expected, the smallest AGRC average increased, 
from an initial $21,555 to $22,438, with participation in AGR-Lite, indicated in Table 
4.25.  Conversely the smallest NFI average declined from -$19,073 to -$20,029.  Average 
standard deviation results coincide with those for AFPF with AGRC observing a $3,512 
reduction while NFI sustained a $323 increase.  AGRC, on average, increased the 
average minimum $10,207, slightly higher than AFPF with participation in AGR-Lite.  
While NFI increased its minimum average, the magnitude of change was slightly less 
compared to AFPF at $1,698. 
AFAR farms with claims 
Results from analysis of farms with claims, for AFAR, are presented in Table 
4.26.  Interestingly, mean premium paid declined to $3,444, illustrated in Table 4.64, 
with a minimum of $401 and maximum of $13,060.  This suggests farms with lower 
liability were more likely to generate claims.  Initial mean AGRC and NFI are consistent 
with those from AFPF.  However, with an applied rate computed from all farms, these 
averages increased $3,329; a 2% and 7% increase in mean AGRC and NFI.  Changes to 
absolute variability closely resemble those for AFPF.  Average absolute variability 
declined $6,744 for AGRC while NFI increased average variability to $655, $10 less 
compared to AFPF.  Although average absolute variability increased for NFI, relative 
variability declined 0.35.  Average minimum increases surpassed those for AFPF with 
increases of $23,089 and $6,619 for AGRC and NFI.  Although a $6,619 increase appears 
consistent with previous findings, when considering an initial average minimum of -
$863, the resulting increase corresponded to a 788% increase.  As has been the case in 
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previous scenarios, average maximum increased, on average, $4,909, three times that for 
AFPF. 
AFARI all farms 
Results corresponding to use of AFARI computed using only farms with 
indemnities are summarized in Table 4.27.  With an average rate of 6.01% (Table 4.64), 
mean paid premium was $6,869 with a range of $562 to $42,257.  Assuming every farm 
participated in AGR-Lite, mean AGRC and NFI declined $3,376.  Results do reveal a 
reduction in average standard deviation for AGRC of $3,562, the largest compared to 
AFPF and AFAR.  Alternatively, average standard deviation increased $309, which 
compared to AFPF and AFAR was lowest.  These results are echoed by CV statistics, 
which reveal a 0.03 reduction for AGRC and 0.66 increase for NFI.  Average minimum 
for AGRC increased $6,864, which was third compared to AFPF and AFAR.  AGR-Lite 
generated a reduction in average minimum of $1,693, suggesting the product may not 
effectively cover low income years.   
AFARI farms with claims 
Results from 33 beef farms using AFARI are summarized in Table 4.28.  Average 
paid premiums ranged from $789 to $25,686 with a mean of $6,773 (Table 4.64).  Pre 
and post AGR-Lite means for AGRC and NFI match those for AFPF.  With the applied 
rate (6.01%), beef farms generated the greatest reduction in average standard deviation 
($6,780) compared to AFPF and AFAR.  Similarly, with observed increases across 
categories, average standard deviation was minimized for NFI, relative to AFPF and 
AFAR, at $651.  Interestingly, from a relative variability standpoint, NFI sustained a 0.19 
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average reduction.  Average minimums for AGRC and NFI declined $19,790 and $3,262 
respectively which were second and third highest compared to AFAR and AFPF. 
Summary of Beef farms 
 Interestingly, participation in AGR-Lite increased average standard deviation 
consistently for all farms and farms with claims for NFI.  However average percentage 
increases were minimal at 0.85% and 2% for all farms and farms with claims.  Despite 
increases in absolute variability relative risk declined for all farms and farms with claims 
for AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI farms with claims.  AFARI yielded increases to relative 
risk for all farms.  Average minimum increased for all farms and farms with claims, 
except with use of AFARI for all farms, to which it decreased.  
4.3.4 Dairy Farms 
AFPF all farms 
In total, 13 dairy farms were analyzed assuming AFPF with an average paid 
premium of $4,926 (Table 4.64).  These farms tallied the largest mean AGRC and NFI 
across categories at $337,798 and $80,406, revealed in Table 4.29.  As expected post 
AGR-Lite means remain unchanged from initial levels assuming AFPF.  Both AGRC and 
NFI benefited from AGR-Lite with average standard deviation reductions of $1,881 and 
$977.  Interestingly these reductions corresponded to near negligible changes in average 
relative variability.  Average minimums for AGRC and NFI with participation in AGR-
Lite generated expected results with increases of $6,665 and $2,884.   
Of the 13 dairy farms four received at least one indemnity over the seven year 
period, leaving the remaining nine (almost 70%) receiving zero claims (Table 4.30).  
Average premium rates do reveal an increase with increasing frequency of claims.  
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However, transition from a frequency of two to three reveals a decrease from 7.14% to 
2.34%.  Although this is inconsistent with previous findings, it could be attributed to such 
a small sample size.  When comparing average paid premium assuming AFAR and 
AFARI, frequency two, marked the smallest relative to AFPF.  Furthermore, these results 
are validated by frequency two reporting the lowest average liability, which in most cases 
was half of others liability.  Average indemnity per farm per year for frequencies one 
through three respectively were $31,446, $24,461, and $8,702. 
AFPF farms with claims 
Removal of farms with zero claims, four farms remained for analysis.  Summary 
results for four dairy farms are presented in Table 4.31.  Mean AGRC and NFI increased 
to $393,455 and $120,976.  Again given the use of AFPF with AGR-Lite means remain 
unchanged.  On average, with AGR-Lite, average standard deviations declined $6,112 
and $3,174 for AGRC and NFI.  Accordingly CV results indicate a slight reduction in 
relative variability of AGRC however; NFI actually reported a slight increase.  Average 
minimums received increased for AGRC and NFI, $21,662 and $9,374. 
AFAR all farms 
Dividing total indemnities by total liabilities a 0.7% rate was computed and 
applied to each farm (Table 4.64).  As a result the average premium paid ranged from a 
$457 low to a $5,303 high with a $1,516 mean.  AGR-Lite contributed to a reduction in 
average standard deviation for both AGRC and NFI with respective reductions of $1,874 
and $961 (Table 4.32).  Similar to AFPF a slight reduction in relative variability was 
observed for AGRC, whereas relative variability actually increased 0.05 for NFI.  
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Average minimums were increased with AGR-Lite $6,660 and $2,834 which are 
comparable to AFPF. 
AFAR farms with claims 
With an applied rate of 0.7% and eliminating farms with zero claims, summary 
results for the remaining farms are presented in Table 4.33.  With a questionably low rate 
mean AGRC and NFI increased $3,089 with participation in AGR-Lite.  Average 
standard deviations declined two fold, $6,091 and $3,134 for AGRC and NFI.  Yet again, 
CV reveals conflicting results for NFI indicating an increase in relative variability despite 
a reduction in absolute variability.  Finally, AGR-Lite reduced average minimums 
$24,762 and $12,388 which exceed those from AFPF. 
AFARI all farms 
Computing a rate to reflect farms with claims resulted in a value 2.5 times larger 
than that for AFAR at 1.9% (Table 4.64).  The average paid premium was $4,064 with a 
$1,224 to $14,219 range.  Applying the higher rate mean AGRC and NFI declined $2,548 
(Table 4.34).  Average standard deviations declined for AGRC and NFI, on average,  
$1,864 and $933.  Relative variability reveals a slight decline for AGRC and slight 
increase for NFI.  Average minimum increases fell sharply compared to AFPF and AFAR 
with increases of $4,102 and $202 for AGRC and NFI. 
AFARI farms with claims 
With an applied average rate of 1.9%, the following results reflect four dairy 
farms with claims.  Results are summarized in Table 4.35.  Average paid premium was 
$4,926 with a $1,224 low and $14,219 high (Table 4.64).  Mean AGRC and NFI 
remained unchanged, which with a rate linked directly to farms with claims makes sense.  
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Participation in AGR-Lite reduced average standard deviation for AGRC and NFI $6,057 
and $3,067, the lowest compared to AFPF and AFAR.  Comparison of relative variability 
reveals similar findings.  There is a slight reduction in relative variability for AGRC 
however NFI reported a slight increase.  Average minimum increased $21,692 and 
$9,174 for AGRC and NFI, which ranked second and third to AFPF and AFAR. 
Summary of Dairy farms 
 For all farms and farms with claims, participation in AGR-Lite reduced standard 
deviation for NFI.  Relative risk, under NFI, was reduced for all farms and farms with 
claims, however increased under AFARI.  Participation in AGR-Lite generated consistent 
increases to average minimum across all scenarios. 
4.4 Value of Farm Production (VFP) Results 
Crop farms were selected for further analysis by farm size.  These farms were 
categorized using VFP levels less than $100,000, $100,000 to $249,999, $250,000 to 
$500,000, and greater than $500,000.  Each subset was analyzed assuming AFPF, AFAR, 
and AFARI with and without farms with indemnities.  Corresponding results are 
presented in subsequent sections. 
4.4.1 VFP less than $100,000 
AFPF all farms 
There were 33 farms with an average VFP of $71,407.  Including only farms 
which paid premiums, the average cost was $5,393 with a $19,974 maximum (Table 
4.65).  Initial mean AGRC and NFI were $54,210 and $8,508 (Table 4.36).  Average 
standard deviations declined, as a result of participation in AGR-Lite, $3,648 and $930.  
Additionally, relative risk, measured by CV, declined 0.09 and 0.04 respectively.  The 
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range in relative risk shrunk for AGRC from an initial 0.14 to 1.41 to 0.09 to 1.11 
suggesting AGR-Lite was effective in risk reduction.  However, NFI reduced the 
minimum CV to 0.50 from an initial 0.54 with the maximum remaining unchanged.  
Average minimum increased for both AGRC and NFI, on average, $5,773 and $1,266. 
Table 4.37 presents the summary by frequency of claim for 33 crop farms.  Of the 
33 farms, seven generated zero claims indicating nearly 79% (26) of farms received a 
minimum of one indemnity over the seven year period.  Dissimilar from previous 
categories of farm type average liability exhibits a slight increase with increasing 
frequency of claim.  Consistent with previous findings, variability in liability increases as 
claims increase in frequency.  Average indemnity per farm per year for frequencies 1 
through 6 were $9,036, $14,608, $12,171, $10,600, $18,344, and $14,910 respectively. 
AFPF farms with claims 
Eliminating farms with zero claims, Table 4.38 presents the findings for farms 
with claims.  Initial mean AGRC and NFI declined from all farms to $48,320 and $7,624.  
Reductions in average standard deviation increased in comparison to all farms to $4,630 
and $1,180.  So too did the reductions in relative risk, with average reductions for AGRC 
and NFI of 0.11 and 0.06.  As a result of AGR-Lite participation, average minimums 
increased $7,327 and $1,606 for AGRC and NFI respectively. 
AFAR all farms 
Computing an AFAR of 11.04%, the 33 farms paid, on average, $4,249 with a 
range of $1,158 to $8,110 (Table 4.65).  Initial average AGRC and NFI were consistent 
with those from AFPF at $54,210 and $8,508 (Table 4.39).  The range in minimum 
average was reduced, resulting from participation in AGR-Lite program.  AGRC and NFI 
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increased the lowest average to $19,875 and -$8,176 from initial levels of $15,560 and -
$10,968 respectively.  Compared to AFPF, average reductions in standard deviation were 
higher at $3,710 and $977.  The average reduction in relative risk was similar for AGRC 
compared to AFPF, however farms with positive CV for NFI actually reported an 
increase from 1.15 to 2.37.  It is important to note that 11 farms were excluded due to 
negative CV.  Average minimum increases faired better compared to AFPF, with average 
increases of $6,058 and $1,418. 
AFAR farms with claims 
Excluding farms with zero claims and continuing with an AFAR of 11.04%, 
Table 4.40 summarizes the findings.  As such, the remaining farms paid $4,272, on 
average, ranging from $1,158 to $8,110 (Table 4.65).  Results from an 11.04% rate reveal 
an increase in average AGRC and NFI of $1,121.  Average standard deviations declined 
from participation in AGR-Lite, on average, $4,671 and $1,225 or $41 and $45 higher 
respectively compared to AFPF reductions.  Average reductions to relative risk were 
slightly higher in comparison to AFPF.  Interestingly, under AFAR, relative risk 
increased 1.44, whereas declined under AFPF.  These findings can be attributed to farms 
with less frequent claims which comparatively pay a relatively small AFPF to AFAR.  
Using AFAR does not take into consideration frequencies of claims by farm, and as such 
farms that paid a relatively small premium under AFPF are paying considerably higher 
premiums under AFAR (11.04%).  Thus the rather small indemnities are offset by higher 
premiums, resulting in greater absolute variability, ultimately leading to heightened 
relative risk for AFAR compared to AFPF.  Average minimums increased for AGRC and 
NFI $8,769 and $2,863, a larger increase compared to AFPF. 
  117
AFARI all farms 
The final rate, AFARI, resulted in 13.93% rate which generated an average paid 
premium of $5,364 (Table 4.65) with a $1,461 to $10,238 range.  With initial average 
AGRC and NFI equivalent to previous scenarios, the 13.93% applied rate resulted in a 
$1,115 decline from initial levels (Table 4.41).  Under AFARI, farms generated the 
largest standard deviation reduction, compared to AFPF and AFAR, for AGRC and NFI, 
$3,721 and $983 respectively.  Consistent with previous findings, reduction to relative 
risk was virtually equivalent for AGRC.  Between AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI, AFPF 
generated the only relative risk reduction for NFI.  Comparing AFAR and AFARI for 
NFI, AFARI marked the smaller increase of the two (0.44).  Ranking average minimum 
increase reveals AFARI as second to AFAR with an average increase of $5,011 and $340 
for AGRC and NFI. 
AFARI farms with claims 
Eliminating farms with zero claims, average paid premium increased to $5,393, 
indicated in Table 4.65.  Initial average AGRC and NFI are equivalent to AFAR and 
AFPF.  Under AFARI farms generated the largest benefit compared to AFPF and AFAR, 
with average standard deviation reductions of $4,675 and $1,229 (Table 4.42).  With an 
average relative reduction of 0.12 and average increase of 0.33, AFARI ranked second to 
AFAR and AFPF respectively for AGRC and NFI.  Similarly AFARI ranked second to 
AFAR for average minimum increase for AGRC and NFI. 
Summary of VFP less than $100,000 
 Participation in AGR-Lite reduced initial standard deviation for all farms and 
farms with claims under all scenarios for NFI.  Relative risk (CV) generally incurred 
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increases for AFAR and AFARI, however actually declined under AFPF.  This is a direct 
result of farms with small AFPF paying a substantially higher premium under AFAR and 
AFARI, resulting in large CV increases.  Average minimum exhibited consistent 
increases for all farms and farms with claims. 
4.4.2 VFP $100,000 to $249,999 
AFPF all farms 
Of the 126 total crop farms, 49 fell within the VFP level of $100,000 to $249,999.  
These 49 farms reported an average VFP of $162, 533.  Table 4.43 presents the results 
from these farms.  Under AFPF, average paid premium was $7,963 (Table 4.65) with a 
$491 minimum and $23,424 maximum.  Initial average AGRC and NFI were $130,301 
and $31,381.  With participation in AGR-Lite, average standard deviations declined 
$8,144 and $3,803.  Computing relative risk reveals the initial CV values for AGRC 
exhibit considerably less variability than NFI with CVs of 0.35 and 2.54 respectively.  
However, NFI generated a larger relative reduction compared to AGRC, with averages of 
0.22 and 0.07 respectively.  Lastly, average minimum increased roughly 33% and 88%, 
or $21,713 and $8,339, for AGRC and NFI. 
For 49 farms with VFP of $100,000 to $249,999, Table 4.44 presents the 
summary by frequency of claim.  Upwards of 90% of the 49 farms generated a minimum 
of one indemnity over the seven year period.  As expected average premium rates 
increase with increasing frequency of claim.  Consistent with VFP of less than $100,000 
and previous categories, variability of liability increases as claims become more frequent.  
Average indemnity per farm per year ranged from $18,731 to $30,646. 
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AFPF farms with claims 
Five of the 49 farms had zero claims, thus 44 farms remained for analysis.  
Average paid premiums remained unchanged from AFPF all farms.  Initial mean AGRC 
and NFI declined from all farms to $125,575 and $30,528.  After eliminating farms with 
zero claims the reduction in average standard deviation was $9,069 and $4,235 (Table 
4.45).  Although NFI reported a smaller absolute change, relative risk, measured by CV, 
indicates a reduction three times that compared to AGRC.  Average relative risk 
reductions were 0.08 and 0.24 for AGRC and NFI.  The overall increase to average 
minimums increased compared to all farms, on average, $24,181 and $9,286.   
AFAR all farms 
Calculating an AFAR using 49 farms, the following results reflect farms with an 
AFAR of 8.13% (Table 4.46).  On average, these 49 farms paid $7,151 with a $3,223 to 
$13,313 range (Table 4.65).  Initial average AGRC and NFI were unchanged from AFPF.  
Comparing reductions in standard deviations, AGRC was less, while NFI was larger, to 
those for AFPF.  CV statistics indicate an equivalent reduction for AGRC, compared to 
AFPF.  NFI, however, reported an initial CV 0.8 less than that compared to AFPF.  
Furthermore, the reduction under AFPF was nearly three times that compared to AFAR.  
That being said, only 46 farms were included in generating NFI CV for AFAR, whereas 
48 farms were used for AFPF.  Average minimum increased for AGRC and NFI, $21,678 
and $8,465.  When measured against AFPF, the AGRC increase was less while NFI was 
greater.   
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AFAR farms with claims 
Using only farms with claims (44), the average paid premium declined compared 
to all farms to $7,061 with an equivalent range, illustrated in Table 4.65.  Using AFAR, 
average AGRC and NFI increased $902 (Table 4.47).  Average standard deviation 
reductions were $8,808 and $4,258 which were second and first in comparison to AFPF.  
Here again, initial and post AGR-Lite relative risk for AGRC went unchanged compared 
to AFPF.  Conversely, relative risk declined further for NFI compared to AFPF.  
Generating a larger increase than AFPF, average minimum increased $25,014 and 
$10,322 for AGRC and NFI. 
AFARI all farms 
Computing AFARI resulted in a 9.17% rate (Table 4.65), in turn costing farms on 
average $8,065 with a $3,635 to $15,014 range for AGR-Lite.  Applying a rate computed 
using farms with claims, to all farms, resulted in a $914 decrease in average AGRC and 
NFI (Table 4.48).  Application of AFARI resulted in a similar reduction to standard 
deviation compared to AFAR by larger when in comparison to AFPF.  Conversely, the 
higher rate resulted in the lowest standard deviation reduction comparatively for AGRC.  
CV statistics indicate a 0.07 reduction to AGRC however a 0.47 increase to NFI.  
Average minimum increased $20,747 and $7,567 which ranked last for AGRC and NFI 
in comparison to AFPF and AFAR. 
AFARI farms with claims 
For the 44 farms with claims, initial average AGRC and NFI were $125,575 and 
$30,528 (Table 4.49).  Using a rate based solely on farms with claims and assuing 
participation in AGR-Lite, average standard deviation declined $8,773 and $4,258 for 
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AGRC and NFI.  The reduction for AGRC ranked third to AFPF and AFAR whereas, the 
reduction for NFI was equivalent to that for AFAR, both of which were higher than 
AFPF.  Reductions to relative risk were constant for AGRC compared to AFPF and 
AFAR.  Inconsistent with AFPF and AFAR, AFARI generated an increase of 0.05 in 
relative risk.  Increases in average minimum ranked third and second respectively behind 
AFAR and AFPF for AGRC and NFI. 
Summary of VFP $100,000 to $249,999 
 Absolute variability, in NFI, declined with participation in AGR-Lite consistently 
across all scenarios for all farms and farms with claims.  Relative risk declined, for the 
most part, under all farms and farms with claims.  However application of AFARI 
yielded increases in relative risk for all farms and farms with claims.  This result is 
explained by AFPF and AFAR resulting in more farms generating larger reductions 
compared to AFARI, attributed to increased premiums.  Average minimum generated 
consistent increases, across premium scenarios, for all farms and farms with claims.  
Impacts from AGR-Lite tend to be greater for farms with claims compared to all farms. 
4.4.3 VFP $250,000 to $500,000 
AFPF all farms 
There were 38 farms with VFP of $250,000 to $500,000.  These 38 farms 
reported an average VFP of $328,798.  Using AFPF, average paid premium was $11,937 
(Table 4.65) with a $53 to $41,508 range.  Initial average AGRC and NFI were $291,674 
and $73,546 (Table 4.50).  AGR-Lite reduced average standard deviation $12,582 and 
$8,069 respectively for AGRC and NFI.  Initial average relative risk for AGRC and NFI 
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were 0.37 and 1.36.  With AGR-Lite these values declined 0.04 and 0.18.  Average 
minimums increased, as a result of AGR-Lite, $29,221 and $18,714.   
With 87% of farms receiving a minimum of one indemnity over the seven year 
period, Table 4.51 presents the summary by frequency of claim.  Consistent with 
previous findings, average premium rate increases with greater frequency of claims.  
These 38 farms exhibit a definitive increase in average liability as frequencies increase.  
Additionally standard deviation of liability increases as claims become more frequent.  
Average indemnity per farm per year ranged from $36,820 to $66,516.   
AFPF farms with claims 
Of the 38 farms, 33 farms remained receiving at least one indemnity over the 
seven year period.  Average AGRC increased, relative to all farms, to $292,904 while 
NFI declined to $73,115 (Table 4.52).  By eliminating farms with zero claims, average 
reduction in standard deviation increased to $14,489 and $9,929 for AGRC and NFI 
respectively.  Reductions in relative variability were comparable to all farms with slight 
increases.  Along with that, average increases in average minimum were higher for farms 
with claims at $33,649 and $21,550. 
AFAR all farms 
Computing an AFAR of 5.81%, the following reflects the results from 38 farms 
with the applied rate (Table 4.53).  Average paid premium, resulting from an AFAR, was 
$10,367 (Table 4.65).  Initial average AGRC and NFI were equivalent to those for AFPF 
at $291,674 and $73,546.  Perhaps most interesting was the increase in minimum 
average, for NFI, with an initial observation of -$140 to a post value of $13,297 which 
equates to a 9,569% increase.  Average standard deviation declined $12,493 and $8,135, 
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which compared to AFPF were less than and greater than AGRC and NFI respectively.  
Reduction in relative risk went unchanged from AFPF results, whereas AFAR generated 
a larger reduction of 0.26.  Comparison of average minimum increase reveals a greater 
increase for AGRC and NFI relative to AFPF results.   
AFAR farms with claims 
Continuing to apply AFAR, including only farms with claims reveals a $1,198 
increase in average AGRC and NFI, illustrated in Table 4.54.  The average paid premium 
for these farms increased to $10,739 (Table 4.65).  Average reductions in average 
standard deviation ranked second overall compared with AFPF and AFAR for AGRC and 
NFI, on average $14,315 and $9,327.  Similar to previous findings, relative risk 
reductions for AGRC were constant across AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI.  NFI, conversely, 
reported the largest reduction compared to AFPF and AFARI, at 0.37.  Lastly, AFAR 
marked the largest increase in average minimum for AGRC and NFI at $35,334 and 
$23,211. 
AFARI all farms 
Resulting from a computed AFARI of 6.45%, average AGRC and NFI declined 
$1,157 (Table 4.55).  Overall, paid premiums averaged $11,523, illustrated in Table 4.65.  
With average standard deviation reductions of $12,482 and $8,141 for AGRC and NFI, 
these values marked the third and first highest reductions respectively.  Again, average 
reductions in relative variability were nearly equal for AGRC while NFI marked the 
second highest reduction behind AFAR.  Reporting the smallest increase in minimums 
compared to AFPF and AFAR, AGRC and NFI increased minimums, on average, 
$28,654 and $18,111. 
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AFARI farms with claims 
Removal of farms with zero claims increased the average premium cost to 
$11,937 (Table 4.65).  Initial average AGRC and NFI were equivalent to those for AFPF 
(Table 4.56).  With AGR-Lite, 33 farms benefited with average standard deviation 
reductions of $14,294 and $9,330.  CV reveals the second largest reduction for NFI 
(0.34) behind AFAR.  Imposing AGR-Lite average minimum increased $34,190 and 
$22,058 which ranked second to AFAR. 
Summary of VFP $250,000 to $500,000 
 Participation in AGR-Lite reduced absolute variability and relative risk for all 
farms and farms with claims with VFP of $249,999 to $500,000.  Additionally, insuring 
with AGR-Lite increased average minimums for all farms and farms with at least one 
claim. 
4.4.4 VFP greater than $500,000 
AFPF all farms 
There were 6 farms with VFP of greater than $500,000 (Table 4.57).  The average 
VFP for these 6 farms was $877,723.  Using AFPF, the average paid premium, for the 6 
farms, was $16,910 (Table 4.65) with a $5,967 to $27,677 range.  Initial and post AGRC 
and NFI were $831,791 and $197,236.  With participation in AGR-Lite, absolute 
variability measured by standard deviation, declined $16,130 and $14,473.  Relative 
variability declined for AGRC and NFI, however rather minimal at 0.02 and 0.08 
respectively.  Assuming participation in AGR-Lite average minimum increased $55,214 
and $27,966. 
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Table 4.58 presents the summary by frequency for 6 farms.  Four of six farms 
generated a minimum of one claim over the seven year period.  As expected average 
premium rate increases as claims become more frequent.  Use of AFARI resulted in 
premiums which corresponded closely with AFPF.  Consistent with previous analysis, 
average liability declines with increasing frequency of claims.  Unique from previous 
results is the decline in mean standard deviation of liability as claims become more 
frequent.  Finally, average indemnity per farm per year respectively for frequencies 1 
through 3 were $117,717, $71,165, and $31,905. 
AFPF farms with claims 
Eliminating farms with claims, four farms remained for analysis.  Table 4.59 
summarizes the results with use of AFPF on four farms.  Initial mean AGRC and NFI 
declined from all farms to $775,482 and $167,011.  As expected, omitting farms with 
zero claims increased the impact of participation in AGR-Lite on average standard 
deviation.  Respective reductions in standard deviation for AGRC and NFI were $24,194 
and $21,710.  Additionally, reductions to relative risk were reduced further to 0.03 and 
0.12 with participation in AGR-Lite.  Similarly average minimum increased for AGRC 
and NFI, $82,820 and $41,948, corresponding to a 25% and 55% increase. 
AFAR all farms 
Dividing total indemnities by total liabilities resulted in an AFAR of 2.52%.  As 
such, those six farms paid, on average, $11,273 with a $7,214 to $18,453 range (Table 
4.65).  Initial average AGRC and NFI correspond to those for AFPF (Table 4.60).  
Reductions to standard deviation, assuming participation in AGR-Lite were $16,409 and 
$14,863, both of which exceed those compared to AFPF.  Reductions to relative risk 
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were similar in comparison to AFPF, with reductions of 0.02 and 0.08.  Compared to 
AFPF, increases in average minimum were larger at $55,872 and $29,216. 
AFAR farms with claims 
Analyses of farms (4) with claims are presented in Table 4.61 assuming AFAR.  
Following elimination of farms with zero claims average paid premium declined to 
$10,612 (Table 4.65) with a $7,214 to $13,322 range.  As a result, average AGRC and 
NFI increased $6,298.  Average reductions were larger under AFAR, compared to AFPF, 
at $24,411 and $22,002.  Reductions to relative risk were comparable to AFPF.  Average 
minimum, on the other hand, increased compared to AFPF, with averages of $89,730 and 
$49,076. 
AFARI all farms 
Calculating an AFARI of 4.01%, using only farms with claims, Table 4.62 
presents the results for 6 farms with the applied AFARI.  Table 4.65 presents the average 
paid premium by all 6 farms corresponding to AFARI.  Use of AFARI resulted in a mean 
paid premium of $17,964 with an $11,495 to $29,405 range.  Consistent with previous 
findings, due to application of an overstated rate, average AGRC and NFI declined 
$6,691.  Average reduction in standard deviation ranked highest relative to AFPF and 
AFAR with $16,574 and $15,091 declines for AGRC and NFI.  Results from relative risk 
were comparable for AGRC however, reductions for NFI were lowest in comparison to 
AFPF and AFAR.  Lastly, AFARI generated the smallest average minimum increase, in 
comparison to AFAR and AFPF, with increases of $49,564 and $23,267. 
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AFARI farms with claims 
Consistent with AFPF and AFAR, initial mean AGRC and NFI were $775,482 
and $167,011 (Table 4.63).  Eliminating farms with zero claims, 4 farms remained for 
analysis with AFARI.  With an AFARI of 4.01%, indicated in Table 4.65, average paid 
premium, across farms, was $16,910 with a range from $11,495 to $21,229.  Here again, 
assuming participation in AGR-Lite, use of AFARI resulted in a larger benefit in average 
standard deviation reduction compared to AFPF and AFAR, with reductions of $24,539 
and $22,174.  As for relative risk, reductions for AGRC were comparable to AFPF and 
AFAR, while the reduction under NFI was the smallest compared to AFPF and AFAR.  
Average minimum increased $83,783 and $43,271 for AGRC and NFI, which in 
comparison ranked second to AFAR but higher than AFPF. 
Summary of VFP greater than $500,000 
 Overall participation in AGR-Lite consistently reduced standard deviation and 
relative risk for NFI.  Furthermore, AGR-Lite increased average minimums for all farms 
and farms with claims. 
4.5 Summary results by farm category and VFP 
Table 4.64 and Table 4.65 present a combined summary of results by farm type 
and VFP category.  As Table 4.64 reveals crop farms consistently reported higher values 
for; average AFPF, AFAR, average AFAR premium, AFARI, average AFARI premium, 
percent of farms with claims, average indemnity, and frequency of claims in comparison 
to the other four categories.  However crop farms reported the second smallest liability, 
behind beef.  Comparatively, dairy farms registered the smallest values for every 
category with the exception of average liability, for which it ranked highest overall. 
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Table 4.65 reports the summary statistics for four VFP categories.  Average AFPF 
and average premiums corresponding to AFAR and AFARI increase as VFP levels 
increase which are expected as size (liability) increases.  Interestingly VFP of less than 
$100,000 generated the largest AFAR (11.04%) and AFARI (13.93%) followed by VFP 
of $100,000 to $249,999, $250,000 to $500,000, and greater than $500,000.  This 
indicates that smaller farms, measured by VFP, generated claims more frequently, 
relative to larger farms.  Intuitively this makes sense as smaller farms are more 
concentrated in nature thus any economic misfortune will lead to severe losses.  The 
percent of farms which received claims was largest for VFP of $100,000 to $249,999, 
followed by VFP of $250,000 to $500,000, less than $100,000, and greater than 
$500,000.  Frequency of claims ranks VFP category of less than $100,000 highest 
followed by VFP categories of $100,000 to $249,999, $250,000 to $500,000, and greater 
than $500,000. 
4.6 Certainty Equivalent (CE) analysis 
The following sections present CE results under AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI.  Each 
section provides discussion for each category (total, crop, livestock, beef, and dairy). 
Additionally CE results are discussed for VFP categories (less than $100,000, $100,000 
to $249,999, $250,000 to $500,000, and greater than $500,000).  For each scenario results 
are presented including all farms from each category and then farms which yielded a 
minimum of one claim over the seven years.  Using AGRC, CE results were computed 
assuming a logarithmic utility function.  Due to high premium costs and inventory 
adjustments negative values of AGRC were encountered which for a logarithmic utility 
function are problematic.  Realizing this, analysis proceeded by excluding farms with 
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negative values.  As such, farm numbers discussed below may not coincide with those 
previously presented. 
Certainty equivalents provide a monetary proxy for what a decision maker would 
be willing to accept to forgo some risky alternative.  For this analysis CEs revealed the 
level of income a decision maker would be willing to accept in lieu of the observed 
variability in income spanning the seven year period.  It is expected that as variability 
declines CE will increase and vice versa.  Therefore we would expect CEs with AGR-
Lite to be larger than those without AGR-Lite. 
4.6.1 Total Results 
AFPF all farms 
For the five categories, total, crop, livestock, beef, and dairy Table 4.66 presents 
the results assuming AFPF for all farms.  Initial mean CEs for the five categories were 
$194,095, $179,414, $214,262, $182,416, and $331,784 for total, crop, livestock, beef, 
and dairy.  Application of AFPF resulted in each of the five categories yielding a positive 
change in CE suggesting AGR-Lite reduced the initial seven year variability thus proving 
beneficial to producers.  Ranking of the five categories based on change as a percent of 
initial AGRC reveals crop farms as highest followed by total, livestock, beef, and dairy.  
This suggests that participation in AGR-Lite yielded the greatest benefit to crop farms 
and the least to dairy.  This is expected considering the frequency of claims generated by 
crop farms relative to dairy farms.  Respective CE changes (including only farms with 
changes) according to the above ranking were $5,400, $4,769, $3,129, $2,962, and 
$1,674.  Of the five categories dairy farms were the only group not to generate a negative 
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change in CE.  Percent of farms with positive CE change ranged from 31 to 83.  Crop 
farms marked the top slot followed by total, beef, livestock, and dairy. 
AFPF farms with claims 
After excluding farms with zero claims, the following number of farms remained 
from each farm category, 150, 106, 44, 31, and 4 for total, crop, livestock, beef, and 
dairy, located in Table 4.66.  Again theses numbers may not reflect those presented in 
previous analysis due to exclusion of farms with negative observations.  Mean CEs for 
farms with claims for each category were $172,475, $169,377, $179,938, $160,293, and 
$381,702.  Changes in CE were the same as those for all farms as the CE changes only 
reflect farms with increased CE.  Farm category dairy was the only group to increase the 
minimum CE change across categories.  We would expect that by eliminating farms with 
zero claims results would reveal zero farms with decreased CE.  Results were generated 
which calculated the percent of farms with positive changes.  With participation in AGR-
Lite farm category dairy reported 100% of farms with increases followed by crop, total, 
livestock, and beef at 98%, 97%, 95%, and 94% respectively.  These findings are 
somewhat unexpected considering these include indemnities and premiums by farm.  
There are two possible explanations.  In most scenarios farms reduced standard deviation 
with participation in AGR-Lite.  However, the farm with reduced CE yielded an increase 
in standard deviation.  A second reason is that, in general, farms increased minimums and 
reduced maximums with participation AGR-Lite.  However a few farms resulted in 
minimum reductions in AGRC.  In the case for reduced CE the reduction to the 
maximum exceed that in comparison to the reduction in minimum.  As such, even with 
reduced absolute variability, a smaller distribution range resulted in a CE reduction. 
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AFAR all farms 
Using an AFAR calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for 
each category, CE changes shrunk relative to AFPF.  Table 4.67 presents the results 
assuming AFAR.  Consistent with AFPF results, each category generated increases in CE 
with crop farms ranking highest with a $4,428 increase.  Conversely dairy farms recorded 
the smallest benefit from participation in AGR-Lite at $525.  The CE changes across the 
five categories ranged from -$41,624 to $75,050.  Percent of farms with positive change 
declined relative to AFPF, with the exception of dairy which remained at 31%. 
AFAR farms with claims 
After eliminating farms with zero claims, the remaining subset consistently 
yielded greater increases compared to AFPF farms with claims, assuming AFAR (Table 
4.67).  Ordinal ranking of farms based on absolute change places total as number one 
followed by crop, livestock, beef, and dairy.  However rankings are altered when 
compared to those computed as a percent of initial mean AGRC.  On percentage terms 
farm categories were aligned as follows; total, crop, beef, livestock, and dairy.  Compared 
to AFPF, percent of farms with positive change declined with each category, excluding 
dairy which maintained a 100% positive rate.  Percentage changes declined drastically for 
total and crops, each at 69% of farms, whereas livestock and beef dropped to 80% and 
74% respectively. 
AFARI all farms 
The final analysis across categories reflects CEs calculated assuming AFARI, 
which only uses farms who received at least one claim over the seven year period.  Table 
4.68 presents category specific farm numbers, rates, CE, and CE changes.  With a higher 
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applied rate three of the five categories averaged negative CE changes.  These categories 
include livestock, beef, and dairy.  Categories total and crop reported CE increases of 
$104 and $2,914.  CE changes for all categories ranged from -$49,665 to $64,290.  
Applying AFARI, percent of farms with positive change, benefiting producers, declined 
even further, relative to AFPF and AFAR. 
AFARI farms with claims 
Results for farms with claims assuming AFARI, calculated using farms with 
claims are presented on the lower half of Table 4.68.  Ordinal ranking of categories based 
on the magnitude of CE change places crop at the top with an average increase of $5,207.  
Interestingly, change as a percent of initial mean AGRC reveals category total reaped the 
largest benefit with an average CE change of $4,464, second to crop.  For farms with 
claims the range in CE changes spanned from -$40,480 to $64,290.  Farm percentages 
were computed to indicate the percent of farms with increased CEs.  Dairy farms with 
claims reported 75% with positive increases.  The remaining categories reported 61%, 
59%, 52%, and 48% with increases for crop, total, beef, and livestock.  These values 
were lower in comparison to AFPF and AFAR. 
Summary for total CE results 
 Overall participation in AGR-Lite increased CE indicating the product to be 
beneficial to producers through a reduction in variability over the seven years.  With the 
exception of application of AFARI for all farms, AGR-Lite increased CE for all farms 
and farms with claims.  Even so, crop farms and total farms increased CE, while 
livestock, beef, and dairy declined under AFARI for all farms.  As expected the percent 
of farms with increased CE increased for farms with claims in comparison to all farms. 
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4.6.2 Value of Farm Production Results – Crop Farms 
AFPF all farms 
For the four VFP categories from smallest to largest initial CE means, without AGR-Lite, 
for the respective categories were $51,204, $121,088, $270,331, and $763,724 (Table 
4.69).  As the table indicates, and as expected, using AFPF resulted in zero change to 
mean AGRC.  However, results reveal participation in AGR-Lite increased mean CE 
with changes ranging from $1,964 to $20,992.  This indicates that the presence of AGR-
Lite reduced the variability within the seven year distribution, leading to CE increases.  
To establish ordinal ranking of categories, average changes can be divided by initial 
AGRC.  As such, VFP of $100,000 to $249,999 resulted in the largest change, followed 
by VFP of less than $100,000, greater than $500,000, and $250,000 to $500,000.  
However, VFP of $250,000 to $500,000 reported the largest percent of farms with a 
positive change at 87%.  The smallest percent (67) resided in VFP category of greater 
than $500,000.   
AFPF farms with claims 
For VFP categories from smallest to largest 25, 44, 33, and 4 farms remained 
generating at least one claim.  Results for these farms are located at the bottom of Table 
4.69.  Initial mean CE dropped for each VFP category averaging $45,445, $115,949, 
$270,152, and 700,254.  With application of AFPF mean AGRC remain unchanged.  CE 
changes go unchanged from all farms because CE change was calculated using only 
farms with increased CE.  To compare CE changes were divided by initial AGRC.  As a 
percent of initial mean AGRC, VFP of less than $100,000 generated the greatest benefit 
to farms followed by VFP of $100,000 to $249,999, greater than $500,000, and $250,000 
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to $500,000 respectively.  Percent of farms with positive changes increased considerably 
with three of the four categories achieving 100%.  The only category not attaining 100% 
was VFP of $100,000 to $249,999 with 95%.  Further examination reveals the two farms 
with reduced CEs showed increases in standard deviation. 
AFAR all farms 
Results by category under AFAR all farms are reported at the top portion of Table 
4.70.  Average premium rates by category were 11.04%, 8.13%, 5.81%, and 2.52% from 
smallest to largest VFP categories.  Initial CE averages by VFP category were $51,204, 
$121,088, $270,331, and $763,724.  With participation in AGR-Lite average CE changes, 
for farms with increases, ranged from $1,033 to $14,445.  To rank categories, average CE 
change as a percent of initial mean AGRC revealed VFP of $100,000 to $249,999 was 
highest followed by VFP of $250,000 to $500,000, less than $100,000, and greater than 
$500,000.  Using AFAR, percent of farms with positive changes fell for each category, in 
comparison to AFPF, ranging from 44% to 59%.  Using AFPF, participation in AGR-Lite 
cost nothing to farms with zero claims thus their corresponding distributions remain 
unaffected.  However using AFAR, farms with zero claims incur the cost of insurance 
which is reflected in a reduced income distribution, by the cost of insurance.  
AFAR farms with claims 
The lower half of Table 4.70 presents the results for farms with claims assuming 
application of AFAR.  Initial CEs declined from all farms, averaging $45,445, $115,949, 
$270,152, and $700,254 from smallest to highest VFP categories.  CE average changes 
across the four categories increased from all farms with a $2,537 to $28,225 range.  
Converting CE changes to a percent of initial AGRC reveals VFP of less than $100,000 
  135
as the highest followed by VFP of $100,000 to $249,999, greater than $500,000, and 
$250,000 to $500,000.  Comparing these results to those from AFPF reveal equivalent 
rankings.  The percentage of farms with positive changes fell precipitously compared to 
AFPF with an overall range of 56% to 75%.  VFP of less than $100,000 had the smallest 
(56%) while VFP of greater than $500,000 had the highest (75%). 
AFARI all farms 
Computing a rate which reflected only farms with claims, excluding farms with 
zero claims, resulted in the following rates, 13.93%, 9.17%, 6.45%, and 4.01%, for VFP 
categories of less than $100,000, $100,000 to $249,999, $250,000 to $500,000, and 
greater than $500,000 (Table 4.71).  Average change in CE was comparable to AFPF and 
AFAR.  Of the four categories VFP of less than $100,000 was the only group to sustain a 
decline ($118).  The remaining VFP categories reported an average increase ranging from 
$3,474 to $7,392.  As a percent of initial AGRC, VFP of $100,000 to $249,999 ranked 
highest with VFP of $250,000 to $500,000 and greater than $500,000 following 
respectively.  Comparing the percent of farms with positive changes indicates slight 
decreases for VFP of less than $100,000 and $250,000 to $500,000 to AFAR.  However, 
VFP of $100,000 to $249,999 and greater than $500,000 resulted in an equivalent 
percentage increase (59% and 50%). 
AFARI farms with claims 
After elimination of farms with zero claims, the following results reflect CEs 
from farms with claims located in lower half of Table 4.71.Continuing with use of 
AFARI, initial average CE declined from all farms.  By eliminating farms with zero 
claims, average CE changes were positive for every category ranging from $1,348 to 
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$21,543.  As a percent of initial AGRC, VFP of $100,000 to $249,999 ranked first, 
followed by VFP of less than $100,000, greater than $500,000, and $250,000 to 
$500,000.  The only difference in rankings compared to AFPF and AFAR, was the first 
and second slots, which interchanged for AFARI.  Similar to findings for all farms, 
percent of farms with positive changes went unchanged for VFP of $100,000 to $249,999 
and greater than $500,000, and declined for VFP of less than $100,000 and $250,000 to 
$500,000. 
Summary of VFP CE results 
 Overall, participation in AGR-Lite increased CE for each VFP category indicating 
the presence of insurance reduced income variability over the seven years.  It was only 
with application of AFARI that VFP of less than $100,000 reduced CE.  As expected, 
percent of farms with increased CE rose when comparing all farms to only farms with 
claims.  Additionally, as farm size increased CE change did as well. 
4.7 Downside Risk 
Another measure used to evaluate the effectiveness of AGR-Lite at risk reduction 
was Downside Risk (DR).  DR informs a manager of the largest downside potential risk 
he/she could incur from a given alternative or strategy relative to some target income.  
This could also be thought of as safety first criterion which suggests a farm manager will 
evaluate a decision based on performance against the criterion.  Using a Kansas average 
family living cost and the number of operators per farm and computing the product, a 
target return was determined and then subtracted from NFI.  DR was calculated prior to 
and post participation in AGR-Lite.  Section 4.7.1 presents the results for DR assuming 
AFAR and AFARI for all categories.  Subsequently, section 4.7.2 presents DR results for 
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crop farms which were grouped into VFP categories.  Additionally both scenarios will 
provide discussions and comparisons of results for all farms and then farms with claims 
(eliminating farms with zero claims). 
DR was only examined under AFAR and AFARI because, unlike AFPF, these 
premium scenarios result in changes to minimum and maximum averages.  With that 
said, AFPF would result in a zero change to DR and thus was not used for DR analysis. 
4.7.1 Total Results 
AFAR all farms  
Table 4.72 presents the summary of DR by farm category assuming application of 
AFAR.  Initial mean DRs by farm category were $11,964, $9,126, $15,810, $13,158, and 
$29,155 for total, crop, livestock, beef, and dairy respectively.  These results indicate 
crops farms retained the greatest initial DR, evident by the lowest value.  The overall 
range in DR change across farm categories was -$40,575 to $30,961.  Given application 
of AFAR, on average, DR change was zero with participation in AGR-Lite.  The bottom 
of Table 4.72 provides a summary by farm category of farms with increased and 
decreased DR.  To clarify, increased DR, indicated by negative values, implies the farm 
was worse off as a result of the insurance product.  Decreased DR, indicated by positive 
values, suggests the farm benefited from the insurance program.  Towards the top of the 
table, minimum and maximum DR was included with and without participation in AGR-
Lite to illustrate the range in DR by farm category.  In the presence of AGR-Lite the 
minimum DR decreased for farm categories dairy, crop, and total.  Individuals would 
expect to decrease DR with insurance.  For example, farm category dairy increased the 
minimum from -$47,236 to -$44,627, with participation in AGR-Lite, meaning a DR 
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decrease.  The crop farm category results reveal nearly 47% of farms with decreased DR, 
the largest across categories.  For the 59 crop farms DR declined $6,402 indicating, on 
average, a farm increased their bottom dollar $6,402.  Percent of farms with decreased 
DR ranged from 30.77% to 46.83%.  Farm category dairy reported 4 farms (30%) with an 
average DR decrease of $3,089, the lowest across categories.  Despite grabbing the 
largest benefit from AGR-Lite, 67 of the 126 crop farms, consequently, tallied the largest 
average increase in DR by $5,637.  The largest percent (69) of farms with increased DR 
was farm category dairy.  Although dairy had the highest percentage, these farms marked 
the lowest average increase across categories at $1,373. 
AFAR farms with claims 
Excluding farms with zero claims average DR across farm categories were 
$9,331, $6,995, $14,766, $13,584, and $50,827 for total, crop, livestock, beef, and dairy 
respectively, presented in Table 4.73.  With participation in AGR-Lite average decreases 
to DR, beneficial to producers, were highest for livestock at $3,574 and lowest for crops 
at $1,419.  Farms incurred DR decreases due to the elimination of farms with zero claims.  
By eliminating farms with zero claims, DR results are no longer influenced by farms with 
lowered distributions due only to premium costs.  That said, including farms with zero 
claims increases the number of farms with increased DR.  As a comparative measure 
calculating average DR change as a percent of initial DR, reveals total farms, which had 
the fourth highest decrease, actually reported the largest average percent decrease in DR 
followed by beef, livestock, crop, and dairy.  Dairy was the only farm category to have 
reported 100% of farms with reductions in DR (benefiting producers) compared to other 
farm categories.  Further analysis of farm categories by farms with increases and 
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decreases in DR as a percentage of initial downside risk reveal crop farms generated the 
greatest benefit followed by total, beef, livestock, and dairy.  The number of farms with 
increased DR declined when eliminating farms with zero claims.  This makes sense due 
to the elimination of farms that paid a premium but received no claim.  In doing so, DR 
results are no longer influenced by farms with declining distributions due only to 
premium costs. 
AFARI all farms 
Using only farms which received at least one claim over the seven year period for 
every category, an AFARI was computed and applied to each farm category.  With rates 
reflecting farms with claims each farm category (including all farms), on average, were 
worse off, meaning an increase in DR, as a result of participation in AGR-Lite.  Average 
changes in DR ranged from -$1,438 to -$3,842.  Examining DR changes as a percent of 
initial DR suggest beef farms were most negatively impacted, followed by livestock, 
total, crop, and dairy.  Similar results were found when ordinal ranking of farm 
categories, based on average reductions to DR, were performed.  Table 4.74, near the 
bottom, presents the average reduction in DR, computed using only farms with decreased 
DR.  Across farm categories, average DR reductions ranged from $2,073 to $6,426.  
Computing the reductions as a percent of initial DR indicates category crop farms 
sustained the largest reduction comparatively followed by total, livestock, beef, and 
dairy.  Additionally, just over 41% of crop farms (largest across categories) generated a 
reduction in DR. 
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AFARI farms with claims 
Table 4.75 presents the summary DR results by farm category assuming an 
AFARI.  A comparison of AFARI to AFAR results reveals slight differences.  First, as 
expected from a higher applied rate, less farms reduced DR.  Furthermore, farms with 
decreased DR incurred, on average, a smaller reduction in DR ranging from $2,073 to 
$6,426.  Recall under AFAR, category dairy reported 100% of farms with decreased DR, 
followed by livestock, beef, total, and crop.  While category dairy continued to report the 
highest percent of farms with decreased DR (75%), livestock and beef were interchanged, 
arranging themselves fifth and fourth behind crop and total at second and third.  Ordinal 
ranking based on average decrease in DR, calculated as a percent of initial DR, placed 
crop first followed by total, livestock, beef, and dairy.  When compared to AFAR, results 
are consistent with the exception of beef and livestock which ranked fourth and third 
respectively. 
Summary of total DR results 
 Participation in AGR-Lite did reduce DR, benefiting producers, however the 
impact varies with premium application.  Reductions to DR were higher under AFAR in 
comparison to AFARI.  Increases in DR were also higher under AFARI relative to 
AFAR.  This is a directly related to the higher associated premium costs resulting from a 
higher rate.  Furthermore, percent of farms with increased DR, which negatively impact 
farms, declined when eliminating farms with zero claims.  As such the results no longer 
include farms which paid a premium and received zero claims.  Therefore there are no 
farms with lowered distributions attributed only to premium costs.  
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4.7.2 Value of Farm Production (VFP) – Crop farms 
AFAR all farms 
Table 4.76 presents the results for VFP categories assuming AFAR.  Initial DR 
ranged from -$18,533 to $142,139.  These results indicate VFP of less than $100,000 to 
bear the greatest DR followed by VFP of $100,000 to $249,999, $250,000 to $500,000, 
and greater than $500,000.  Use of AFAR on all farms resulted in a zero DR change, 
which is expected from an AFAR in which indemnities equal premiums.  However, 
average decrease in DR, located near the bottom of the table, by category does establish a 
ranking.  Due to variation in average DR, average reductions were computed as a percent 
of initial DR to establish rankings.  These percentages reveal the following ranking from 
most to least preferred; VFP of $100,000 to $249,999, $250,000 to $500,000, less than 
$100,000, and greater than $500,000.  The percent of farms with DR reductions ranged 
from 28.95% to 50%.  It is apparent that a greater percent of farms increased DR, 
negatively impacting farms, with average increases ranging from -$3,052 to -$10,206. 
AFAR farms with claims 
Eliminating farms with zero claims results deviate from all farms as Table 4.77 
illustrates.  Initial DRs were -$18,498, -$5,648, $30,036, and $121,676 for VFP of less 
than $100,000, $100,000 to $249,999, $250,000 to $500,000, and greater than $500,000.  
Using AFAR, average change in DR increased, indicating greater decreases in DR, for all 
categories as a result of participation in AGR-Lite.  Average DR changes ranged from 
$902 to $6,298.  This indicates that one farm category reduced DR, on average, $902, 
meaning they would be $902 better off with participation in AGR-Lite.  Ordinal ranking, 
following computation of DR changes as a percent of initial DR, reveals VFP of 
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$100,000 to $249,999 to benefit the greatest followed by VFP of less than $100,000, 
greater than $500,000, and $250,000 to $500,000.  Further analysis broke farms apart 
according to increases and decreases in DR.  Three of the four VFP categories reported 
more than 50% of farms with decreased DR.  Ranking of categories by decreased DR, as 
a percent of initial DR, coincides with those of AFAR all farms. 
AFARI all farms 
A second scenario calculated an AFARI which used only farms with claims.  
These results are summarized and presented in Table 4.78.  Initial DR levels parallel 
those for AFAR all farms.  Through application of AFARI, average change in DR were 
negative for all categories ranging from -$914 to -$6,691.  This indicates that each VFP 
category increased DR which negatively impacted farms.  Computing these changes as 
percent of initial DR reveals VFP of $100,000 to $249,999 as having the largest 
percentage DR increase, followed by VFP of less than $100,000, greater than $500,000, 
and $250,000 to $500,000.  Although VFP of $100,000 to $249,999 had the largest 
percentage increase change in DR, when analyzing only farms with decreased DR as a 
percentage of initial DR, were comparatively the highest across categories.  The percent 
of farms with decreased DR ranged from 33% to 50%, indicating a greater percent of 
farms increased DR with participation in AGR-Lite.  This suggests AGR-Lite may not be 
effective in reducing DR. 
AFARI farms with claims 
Excluding farms with zero claims, Table 4.79 presents downside risk results 
assuming AFARI.  Initial levels of DR are equivalent to those for AFAR farms with 
claims.  Comparing rank of VFP categories by average decrease in DR as a percent of 
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initial DR reveals an exact match to AFAR.  Different from AFAR is the percent of farms 
with decreased DR.  VFP categories greater than $250,000 remained unchanged while 
VFP categories below $250,000 reduced the percent of farms with decreased DR.  As 
such, the percent of farms with increased DR increased under AFARI, a direct result of 
increased premiums due to a higher premium rate. 
Summary of VFP DR results 
 As expected, participation in AGR-Lite, in most instances, reduced DR.  
Consistent with previous findings results will vary with premium selection.  Average 
decreases in DR were greater under AFAR in comparison to AFARI, due to lower 
associated premium costs.  Increases to DR, negatively impacting farms, were larger 
under AFARI compared to AFAR which is expected due to increased premium costs.  
The percent of farms with decreased DR increased for farms with claims in comparison 
to all farms.  These results are expected following the elimination of farms with zero 
claims with lowered distributions attributed to corresponding premium costs.   
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Table 4.1  Summary statistics for 219 SE Kansas farms assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $203,236 $203,236 $0 0.00% $49,284 $49,284 $0 0.00%
Minimum $15,560 $15,560 $0 0.00% -$19,073 -$19,073 $0 0.00%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,160,123 $0 0.00% $414,205 $414,205 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $64,803 $58,380 -$6,424 -9.91% $41,280 $38,437 -$2,843 -6.89%
Minimum $6,086 $2,931 -$57,563 -51.84% $4,958 $3,075 -$62,315 -37.98%
Maximum $529,292 $481,845 $17,617 -8.96% $250,775 $240,432 $22,622 -4.12%
Average CV1 0.33 0.28 -0.05 -14.60% 1.63 1.53 -0.10 -6.00%
Minimum 0.06 0.06 -0.33 0.00% 0.19 0.19 -3.73 0.00%
Maximum 1.41 1.11 0.10 -21.35% 35.28 34.52 2.07 -2.18%
Average Minimum $118,185 $134,517 $16,333 13.82% -$6,631 $273 $6,904 104.12%
Minimum -$24,742 -$1,888 -$13,416 92.37% -$313,879 -$147,879 -$20,333 52.89%
Maximum $783,502 $827,107 $166,000 5.57% $218,015 $261,620 $166,000 20.00%
Average Maximum $298,628 $293,665 -$4,962 -1.66% $111,852 $109,276 -$2,576 -2.30%
Minimum $25,147 $21,723 -$41,508 -13.62% -$2,300 -$6,335 -$35,628 -175.44%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,680,736 $37,357 -1.62% $719,861 $712,594 $84,436 -1.01%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 202 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note: Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)
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Table 4.2  Summary by frequency of claim for 219 SE Kansas farms assuming AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI 
Years With 
Indemnity
Number of 
Farms
Average 
Premium Rate1
Average AFPF 
Premium Paid2
Average AFAR 
Premium Paid3
Average AFARI 
Premium Paid4
Average 
Liability5
Mean Standard 
Deviation of 
Liability6
Average 
Indemnity/Farm/
Year7
0 66 0.00% $0 $6,375 $9,577 $140,336 $11,261 $0
1 60 3.34% $4,810 $6,542 $9,828 $144,011 $11,753 $33,673
2 40 6.24% $6,690 $4,874 $7,322 $107,292 $10,714 $23,414
3 30 9.38% $10,894 $5,274 $7,923 $116,100 $14,633 $25,418
4 13 15.67% $15,866 $4,599 $6,910 $101,246 $14,197 $27,766
5 7 23.18% $16,332 $3,201 $4,809 $70,467 $19,401 $22,865
6 2 23.19% $15,723 $3,080 $4,627 $67,798 $22,472 $18,343
7 1 30.52% $23,156 $3,447 $5,178 $75,874 $14,621 $23,156
1Average premium rate reflects the average premium rate calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for each frequency of indemnity
2Average Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) premium paid reflects the average paid premium resulting from AFPF such that premiums equal indemnities
3Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFAR (4.54%)
7Average indemnity per farm per year was calculated using the following formula: (((sum of indemnities)/(number of farms))/ years with indemnity)
4Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFARI (6.82%)
5Average liability was computed by averaging the liability across farms for each frequency of claim
6Mean standard deviation of liability was calculated by taking the average of the standard deviation of liability by farm
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Table 4.3 Summary statistics for 153 SE Kansas farms with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm 
(AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average 
AGRC Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $182,736 $182,736 $0 0.00% $46,247 $46,247 $0 0.00%
Minimum $15,560 $15,560 $0 0.00% -$10,968 -$10,968 $0 0.00%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,160,123 $0 0.00% $414,205 $414,205 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $66,144 $56,949 -$9,195 -13.90% $41,103 $37,033 -$4,070 -9.90%
Minimum $6,086 $2,931 -$57,563 -51.84% $4,958 $3,075 -$62,315 -37.98%
Maximum $529,292 $481,845 $17,617 -8.96% $250,775 $188,460 $22,622 -24.85%
Average CV1 0.37 0.30 -0.07 -18.91% 1.69 1.55 -0.14 -8.45%
Minimum 0.12 0.09 -0.33 -20.61% 0.22 0.19 -3.73 -11.74%
Maximum 1.41 1.11 0.10 -21.35% 35.28 34.52 2.07 -2.18%
Average Minimum $92,742 $116,120 $23,378 25.21% -$10,957 -$1,075 $9,882 90.19%
Minimum -$24,742 -$1,888 -$13,416 92.37% -$313,879 -$147,879 -$20,333 52.89%
Maximum $783,502 $827,107 $166,000 5.57% $218,015 $261,620 $166,000 20.00%
Average Maximum $278,688 $271,585 -$7,103 -2.55% $108,384 $104,697 -$3,687 -3.40%
Minimum $25,147 $21,723 -$41,508 -13.62% -$2,300 -$6,335 -$35,628 -175.44%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,680,736 $37,357 -1.62% $719,861 $712,594 $84,436 -1.01%
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 138 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
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Table 4.4   Summary statistics for 219 SE Kansas farms assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average 
AGRC Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $203,236 $203,236 $0 0.00% $49,284 $49,284 $0 0.00%
Minimum $15,560 $21,002 -$30,602 34.98% -$19,073 -$20,493 -$1,420 -7.45%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,134,816 $30,961 -2.18% $414,205 $388,898 -$25,307 -6.11%
Average Std Deviation $64,803 $58,380 -$6,424 -9.91% $41,280 $38,401 -$2,879 -6.97%
Minimum $6,086 $2,942 -$57,025 -51.67% $4,958 $3,097 -$1,861 -37.54%
Maximum $529,292 $479,664 $16,995 -9.38% $250,775 $239,336 -$11,439 -4.56%
Average CV1 0.33 0.28 -0.06 -17.03% 1.32 1.23 -0.09 -6.66%
Minimum 0.06 0.06 -0.76 4.14% 0.19 0.16 -0.03 -14.01%
Maximum 1.41 0.70 0.04 -50.38% 10.42 19.22 8.80 84.50%
Average Minimum $118,185 $134,670 $16,486 13.95% -$6,631 $382 $7,013 105.77%
Minimum -$24,742 $15,292 -$31,777 161.81% -$313,879 -$135,631 $178,248 56.79%
Maximum $783,502 $800,031 $178,248 2.11% $218,015 $234,545 $16,530 7.58%
Average Maximum $298,628 $293,695 -$4,933 -1.65% $111,852 $109,238 -$2,613 -2.34%
Minimum $25,147 $26,773 -$31,639 6.47% -$2,300 -$3,108 -$808 -35.14%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,685,628 $42,522 -1.33% $719,861 $688,222 -$31,639 -4.40%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 200 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.5 Summary statistics for 153 SE Kansas farms with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate 
(AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average 
AGRC Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $182,736 $185,486 $2,750 1.50% $46,247 $48,997 $2,750 5.95%
Minimum $15,560 $21,002 -$25,307 34.98% -$10,968 -$13,450 -$2,483 -22.64%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,134,816 $30,961 -2.18% $414,205 $388,898 -$25,307 -6.11%
Average Std Deviation $66,144 $57,001 -$9,142 -13.82% $41,103 $37,015 -$4,087 -9.94%
Minimum $6,086 $2,942 -$57,025 -51.67% $4,958 $3,097 -$1,861 -37.54%
Maximum $529,292 $479,664 $16,995 -9.38% $250,775 $186,419 -$64,355 -25.66%
Average CV1 0.37 0.28 -0.08 -22.71% 1.45 1.05 -0.39 -27.24%
Minimum 0.12 0.08 -0.76 -27.47% 0.22 0.16 -0.06 -25.53%
Maximum 1.41 0.69 0.04 -51.01% 10.42 13.28 2.87 27.52%
Average Minimum $92,742 $119,027 $26,285 28.34% -$10,957 $1,789 $12,746 116.33%
Minimum -$24,742 $15,292 -$12,079 161.81% -$313,879 -$135,631 $178,248 56.79%
Maximum $783,502 $800,031 $178,248 2.11% $218,015 $234,545 $16,530 7.58%
Average Maximum $278,688 $274,462 -$4,226 -1.52% $108,384 $107,476 -$908 -0.84%
Minimum $25,147 $26,773 -$31,639 6.47% -$2,300 -$3,108 -$808 -35.14%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,685,628 $42,522 -1.33% $719,861 $688,222 -$31,639 -4.40%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 137 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.6 Summary statistics for 219 SE Kansas farms assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities 
(AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average 
AGRC Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $203,236 $200,349 -$2,886 -1.42% $49,284 $46,398 -$2,886 -5.86%
Minimum $15,560 $20,606 -$45,976 32.43% -$19,073 -$21,206 -$2,134 -11.19%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,118,451 $25,662 -3.59% $414,205 $372,533 -$41,672 -10.06%
Average Std Deviation $64,803 $58,383 -$6,421 -9.91% $41,280 $38,388 -$2,892 -7.01%
Minimum $6,086 $2,951 -$56,755 -51.50% $4,958 $3,112 -$1,846 -37.23%
Maximum $529,292 $478,569 $16,705 -9.58% $250,775 $238,791 -$11,984 -4.78%
Average CV1 0.33 0.28 -0.05 -15.85% 1.29 1.53 0.24 18.94%
Minimum 0.06 0.06 -0.75 6.32% 0.19 0.17 -0.02 -11.82%
Maximum 1.41 0.71 0.05 -49.80% 10.42 71.03 60.61 581.91%
Average Minimum $118,185 $131,850 $13,666 11.56% -$6,631 -$2,458 $4,173 62.93%
Minimum -$24,742 $14,956 -$47,742 160.45% -$313,879 -$143,378 $170,501 54.32%
Maximum $783,502 $782,778 $170,501 -0.09% $218,015 $217,291 -$724 -0.33%
Average Maximum $298,628 $290,828 -$7,800 -2.61% $111,852 $106,336 -$5,516 -4.93%
Minimum $25,147 $26,180 -$47,534 4.11% -$2,300 -$3,514 -$1,214 -52.79%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,674,186 $32,777 -2.00% $719,861 $672,327 -$47,534 -6.60%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 198 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.7  Summary statistics for 153 SE Kansas farms with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate for 
farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $182,736 $182,736 $0 0.00% $46,247 $46,247 $0 0.00%
Minimum $15,560 $20,606 -$41,672 32.43% -$10,968 -$17,095 -$6,127 -55.86%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,118,451 $25,662 -3.59% $414,205 $372,533 -$41,672 -10.06%
Average Std Deviation $66,144 $57,031 -$9,113 -13.78% $41,103 $37,012 -$4,091 -9.95%
Minimum $6,086 $2,951 -$56,755 -51.50% $4,958 $3,112 -$1,846 -37.23%
Maximum $529,292 $478,569 $16,705 -9.58% $250,775 $185,397 -$65,377 -26.07%
Average CV1 0.37 0.29 -0.08 -21.51% 1.45 1.62 0.17 11.91%
Minimum 0.12 0.09 -0.75 -26.63% 0.22 0.17 -0.05 -23.63%
Maximum 1.41 0.70 0.05 -50.50% 10.42 71.03 60.61 581.91%
Average Minimum $92,742 $116,341 $23,600 25.45% -$10,957 -$916 $10,041 91.64%
Minimum -$24,742 $14,956 -$18,721 160.45% -$313,879 -$143,378 $170,501 54.32%
Maximum $783,502 $782,778 $170,501 -0.09% $218,015 $217,291 -$724 -0.33%
Average Maximum $278,688 $271,781 -$6,907 -2.48% $108,384 $104,744 -$3,640 -3.36%
Minimum $25,147 $26,180 -$47,534 4.11% -$2,300 -$3,514 -$1,214 -52.79%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,674,186 $32,777 -2.00% $719,861 $672,327 -$47,534 -6.60%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 137 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.8  Summary statistics for 126 SE Kansas crop farms assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $192,445 $192,445 $0 0.00% $46,005 $46,005 $0 0.00%
Minimum $15,560 $15,560 $0 0.00% -$10,968 -$10,968 $0 0.00%
Maximum $1,034,902 $1,034,902 $0 0.00% $264,961 $264,961 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $71,536 $62,941 -$8,595 -12.02% $43,643 $38,792 -$4,851 -11.12%
Minimum $6,509 $2,931 -$57,563 -54.97% $5,076 $3,075 -$62,315 -39.42%
Maximum $529,292 $481,845 $6,328 -8.96% $250,775 $237,850 $16,902 -5.15%
Average CV1 0.37 0.31 -0.06 -16.93% 2.07 1.91 -0.16 -7.93%
Minimum 0.09 0.09 -0.30 -2.64% 0.22 0.23 -3.73 3.49%
Maximum 1.41 1.11 0.10 -21.35% 35.28 34.52 2.07 -2.18%
Average Minimum $98,362 $119,286 $20,925 21.27% -$13,789 -$3,136 $10,653 77.26%
Minimum -$1,341 -$1,888 -$13,416 -40.78% -$313,879 -$147,879 -$19,974 52.89%
Maximum $729,900 $729,900 $166,000 0.00% $168,481 $168,481 $166,000 0.00%
Average Maximum $296,738 $289,756 -$6,983 -2.35% $112,259 $107,593 -$4,666 -4.16%
Minimum $25,147 $21,723 -$41,508 -13.62% -$2,300 -$6,335 -$35,628 -175.44%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,680,736 $13,381 -1.62% $686,230 $686,230 $38,922 0.00%
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 115 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
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Table 4.9  Summary by frequency of claim for 126 SE Kansas crop farms assuming AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI 
Years With 
Indemnity
Number of 
Farms
Average 
Premium Rate1
Average AFPF 
Premium Paid2
Average AFAR 
Premium Paid3
Average AFARI 
Premium Paid4
Average 
Liability5
Mean Standard 
Deviation of 
Liability6
Average 
Indemnity/Farm/
Year7
0 19 0.00% $0 $7,994 $9,536 $128,077 $11,788 $0
1 39 3.64% $4,813 $8,243 $9,833 $132,069 $11,908 $33,689
2 26 6.24% $7,878 $7,875 $9,395 $126,184 $12,722 $27,572
3 25 10.26% $11,506 $6,997 $8,346 $112,105 $13,465 $26,848
4 11 16.26% $14,991 $5,753 $6,863 $92,174 $12,913 $26,233
5 4 24.00% $14,558 $3,786 $4,516 $60,659 $17,519 $20,381
6 1 26.16% $12,780 $3,049 $3,637 $48,850 $12,654 $14,910
7 1 30.52% $23,156 $4,736 $5,649 $75,874 $14,621 $23,156
5Average liability was computed by averaging the liability across farms for each frequency of claim
6Mean standard deviation of liability was calculated by taking the average of the standard deviation of liability by farm
1Average premium rate reflects the average premium rate calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for each frequency of indemnity
2Average Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) premium paid reflects the average paid premium resulting from AFPF such that premiums equal indemnities
3Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFAR (6.24%)
4Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFARI (7.45%)
7Average indemnity per farm per year was calculated using the following formula: (((sum of indemnities)/(number of farms))/ years with indemnity)
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Table 4.10  Summary statistics for 107 SE Kansas crop farms with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by 
Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $182,705 $182,705 $0 0.00% $43,199 $43,199 $0 0.00%
Minimum $15,560 $15,560 $0 0.00% -$10,968 -$10,968 $0 0.00%
Maximum $988,138 $988,138 $0 0.00% $197,331 $197,331 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $69,997 $59,875 -$10,122 -14.46% $43,624 $37,911 -$5,713 -13.10%
Minimum $6,509 $2,931 -$57,563 -54.97% $5,076 $3,075 -$62,315 -39.42%
Maximum $529,292 $481,845 $6,328 -8.96% $250,775 $188,460 $16,902 -24.85%
Average CV1 0.38 0.31 -0.07 -19.41% 1.92 1.72 -0.20 -10.24%
Minimum 0.12 0.09 -0.30 -20.61% 0.22 0.23 -3.73 3.49%
Maximum 1.41 1.11 0.10 -21.35% 35.28 34.52 2.07 -2.18%
Average Minimum $88,113 $112,753 $24,640 27.96% -$17,675 -$5,130 $12,544 70.97%
Minimum -$1,341 -$1,888 -$13,416 -40.78% -$313,879 -$147,879 -$19,974 52.89%
Maximum $482,838 $492,817 $166,000 2.07% $70,438 $83,158 $166,000 18.06%
Average Maximum $283,864 $275,641 -$8,222 -2.90% $109,380 $103,886 -$5,494 -5.02%
Minimum $25,147 $21,723 -$41,508 -13.62% -$2,300 -$6,335 -$35,628 -175.44%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,680,736 $13,381 -1.62% $484,797 $476,248 $38,922 -1.76%
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 96 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
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Table 4.11  Summary statistics for 126 SE Kansas crop farms assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average 
AGRC Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $192,445 $192,445 $0 0.00% $46,005 $46,005 $0 0.00%
Minimum $15,560 $20,707 -$40,575 33.08% -$10,968 -$7,170 -$40,575 34.62%
Maximum $1,034,902 $994,326 $27,017 -3.92% $264,961 $243,118 $27,017 -8.24%
Average Std Deviation $71,536 $62,997 -$8,539 -11.94% $43,643 $38,709 -$4,934 -11.31%
Minimum $6,509 $2,949 -$56,824 -54.70% $5,076 $3,108 -$65,116 -38.77%
Maximum $529,292 $478,849 $5,192 -9.53% $250,775 $235,873 $16,136 -5.94%
Average CV1 0.37 0.30 -0.07 -19.02% 1.49 1.46 -0.04 -2.45%
Minimum 0.09 0.08 -0.75 -10.30% 0.22 0.17 -7.32 -24.16%
Maximum 1.41 0.71 0.04 -49.95% 10.42 33.64 26.05 222.91%
Average Minimum $98,362 $119,574 $21,212 21.57% -$13,789 -$2,765 $11,024 79.95%
Minimum -$1,341 $15,042 -$38,824 1221.90% -$313,879 -$141,398 -$32,195 54.95%
Maximum $729,900 $691,076 $172,481 -5.32% $168,481 $148,615 $172,481 -11.79%
Average Maximum $296,738 $289,936 -$6,803 -2.29% $112,259 $107,549 -$4,710 -4.20%
Minimum $25,147 $26,331 -$41,462 4.71% -$2,300 -$3,410 -$44,446 -48.28%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,677,111 $22,469 -1.83% $686,230 $641,784 $65,039 -6.48%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 112 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.12  Summary statistics for 107 SE Kansas crop farms with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate 
(AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $182,705 $184,124 $1,419 0.78% $43,199 $44,619 $1,419 3.29%
Minimum $15,560 $20,707 -$22,256 33.08% -$10,968 -$7,170 -$22,256 34.62%
Maximum $988,138 $988,542 $27,017 0.04% $197,331 $193,512 $27,017 -1.94%
Average Std Deviation $69,997 $59,995 -$10,002 -14.29% $43,624 $37,863 -$5,761 -13.21%
Minimum $6,509 $2,949 -$56,824 -54.70% $5,076 $3,108 -$65,116 -38.77%
Maximum $529,292 $478,849 $5,192 -9.53% $250,775 $185,658 $16,136 -25.97%
Average CV1 0.38 0.30 -0.08 -22.22% 1.57 1.43 -0.14 -8.95%
Minimum 0.12 0.08 -0.75 -26.86% 0.22 0.17 -7.32 -24.16%
Maximum 1.41 0.70 0.04 -50.63% 10.42 33.64 26.05 222.91%
Average Minimum $88,113 $114,421 $26,308 29.86% -$17,675 -$3,420 $14,255 80.65%
Minimum -$1,341 $15,042 -$12,939 1221.90% -$313,879 -$141,398 -$29,947 54.95%
Maximum $482,838 $469,899 $172,481 -2.68% $70,438 $89,269 $172,481 26.73%
Average Maximum $283,864 $277,335 -$6,529 -2.30% $109,380 $105,338 -$4,042 -3.70%
Minimum $25,147 $26,331 -$31,292 4.71% -$2,300 -$3,410 -$31,404 -48.28%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,677,111 $22,469 -1.83% $484,797 $461,920 $65,039 -4.72%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 95 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.13  Summary statistics for 126 SE Kansas crop farms assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with 
Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $192,445 $191,007 -$1,438 -0.75% $46,005 $44,567 -$1,438 -3.13%
Minimum $15,560 $20,498 -$48,402 31.74% -$10,968 -$7,423 -$48,402 32.32%
Maximum $1,034,902 $986,500 $24,222 -4.68% $264,961 $238,904 $24,222 -9.83%
Average Std Deviation $71,536 $63,009 -$8,527 -11.92% $43,643 $38,695 -$4,948 -11.34%
Minimum $6,509 $2,955 -$56,681 -54.61% $5,076 $3,117 -$65,655 -38.60%
Maximum $529,292 $478,271 $4,976 -9.64% $250,775 $235,499 $15,990 -6.09%
Average CV1 0.37 0.30 -0.07 -18.38% 1.44 1.30 -0.14 -9.52%
Minimum 0.09 0.09 -0.75 -9.70% 0.22 0.17 -6.72 -23.03%
Maximum 1.41 0.71 0.04 -49.64% 10.42 12.31 8.21 18.14%
Average Minimum $98,362 $118,185 $19,823 20.15% -$13,789 -$4,141 $9,648 69.97%
Minimum -$1,341 $14,865 -$46,313 1208.68% -$313,879 -$145,484 -$38,406 53.65%
Maximum $729,900 $683,587 $168,395 -6.35% $168,481 $144,783 $168,395 -14.07%
Average Maximum $296,738 $288,534 -$8,204 -2.76% $112,259 $106,104 -$6,155 -5.48%
Minimum $25,147 $26,018 -$49,460 3.47% -$2,300 -$3,625 -$53,019 -57.59%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,671,075 $21,261 -2.18% $686,230 $633,211 $62,070 -7.73%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 111 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.14  Summary statistics for 107 SE Kansas crop farms with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate 
for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $182,705 $182,705 $0 0.00% $43,199 $43,199 $0 0.00%
Minimum $15,560 $20,498 -$27,701 31.74% -$10,968 -$7,423 -$27,701 32.32%
Maximum $988,138 $983,283 $24,222 -0.49% $197,331 $188,253 $24,222 -4.60%
Average Std Deviation $69,997 $60,019 -$9,977 -14.25% $43,624 $37,857 -$5,767 -13.22%
Minimum $6,509 $2,955 -$56,681 -54.61% $5,076 $3,117 -$65,655 -38.60%
Maximum $529,292 $478,271 $4,976 -9.64% $250,775 $185,120 $15,990 -26.18%
Average CV1 0.38 0.30 -0.08 -21.57% 1.50 1.20 -0.30 -20.28%
Minimum 0.12 0.09 -0.75 -26.37% 0.22 0.17 -6.72 -23.03%
Maximum 1.41 0.70 0.04 -50.36% 10.42 10.90 3.83 4.69%
Average Minimum $88,113 $113,041 $24,928 28.29% -$17,675 -$4,794 $12,880 72.88%
Minimum -$1,341 $14,865 -$19,307 1208.68% -$313,879 -$145,484 -$35,723 53.65%
Maximum $482,838 $463,531 $168,395 -4.00% $70,438 $86,958 $168,395 23.45%
Average Maximum $283,864 $275,969 -$7,895 -2.78% $109,380 $103,927 -$5,454 -4.99%
Minimum $25,147 $26,018 -$37,328 3.47% -$2,300 -$3,625 -$37,462 -57.59%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,671,075 $21,261 -2.18% $484,797 $457,507 $62,070 -5.63%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 94 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.15  Summary statistics for 93 SE Kansas livestock farms assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $217,856 $217,856 $0 0.00% $53,727 $53,727 $0 0.00%
Minimum $21,555 $21,555 $0 0.00% -$19,073 -$19,073 $0 0.00%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,160,123 $0 0.00% $414,205 $414,205 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $55,682 $52,348 -$3,334 -5.99% $38,078 $37,957 -$121 -0.32%
Minimum $6,086 $5,980 -$38,127 -1.74% $4,958 $4,671 -$21,900 -5.78%
Maximum $307,367 $297,418 $17,617 -3.24% $240,432 $240,432 $22,622 0.00%
Average CV1 0.28 0.25 -0.03 -10.31% 1.05 1.03 -0.01 -1.26%
Minimum 0.06 0.06 -0.33 0.00% 0.19 0.19 -1.18 0.00%
Maximum 1.17 0.85 0.05 -27.73% 6.74 5.56 0.86 -17.53%
Average Minimum $145,042 $154,550 $9,508 6.56% $3,067 $5,047 $1,980 64.55%
Minimum -$24,742 $10,737 -$6,930 143.40% -$108,140 -$108,140 -$17,027 0.00%
Maximum $783,502 $827,107 $102,164 5.57% $218,015 $261,620 $56,936 20.00%
Average Maximum $301,187 $299,138 -$2,049 -0.68% $111,300 $111,707 $407 0.37%
Minimum $31,509 $27,886 -$28,383 -11.50% -$1,937 $3,262 -$16,591 268.43%
Maximum $1,597,971 $1,590,704 $37,357 -0.45% $719,861 $712,594 $84,436 -1.01%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 87 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.16  Summary by frequency of claim for 93 SE Kansas livestock farms assuming AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI 
Years With 
Indemnity
Number of 
Farms
Average 
Premium Rate1
Average AFPF 
Premium Paid2
Average AFAR 
Premium Paid3
Average AFARI 
Premium Paid4
Average 
Liability5
Mean Standard 
Deviation of 
Liability6
Average 
Indemnity/Farm/
Year7
0 47 0.00% $0 $3,498 $7,602 $145,292 $11,048 $0
1 21 2.89% $4,806 $4,001 $8,696 $166,190 $11,464 $33,642
2 14 4.72% $3,405 $1,737 $3,775 $72,152 $6,943 $11,916
3 5 5.85% $7,969 $3,278 $7,124 $136,148 $20,615 $18,594
4 2 13.68% $20,683 $3,639 $7,909 $151,143 $21,259 $36,196
5 3 22.38% $18,697 $2,012 $4,372 $83,545 $21,909 $26,176
6 1 21.52% $18,666 $2,089 $4,539 $86,746 $32,289 $21,777
7 - - - - - - - -
1Average premium rate reflects the average premium rate calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for each frequency of indemnity
2Average Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) premium paid reflects the average paid premium resulting from AFPF such that premiums equal indemnities
3Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFAR (2.41%)
4Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFARI (5.23%)
6Mean standard deviation of liability was calculated by taking the average of the standard deviation of liability by farm
5Average liability was computed by averaging the liability across farms for each frequency of claim
7Average indemnity per farm per year was calculated using the following formula: (((sum of indemnities)/(number of farms))/ years with indemnity)
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Table 4.17  Summary statistics for 46 SE Kansas livestock farms with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Premium 
by Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $182,809 $182,809 $0 0.00% $53,336 $53,336 $0 0.00%
Minimum $21,555 $21,555 $0 0.00% -$9,925 -$9,925 $0 0.00%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,160,123 $0 0.00% $414,205 $414,205 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $57,182 $50,442 -$6,741 -11.79% $35,237 $34,993 -$244 -0.69%
Minimum $6,086 $5,980 -$38,127 -1.74% $4,958 $4,671 -$21,900 -5.78%
Maximum $307,367 $297,418 $17,617 -3.24% $178,094 $169,589 $22,622 -4.78%
Average CV1 0.33 0.28 -0.06 -17.40% 1.18 1.15 -0.03 -2.32%
Minimum 0.13 0.13 -0.33 -2.66% 0.22 0.19 -1.18 -12.83%
Maximum 1.17 0.85 0.05 -27.73% 6.74 5.56 0.86 -17.53%
Average Minimum $103,509 $122,731 $19,223 18.57% $4,668 $8,671 $4,002 85.74%
Minimum -$24,742 $10,737 -$6,930 143.40% -$76,207 -$76,290 -$17,027 0.11%
Maximum $783,502 $827,107 $102,164 5.57% $218,015 $261,620 $56,936 20.00%
Average Maximum $266,648 $262,504 -$4,144 -1.55% $106,067 $106,889 $823 0.78%
Minimum $31,509 $27,886 -$28,383 -11.50% -$1,937 $3,262 -$16,591 268.43%
Maximum $1,597,971 $1,590,704 $37,357 -0.45% $719,861 $712,594 $84,436 -1.01%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 42 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.18  Summary statistics for 93 SE Kansas livestock farms assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $217,856 $217,856 $0 0.00% $53,727 $53,727 $0 0.00%
Minimum $21,555 $22,536 -$16,220 4.55% -$19,073 -$19,826 -$16,220 -3.95%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,150,125 $25,495 -0.86% $414,205 $404,207 $25,495 -2.41%
Average Std. Deviation $55,682 $52,322 -$3,360 -6.03% $38,078 $37,960 -$118 -0.31%
Minimum $6,086 $5,721 -$38,049 -6.00% $4,958 $4,193 -$21,952 -15.44%
Maximum $307,367 $297,869 $17,280 -3.09% $240,432 $239,849 $22,276 -0.24%
Average CV1 0.28 0.24 -0.04 -12.80% 1.05 0.96 -0.08 -8.10%
Minimum 0.06 0.06 -0.68 2.16% 0.19 0.20 -5.69 2.29%
Maximum 1.17 0.54 0.04 -53.58% 6.74 6.40 2.32 -5.01%
Average Minimum $145,042 $154,584 $9,542 6.58% $3,067 $4,988 $1,921 62.64%
Minimum -$24,742 $16,042 -$16,843 164.84% -$108,140 -$119,332 -$16,915 -10.35%
Maximum $783,502 $816,171 $113,597 4.17% $218,015 $250,684 $60,652 14.98%
Average Maximum $301,187 $299,080 -$2,107 -0.70% $111,300 $111,684 $384 0.34%
Minimum $31,509 $31,560 -$16,770 0.16% -$1,937 $3,224 -$16,770 266.45%
Maximum $1,597,971 $1,581,201 $51,639 -1.05% $719,861 $703,091 $93,804 -2.33%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 87 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.19  Summary statistics for 46 SE Kansas livestock farms with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average 
Rate (AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $182,809 $186,383 $3,574 1.96% $53,336 $56,910 $3,574 6.70%
Minimum $21,555 $22,536 -$9,998 4.55% -$9,925 -$10,041 -$9,998 -1.16%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,150,125 $25,495 -0.86% $414,205 $404,207 $25,495 -2.41%
Average Std Deviation $57,182 $50,434 -$6,748 -11.80% $35,237 $35,012 -$225 -0.64%
Minimum $6,086 $5,721 -$38,049 -6.00% $4,958 $4,193 -$21,952 -15.44%
Maximum $307,367 $297,869 $17,280 -3.09% $178,094 $170,004 $22,276 -4.54%
Average CV1 0.33 0.26 -0.08 -22.43% 1.18 0.86 -0.32 -26.96%
Minimum 0.13 0.12 -0.68 -4.88% 0.22 0.20 -5.69 -12.49%
Maximum 1.17 0.54 0.04 -53.58% 6.74 3.06 0.37 -54.65%
Average Minimum $103,509 $126,348 $22,839 22.07% $4,668 $12,182 $7,513 160.94%
Minimum -$24,742 $16,042 -$5,866 164.84% -$76,207 -$60,944 -$5,866 20.03%
Maximum $783,502 $816,171 $113,597 4.17% $218,015 $250,684 $60,652 14.98%
Average Maximum $266,648 $266,054 -$593 -0.22% $106,067 $110,488 $4,422 4.17%
Minimum $31,509 $31,560 -$16,770 0.16% -$1,937 $3,224 -$16,770 266.45%
Maximum $1,597,971 $1,581,201 $51,639 -1.05% $719,861 $703,091 $93,804 -2.33%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 42 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.20  Summary statistics for 93 SE Kansas livestock farms assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with 
Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $217,856 $214,014 -$3,842 -1.76% $53,727 $49,885 -$3,842 -7.15%
Minimum $21,555 $22,110 -$35,250 2.57% -$19,073 -$20,709 -$35,250 -8.58%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,129,868 $23,516 -2.61% $414,205 $383,950 $23,516 -7.30%
Average Std Deviation $55,682 $52,295 -$3,387 -6.08% $38,078 $37,967 -$112 -0.29%
Minimum $6,086 $5,440 -$38,152 -10.62% $4,958 $3,671 -$22,009 -25.95%
Maximum $307,367 $298,400 $16,906 -2.92% $240,432 $239,171 $21,874 -0.52%
Average CV1 0.28 0.25 -0.03 -11.38% 1.05 1.23 0.18 17.12%
Minimum 0.06 0.06 -0.66 4.79% 0.19 0.21 -5.47 7.28%
Maximum 1.17 0.55 0.05 -52.92% 6.74 18.90 14.81 180.23%
Average Minimum $145,042 $150,780 $5,738 3.96% $3,067 $1,071 -$1,996 -65.07%
Minimum -$24,742 $15,622 -$36,605 163.14% -$108,140 -$132,463 -$36,761 -22.49%
Maximum $783,502 $794,815 $107,033 1.44% $218,015 $229,328 $53,879 5.19%
Average Maximum $301,187 $295,176 -$6,011 -2.00% $111,300 $107,816 -$3,484 -3.13%
Minimum $31,509 $30,742 -$36,445 -2.43% -$1,937 $1,710 -$36,445 188.28%
Maximum $1,597,971 $1,561,526 $39,576 -2.28% $719,861 $683,416 $86,272 -5.06%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 87 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.21  Summary statistics for 46 SE Kansas livestock farms with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average 
Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $182,809 $182,809 $0 0.00% $53,336 $53,336 $0 0.00%
Minimum $21,555 $22,110 -$30,255 2.57% -$9,925 -$14,552 -$30,255 -46.61%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,129,868 $23,516 -2.61% $414,205 $383,950 $23,516 -7.30%
Average Std Deviation $57,182 $50,429 -$6,753 -11.81% $35,237 $35,040 -$197 -0.56%
Minimum $6,086 $5,440 -$38,152 -10.62% $4,958 $3,671 -$22,009 -25.95%
Maximum $307,367 $298,400 $16,906 -2.92% $178,094 $170,494 $21,874 -4.27%
Average CV1 0.33 0.26 -0.07 -21.02% 1.18 0.98 -0.20 -17.17%
Minimum 0.13 0.12 -0.66 -4.80% 0.22 0.21 -5.47 -5.97%
Maximum 1.17 0.55 0.05 -52.92% 6.74 3.95 0.47 -41.42%
Average Minimum $103,509 $122,818 $19,310 18.66% $4,668 $8,523 $3,855 82.58%
Minimum -$24,742 $15,622 -$14,088 163.14% -$76,207 -$71,760 -$14,088 5.84%
Maximum $783,502 $794,815 $107,033 1.44% $218,015 $229,328 $53,879 5.19%
Average Maximum $266,648 $262,464 -$4,183 -1.57% $106,067 $106,942 $876 0.83%
Minimum $31,509 $30,742 -$36,445 -2.43% -$1,937 $1,710 -$36,445 188.28%
Maximum $1,597,971 $1,561,526 $39,576 -2.28% $719,861 $683,416 $86,272 -5.06%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 42 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.22  Summary statistics for 64 SE Kansas beef farms assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $185,560 $185,560 $0 0.00% $47,284 $47,284 $0 0.00%
Minimum $21,555 $21,555 $0 0.00% -$19,073 -$19,073 $0 0.00%
Maximum $980,749 $980,749 $0 0.00% $270,425 $270,425 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $53,685 $50,229 -$3,456 -6.44% $38,130 $38,473 $343 0.90%
Minimum $6,086 $5,980 -$38,127 -1.74% $4,958 $4,671 -$19,715 -5.78%
Maximum $236,606 $214,462 $17,617 -9.36% $240,432 $240,432 $22,622 0.00%
Average CV1 0.31 0.28 -0.03 -10.05% 1.22 1.21 -0.01 -0.72%
Minimum 0.09 0.09 -0.33 0.00% 0.20 0.19 -1.18 -4.89%
Maximum 1.17 0.85 0.05 -27.73% 6.74 5.56 0.86 -17.53%
Average Minimum $115,506 $125,678 $10,172 8.81% -$2,969 -$1,263 $1,706 57.46%
Minimum -$24,742 $10,737 -$6,930 143.40% -$108,140 -$108,140 -$17,027 0.00%
Maximum $744,319 $744,319 $102,164 0.00% $111,697 $94,670 $56,936 -15.24%
Average Maximum $267,553 $265,681 -$1,872 -0.70% $106,023 $106,867 $843 0.80%
Minimum $31,509 $27,886 -$27,182 -11.50% $9,427 $9,347 -$16,591 -0.85%
Maximum $1,308,513 $1,308,513 $37,357 0.00% $661,206 $661,206 $84,436 0.00%
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 60 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
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Table 4.23  Summary by frequency of claim for 64 SE Kansas beef farms assuming AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI 
Years With 
Indemnity
Number of 
Farms
Average 
Premium Rate1
Average AFPF 
Premium Paid2
Average AFAR 
Premium Paid3
Average AFARI 
Premium Paid4
Average 
Liability5
Mean Standard 
Deviation of 
Liability6
Average 
Indemnity/Farm/
Year7
0 31 0.00% $0 $3,544 $6,971 $115,890 $9,218 $0
1 15 4.09% $5,706 $4,270 $8,397 $139,606 $10,248 $39,941
2 10 4.65% $3,274 $2,153 $4,234 $70,390 $6,212 $11,460
3 4 6.93% $9,029 $3,984 $7,835 $130,262 $22,636 $21,067
4 1 8.86% $12,984 $4,481 $8,812 $146,507 $29,025 $7,574
5 3 22.38% $18,697 $2,555 $5,025 $83,545 $21,909 $26,176
6 0 - - - - - - -
7 0 - - - - - - -
1Average premium rate reflects the average premium rate calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for each frequency of indemnity
2Average Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) premium paid reflects the average paid premium resulting from AFPF such that premiums equal indemnities
3Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFAR (3.06%)
4Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFARI (6.01%)
7Average indemnity per farm per year was calculated using the following formula: (((sum of indemnities)/(number of farms))/ years with indemnity)
5Average liability was computed by averaging the liability across farms for each frequency of claim
6Mean standard deviation of liability was calculated by taking the average of the standard deviation of liability by farm
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Table 4.24  Summary statistics for 33 SE Kansas beef farms with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by 
Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $161,763 $161,763 $0 0.00% $46,276 $46,276 $0 0.00%
Minimum $21,555 $21,555 $0 0.00% -$6,426 -$6,426 $0 0.00%
Maximum $438,132 $438,132 $0 0.00% $179,896 $179,896 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $54,622 $47,920 -$6,702 -12.27% $32,928 $33,593 $665 2.02%
Minimum $6,086 $5,980 -$38,127 -1.74% $4,958 $4,671 -$19,715 -5.78%
Maximum $236,606 $214,462 $17,617 -9.36% $96,832 $96,432 $22,622 -0.41%
Average CV1 0.36 0.30 -0.06 -16.75% 1.31 1.29 -0.02 -1.31%
Minimum 0.16 0.14 -0.33 -9.21% 0.22 0.19 -1.18 -12.83%
Maximum 1.17 0.85 0.05 -27.73% 6.74 5.56 0.86 -17.53%
Average Minimum $84,504 $104,232 $19,728 23.35% -$840 $2,468 $3,308 393.83%
Minimum -$24,742 $10,737 -$6,930 143.40% -$76,207 -$76,290 -$17,027 0.11%
Maximum $322,123 $323,102 $102,164 0.30% $111,697 $94,670 $56,936 -15.24%
Average Maximum $241,200 $237,570 -$3,630 -1.51% $95,541 $97,176 $1,635 1.71%
Minimum $31,509 $27,886 -$27,182 -11.50% $10,692 $9,347 -$16,591 -12.58%
Maximum $872,539 $855,798 $37,357 -1.92% $282,174 $303,294 $84,436 7.48%
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 31 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
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Table 4.25  Summary statistics for 64 SE Kansas beef farms assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $185,560 $185,560 $0 0.00% $47,284 $47,284 $0 0.00%
Minimum $21,555 $22,438 -$20,603 4.10% -$19,073 -$20,029 -$20,603 -5.01%
Maximum $980,749 $960,146 $25,039 -2.10% $270,425 $256,047 $25,039 -5.32%
Average Std Deviation $53,685 $50,173 -$3,512 -6.54% $38,130 $38,453 $323 0.85%
Minimum $6,086 $5,653 -$38,073 -7.11% $4,958 $4,068 -$19,727 -17.95%
Maximum $236,606 $214,057 $17,191 -9.53% $240,432 $239,692 $22,183 -0.31%
Average CV1 0.31 0.27 -0.04 -12.64% 1.22 1.16 -0.06 -5.18%
Minimum 0.09 0.09 -0.67 1.79% 0.20 0.20 -5.65 -2.97%
Maximum 1.17 0.55 0.04 -53.43% 6.74 7.56 3.47 12.10%
Average Minimum $115,506 $125,712 $10,207 8.84% -$2,969 -$1,271 $1,698 57.20%
Minimum -$24,742 $15,945 -$21,394 164.45% -$108,140 -$122,356 -$21,486 -13.15%
Maximum $744,319 $730,103 $112,085 -1.91% $111,697 $104,401 $59,092 -6.53%
Average Maximum $267,553 $265,554 -$1,999 -0.75% $106,023 $106,781 $758 0.71%
Minimum $31,509 $31,236 -$19,049 -0.87% $9,427 $8,672 -$21,126 -8.01%
Maximum $1,308,513 $1,289,464 $48,861 -1.46% $661,206 $645,274 $92,070 -2.41%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 60 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.26  Summary statistics for 33 SE Kansas beef farms with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate 
(AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $161,763 $165,092 $3,329 2.06% $46,276 $49,606 $3,329 7.19%
Minimum $21,555 $22,438 -$8,294 4.10% -$6,426 -$6,435 -$8,294 -0.15%
Maximum $438,132 $440,241 $25,039 0.48% $179,896 $188,516 $25,039 4.79%
Average Std Deviation $54,622 $47,878 -$6,744 -12.35% $32,928 $33,582 $655 1.99%
Minimum $6,086 $5,653 -$38,073 -7.11% $4,958 $4,068 -$19,727 -17.95%
Maximum $236,606 $214,057 $17,191 -9.53% $96,832 $96,359 $22,183 -0.49%
Average CV1 0.36 0.28 -0.08 -22.01% 1.31 0.96 -0.35 -26.80%
Minimum 0.16 0.14 -0.67 -10.11% 0.22 0.20 -5.65 -11.07%
Maximum 1.17 0.55 0.04 -53.43% 6.74 3.23 0.39 -52.16%
Average Minimum $84,504 $107,593 $23,089 27.32% -$840 $5,779 $6,619 787.99%
Minimum -$24,742 $15,945 -$7,759 164.45% -$76,207 -$63,435 -$7,759 16.76%
Maximum $322,123 $314,364 $112,085 -2.41% $111,697 $104,401 $59,092 -6.53%
Average Maximum $241,200 $240,800 -$400 -0.17% $95,541 $100,449 $4,909 5.14%
Minimum $31,509 $31,236 -$9,016 -0.87% $10,692 $10,260 -$9,016 -4.04%
Maximum $872,539 $865,423 $48,861 -0.82% $282,174 $310,928 $92,070 10.19%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 31 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.27  Summary statistics for 64 SE Kansas beef farms assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with 
Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $185,560 $182,184 -$3,376 -1.82% $47,284 $43,907 -$3,376 -7.14%
Minimum $21,555 $21,992 -$40,521 2.03% -$19,073 -$20,953 -$40,521 -9.86%
Maximum $980,749 $940,229 $22,968 -4.13% $270,425 $242,148 $22,968 -10.46%
Average Std Deviation $53,685 $50,123 -$3,562 -6.64% $38,130 $38,439 $309 0.81%
Minimum $6,086 $5,368 -$38,180 -11.80% $4,958 $3,537 -$19,738 -28.66%
Maximum $236,606 $213,666 $16,806 -9.70% $240,432 $238,984 $21,763 -0.60%
Average CV1 0.31 0.27 -0.03 -11.20% 1.22 1.88 0.66 53.84%
Minimum 0.09 0.09 -0.65 3.62% 0.20 0.21 -5.39 4.75%
Maximum 1.17 0.55 0.05 -52.74% 6.74 40.87 36.78 506.06%
Average Minimum $115,506 $122,369 $6,864 5.94% -$2,969 -$4,662 -$1,693 -57.03%
Minimum -$24,742 $15,500 -$42,077 162.65% -$108,140 -$136,099 -$42,257 -25.85%
Maximum $744,319 $716,360 $105,216 -3.76% $111,697 $97,347 $52,003 -12.85%
Average Maximum $267,553 $262,068 -$5,485 -2.05% $106,023 $103,324 -$2,699 -2.55%
Minimum $31,509 $30,627 -$37,464 -2.80% $9,427 $7,942 -$41,550 -15.75%
Maximum $1,308,513 $1,271,049 $36,235 -2.86% $661,206 $629,871 $84,186 -4.74%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 60 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.28  Summary statistics for 33 SE Kansas beef farms with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate 
for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $161,763 $161,763 $0 0.00% $46,276 $46,276 $0 0.00%
Minimum $21,555 $21,992 -$16,470 2.03% -$6,426 -$7,252 -$16,470 -12.86%
Maximum $438,132 $433,106 $22,968 -1.15% $179,896 $181,586 $22,968 0.94%
Average Std Deviation $54,622 $47,843 -$6,780 -12.41% $32,928 $33,579 $651 1.98%
Minimum $6,086 $5,368 -$38,180 -11.80% $4,958 $3,537 -$19,738 -28.66%
Maximum $236,606 $213,666 $16,806 -9.70% $96,832 $96,291 $21,763 -0.56%
Average CV1 0.36 0.29 -0.07 -20.56% 1.31 1.12 -0.19 -14.49%
Minimum 0.16 0.15 -0.65 -7.77% 0.22 0.21 -5.39 -3.99%
Maximum 1.17 0.55 0.05 -52.74% 6.74 4.30 0.50 -36.26%
Average Minimum $84,504 $104,294 $19,790 23.42% -$840 $2,422 $3,262 388.35%
Minimum -$24,742 $15,500 -$16,365 162.65% -$76,207 -$74,755 -$16,365 1.90%
Maximum $322,123 $305,758 $105,216 -5.08% $111,697 $97,347 $52,003 -12.85%
Average Maximum $241,200 $237,400 -$3,800 -1.58% $95,541 $97,066 $1,525 1.60%
Minimum $31,509 $30,627 -$17,731 -2.80% $10,692 $9,842 -$17,731 -7.95%
Maximum $872,539 $858,544 $36,235 -1.60% $282,174 $303,044 $84,186 7.40%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 31 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
  
172 
 
 
Table 4.29  Summary statistics for 13 SE Kansas dairy farms assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $337,798 $337,798 $0 0.00% $80,406 $80,406 $0 0.00%
Minimum $96,585 $96,585 $0 0.00% -$9,925 -$9,925 $0 0.00%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,160,123 $0 0.00% $414,205 $414,205 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $65,604 $63,723 -$1,881 -2.87% $37,095 $36,118 -$977 -2.63%
Minimum $7,259 $7,259 -$9,949 0.00% $11,344 $11,344 -$8,505 0.00%
Maximum $307,367 $297,418 $0 -3.24% $178,094 $169,589 $1,738 -4.78%
Average CV1 0.18 0.18 -0.01 -4.72% 0.51 0.50 -0.01 -2.35%
Minimum 0.06 0.06 -0.07 0.00% 0.19 0.19 -0.10 0.00%
Maximum 0.34 0.27 0.00 -19.57% 0.80 0.80 0.00 0.00%
Average Minimum $259,927 $266,592 $6,665 2.56% $33,780 $36,665 $2,884 8.54%
Minimum $67,497 $74,677 -$1,717 10.64% -$29,840 -$33,569 -$3,729 -12.50%
Maximum $783,502 $827,107 $43,605 5.57% $218,015 $261,620 $43,605 20.00%
Average Maximum $436,698 $435,182 -$1,516 -0.35% $140,919 $139,612 -$1,307 -0.93%
Minimum $126,101 $126,101 -$7,267 0.00% $7,833 $6,815 -$7,267 -12.99%
Maximum $1,597,971 $1,590,704 $0 -0.45% $719,861 $712,594 $0 -1.01%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 12 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.30  Summary by frequency of claim for 13 SE Kansas dairy farms assuming AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI 
Years With 
Indemnity
Number of 
Farms
Average 
Premium Rate1
Average AFPF 
Premium Paid2
Average AFAR 
Premium Paid3
Average AFARI 
Premium Paid4
Average 
Liability5
Mean Standard 
Deviation of 
Liability6
Average 
Indemnity/Farm
/Year7
0 9 0.00% $0 $1,373 $3,681 $195,720 $10,677 $0
1 2 1.14% $4,492 $2,771 $7,429 $395,000 $18,673 $31,446
2 1 7.14% $6,989 $687 $1,841 $97,911 $9,217 $24,461
3 1 2.34% $3,729 $1,120 $3,003 $159,694 $12,535 $8,702
4 0 - - - - - - -
5 0 - - - - - - -
6 0 - - - - - - -
7 0 - - - - - - -
6Mean standard deviation of liability was calculated by taking the average of the standard deviation of liability by farm
5Average liability was computed by averaging the liability across farms for each frequency of claim
1Average premium rate reflects the average premium rate calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for each frequency of indemnity
2Average Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) premium paid reflects the average paid premium resulting from AFPF such that premiums equal indemnities
3Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFAR (0.70%)
4Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFARI (1.88%)
7Average indemnity per farm per year was calculated using the following formula: (((sum of indemnities)/(number of farms))/ years with indemnity)
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Table 4.31  Summary statistics for 4 SE Kansas dairy farms with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by 
Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $393,455 $393,455 $0 0.00% $120,976 $120,976 $0 0.00%
Minimum $96,585 $96,585 $0 0.00% -$9,925 -$9,925 $0 0.00%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,160,123 $0 0.00% $414,205 $414,205 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $103,222 $97,110 -$6,112 -5.92% $61,197 $58,023 -$3,174 -5.19%
Minimum $22,666 $21,297 -$9,949 -6.04% $14,107 $15,845 -$8,505 12.32%
Maximum $307,367 $297,418 -$1,369 -3.24% $178,094 $169,589 $1,738 -4.78%
Average CV1 0.26 0.23 -0.03 -10.80% 0.59 0.54 -0.05 -8.20%
Minimum 0.20 0.18 -0.07 -11.43% 0.43 0.41 -0.10 -4.78%
Maximum 0.34 0.27 -0.01 -19.57% 0.69 0.66 -0.02 -4.14%
Average Minimum $266,315 $287,977 $21,662 8.13% $52,569 $61,943 $9,374 17.83%
Minimum $67,497 $74,677 -$1,717 10.64% -$29,840 -$33,569 -$3,729 -12.50%
Maximum $783,502 $827,107 $43,605 5.57% $218,015 $261,620 $43,605 20.00%
Average Maximum $546,397 $541,472 -$4,926 -0.90% $222,657 $218,409 -$4,248 -1.91%
Minimum $138,934 $137,217 -$7,267 -1.24% $7,833 $6,815 -$7,267 -12.99%
Maximum $1,597,971 $1,590,704 -$1,717 -0.45% $719,861 $712,594 -$1,018 -1.01%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 3 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.32  Summary statistics for 13 SE Kansas dairy farms assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $337,798 $337,798 $0 0.00% $80,406 $80,406 $0 0.00%
Minimum $96,585 $97,791 -$2,577 1.25% -$9,925 -$7,316 -$2,577 26.29%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,162,361 $6,302 0.19% $414,205 $416,443 $6,302 0.54%
Average Std Deviation $65,604 $63,729 -$1,874 -2.86% $37,095 $36,134 -$961 -2.59%
Minimum $7,259 $7,268 -$9,817 0.12% $11,344 $11,329 -$8,385 -0.14%
Maximum $307,367 $297,549 $62 -3.19% $178,094 $169,710 $1,741 -4.71%
Average CV1 0.18 0.17 -0.01 -5.24% 0.51 0.50 -0.01 -1.58%
Minimum 0.06 0.06 -0.08 0.62% 0.19 0.19 -0.15 0.95%
Maximum 0.34 0.26 0.00 -23.23% 0.80 0.82 0.03 2.79%
Average Minimum $259,927 $266,586 $6,660 2.56% $33,780 $36,615 $2,834 8.39%
Minimum $67,497 $75,932 -$2,443 12.50% -$29,840 -$31,027 -$2,563 -3.98%
Maximum $783,502 $829,071 $45,570 5.82% $218,015 $263,585 $45,570 20.90%
Average Maximum $436,698 $435,194 -$1,504 -0.34% $140,919 $139,645 -$1,275 -0.90%
Minimum $126,101 $125,519 -$4,885 -0.46% $7,833 $9,495 -$4,885 21.22%
Maximum $1,597,971 $1,593,086 -$482 -0.31% $719,861 $714,976 $1,662 -0.68%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 12 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.33  Summary statistics for 4 SE Kansas dairy farms with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate 
(AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $393,455 $396,544 $3,089 0.79% $120,976 $124,064 $3,089 2.55%
Minimum $96,585 $97,791 $1,206 1.25% -$9,925 -$7,316 $1,206 26.29%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,162,361 $6,302 0.19% $414,205 $416,443 $6,302 0.54%
Average Std Deviation $103,222 $97,131 -$6,091 -5.90% $61,197 $58,063 -$3,134 -5.12%
Minimum $22,666 $21,290 -$9,817 -6.07% $14,107 $15,848 -$8,385 12.34%
Maximum $307,367 $297,549 -$1,375 -3.19% $178,094 $169,710 $1,741 -4.71%
Average CV1 0.26 0.23 -0.03 -12.55% 0.59 0.51 -0.08 -13.22%
Minimum 0.20 0.18 -0.08 -12.79% 0.43 0.41 -0.15 -5.22%
Maximum 0.34 0.26 -0.01 -23.23% 0.69 0.63 -0.02 -8.50%
Average Minimum $266,315 $291,077 $24,762 9.30% $52,569 $64,957 $12,388 23.57%
Minimum $67,497 $75,932 -$463 12.50% -$29,840 -$31,027 -$1,187 -3.98%
Maximum $783,502 $829,071 $45,570 5.82% $218,015 $263,585 $45,570 20.90%
Average Maximum $546,397 $544,617 -$1,780 -0.33% $222,657 $221,575 -$1,081 -0.49%
Minimum $138,934 $138,452 -$4,885 -0.35% $7,833 $9,495 -$4,885 21.22%
Maximum $1,597,971 $1,593,086 -$482 -0.31% $719,861 $714,976 $1,662 -0.68%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 3 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.34  Summary statistics for 13 SE Kansas dairy farms assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with 
Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $337,798 $335,250 -$2,548 -0.75% $80,406 $77,858 -$2,548 -3.17%
Minimum $96,585 $96,931 -$6,909 0.36% -$9,925 -$9,199 -$6,909 7.31%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,153,904 $5,147 -0.54% $414,205 $407,986 $5,147 -1.50%
Average Std Deviation $65,604 $63,740 -$1,864 -2.84% $37,095 $36,161 -$933 -2.52%
Minimum $7,259 $7,283 -$9,596 0.33% $11,344 $11,303 -$8,181 -0.36%
Maximum $307,367 $297,770 $168 -3.12% $178,094 $169,913 $1,747 -4.59%
Average CV1 0.18 0.18 -0.01 -4.50% 0.51 0.53 0.02 3.19%
Minimum 0.06 0.06 -0.08 1.68% 0.19 0.20 -0.14 2.52%
Maximum 0.34 0.26 0.00 -22.56% 0.80 0.86 0.08 7.86%
Average Minimum $259,927 $264,029 $4,102 1.58% $33,780 $33,983 $202 0.60%
Minimum $67,497 $75,154 -$6,550 11.34% -$29,840 -$33,023 -$6,873 -10.67%
Maximum $783,502 $820,155 $39,574 4.68% $218,015 $254,668 $36,653 16.81%
Average Maximum $436,698 $432,664 -$4,033 -0.92% $140,919 $137,151 -$3,769 -2.67%
Minimum $126,101 $124,539 -$13,099 -1.24% $7,833 $7,730 -$13,099 -1.32%
Maximum $1,597,971 $1,584,872 -$1,292 -0.82% $719,861 $706,762 -$103 -1.82%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 12 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.35  Summary statistics for 4 SE Kansas dairy farms with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate 
for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $393,455 $393,455 $0 0.00% $120,976 $120,976 $0 0.00%
Minimum $96,585 $96,931 -$6,219 0.36% -$9,925 -$9,199 -$6,219 7.31%
Maximum $1,160,123 $1,153,904 $5,147 -0.54% $414,205 $407,986 $5,147 -1.50%
Average Std Deviation $103,222 $97,166 -$6,057 -5.87% $61,197 $58,130 -$3,067 -5.01%
Minimum $22,666 $21,280 -$9,596 -6.11% $14,107 $15,855 -$8,181 12.39%
Maximum $307,367 $297,770 -$1,386 -3.12% $178,094 $169,913 $1,747 -4.59%
Average CV1 0.26 0.23 -0.03 -11.83% 0.59 0.52 -0.06 -10.90%
Minimum 0.20 0.18 -0.08 -12.11% 0.43 0.42 -0.14 -3.14%
Maximum 0.34 0.26 -0.01 -22.56% 0.69 0.65 -0.01 -5.35%
Average Minimum $266,315 $288,007 $21,692 8.15% $52,569 $61,743 $9,174 17.45%
Minimum $67,497 $75,154 -$1,240 11.34% -$29,840 -$33,023 -$3,183 -10.67%
Maximum $783,502 $820,155 $39,574 4.68% $218,015 $254,668 $36,653 16.81%
Average Maximum $546,397 $541,624 -$4,774 -0.87% $222,657 $218,617 -$4,039 -1.81%
Minimum $138,934 $137,642 -$13,099 -0.93% $7,833 $7,730 -$13,099 -1.32%
Maximum $1,597,971 $1,584,872 -$1,292 -0.82% $719,861 $706,762 -$103 -1.82%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 3 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.36  Summary statistics for 33 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of less than $100,000 
assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $54,210 $54,210 $0 0.00% $8,508 $8,508 $0 0.00%
Minimum $15,560 $15,560 $0 0.00% -$10,968 -$10,968 $0 0.00%
Maximum $99,351 $99,351 $0 0.00% $29,156 $29,156 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $20,682 $17,034 -$3,648 -17.64% $13,376 $12,447 -$930 -6.95%
Minimum $6,509 $2,931 -$12,187 -54.97% $5,076 $3,075 -$6,806 -39.42%
Maximum $67,890 $67,890 $0 0.00% $21,761 $20,071 $9,214 -7.77%
Average CV1 0.40 0.31 -0.09 -21.54% 2.52 2.48 -0.04 -1.66%
Minimum 0.14 0.09 -0.30 -36.01% 0.54 0.50 -0.86 -7.40%
Maximum 1.41 1.11 0.00 -21.35% 30.78 30.78 0.83 0.00%
Average Minimum $30,157 $35,930 $5,773 19.14% -$10,318 -$9,052 $1,266 12.27%
Minimum -$1,341 -$1,888 -$547 -40.78% -$34,758 -$41,126 -$19,974 -18.32%
Maximum $62,792 $62,792 $23,204 0.00% $10,404 $8,043 $17,061 -22.70%
Average Maximum $87,141 $83,129 -$4,012 -4.60% $27,883 $26,524 -$1,360 -4.88%
Minimum $25,147 $21,723 -$19,974 -13.62% -$2,300 -$6,335 -$10,900 -175.44%
Maximum $248,226 $248,226 $0 0.00% $53,895 $50,750 $20,316 -5.83%
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 24 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
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Table 4.37  Summary by frequency of claim for 33 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of less than 
$100,000 assuming AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI 
Years With 
Indemnity
Number of 
Farms
Average 
Premium Rate1
Average AFPF 
Premium Paid2
Average AFAR 
Premium Paid3
Average AFARI 
Premium Paid4
Average 
Liability5
Mean Standard 
Deviation of 
Liability6
Average 
Indemnity/Farm/
Year7
0 7 0.00% $0 $4,163 $5,256 $37,726 $4,035 $0
1 5 4.21% $1,291 $3,381 $4,268 $30,637 $2,721 $9,036
2 4 10.36% $4,174 $4,447 $5,614 $40,299 $3,337 $14,608
3 8 12.33% $5,216 $4,667 $5,892 $42,292 $5,871 $12,171
4 6 14.73% $6,057 $4,538 $5,729 $41,118 $7,275 $10,600
5 2 45.10% $13,103 $3,206 $4,047 $29,051 $10,912 $18,344
6 1 26.16% $12,780 $5,391 $6,806 $48,850 $12,654 $14,910
7 0 - - - - - - -
1Average premium rate reflects the average premium rate calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for each frequency of indemnity
2Average Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) premium paid reflects the average paid premium resulting from AFPF such that premiums equal indemnities
3Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFAR (11.04%)
4Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFARI (13.93%)
5Average liability was computed by averaging the liability across farms for each frequency of claim
7Average indemnity per farm per year was calculated using the following formula: (((sum of indemnities)/(number of farms))/ years with indemnity)
6Mean standard deviation of liability was calculated by taking the average of the standard deviation of liability by farm
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Table 4.38  Summary statistics for 26 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of less than $100,000 with 
at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $48,320 $48,320 $0 0.00% $7,624 $7,624 $0 0.00%
Minimum $15,560 $15,560 $0 0.00% -$10,968 -$10,968 $0 0.00%
Maximum $82,102 $82,102 $0 0.00% $29,156 $29,156 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $18,507 $13,877 -$4,630 -25.02% $12,967 $11,787 -$1,180 -9.10%
Minimum $6,509 $2,931 -$12,187 -54.97% $5,076 $3,075 -$6,806 -39.42%
Maximum $38,525 $32,047 -$285 -16.82% $21,761 $18,976 $9,214 -12.80%
Average CV1 0.41 0.30 -0.11 -26.52% 1.18 1.12 -0.06 -5.01%
Minimum 0.14 0.09 -0.30 -36.01% 0.54 0.50 -0.86 -7.40%
Maximum 1.41 1.11 0.00 -21.35% 2.83 3.03 0.83 6.91%
Average Minimum $25,158 $32,485 $7,327 29.12% -$11,038 -$9,432 $1,606 14.55%
Minimum -$1,341 -$1,888 -$547 -40.78% -$34,758 -$41,126 -$19,974 -18.32%
Maximum $56,241 $57,924 $23,204 2.99% $10,404 $8,043 $17,061 -22.70%
Average Maximum $75,919 $70,826 -$5,092 -6.71% $25,967 $24,241 -$1,726 -6.65%
Minimum $25,147 $21,723 -$19,974 -13.62% -$2,300 -$6,335 -$10,900 -175.44%
Maximum $127,361 $122,855 -$369 -3.54% $53,895 $48,795 $20,316 -9.46%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 17 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.39  Summary statistics for 33 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of less than $100,000 
assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $54,210 $54,210 $0 0.00% $8,508 $8,508 $0 0.00%
Minimum $15,560 $19,875 -$5,364 27.73% -$10,968 -$8,176 -$5,364 25.45%
Maximum $99,351 $93,987 $15,478 -5.40% $29,156 $28,632 $15,478 -1.80%
Average Std Deviation $20,682 $16,972 -$3,710 -17.94% $13,376 $12,399 -$977 -7.30%
Minimum $6,509 $2,977 -$12,766 -54.27% $5,076 $3,147 -$6,325 -38.00%
Maximum $67,890 $67,948 $58 0.09% $21,761 $20,032 $9,183 -7.94%
Average CV1 0.40 0.30 -0.10 -24.90% 1.15 2.37 1.23 107.24%
Minimum 0.14 0.09 -0.74 -39.22% 0.54 0.47 -0.97 -14.26%
Maximum 1.41 0.72 0.04 -48.68% 2.83 27.23 24.40 862.37%
Average Minimum $30,157 $36,215 $6,058 20.09% -$10,318 -$8,900 $1,418 13.74%
Minimum -$1,341 $14,336 -$5,447 1169.26% -$34,758 -$35,492 -$6,390 -2.11%
Maximum $62,792 $60,391 $24,436 -3.82% $10,404 $6,412 $17,284 -38.37%
Average Maximum $87,141 $83,160 -$3,981 -4.57% $27,883 $26,490 -$1,393 -5.00%
Minimum $25,147 $25,085 -$6,784 -0.25% -$2,300 -$4,264 -$6,784 -85.37%
Maximum $248,226 $243,320 -$62 -1.98% $53,895 $50,107 $25,346 -7.03%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 22 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.40  Summary statistics for 26 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of less than $100,000 with 
at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $48,320 $49,441 $1,121 2.32% $7,624 $8,745 $1,121 14.70%
Minimum $15,560 $19,875 -$4,940 27.73% -$10,968 -$8,176 -$4,940 25.45%
Maximum $82,102 $78,211 $15,478 -4.74% $29,156 $28,632 $15,478 -1.80%
Average Std Deviation $18,507 $13,836 -$4,671 -25.24% $12,967 $11,743 -$1,225 -9.44%
Minimum $6,509 $2,977 -$12,766 -54.27% $5,076 $3,147 -$6,325 -38.00%
Maximum $38,525 $32,083 -$205 -16.72% $21,761 $18,823 $9,183 -13.50%
Average CV1 0.41 0.28 -0.13 -31.84% 1.18 2.62 1.44 121.72%
Minimum 0.14 0.09 -0.74 -39.22% 0.54 0.47 -0.97 -14.26%
Maximum 1.41 0.71 0.03 -49.51% 2.83 27.23 24.40 862.37%
Average Minimum $25,158 $33,927 $8,769 34.86% -$11,038 -$8,176 $2,863 25.94%
Minimum -$1,341 $14,336 -$3,215 1169.26% -$34,758 -$35,492 -$6,390 -2.11%
Maximum $56,241 $60,391 $24,436 7.38% $10,404 $6,412 $17,284 -38.37%
Average Maximum $75,919 $72,016 -$3,903 -5.14% $25,967 $25,332 -$634 -2.44%
Minimum $25,147 $25,085 -$6,784 -0.25% -$2,300 -$4,264 -$6,784 -85.37%
Maximum $127,361 $123,727 -$62 -2.85% $53,895 $50,107 $25,346 -7.03%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 17 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.41  Summary statistics for 33 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of less than $100,000 
assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $54,210 $53,095 -$1,115 -2.06% $8,508 $7,393 -$1,115 -13.10%
Minimum $15,560 $19,372 -$6,771 24.50% -$10,968 -$8,930 -$6,771 18.58%
Maximum $99,351 $92,579 $14,298 -6.82% $29,156 $27,467 $14,298 -5.79%
Average Std Deviation $20,682 $16,961 -$3,721 -17.99% $13,376 $12,394 -$983 -7.35%
Minimum $6,509 $3,001 -$12,915 -53.91% $5,076 $3,177 -$6,327 -37.42%
Maximum $67,890 $67,966 $75 0.11% $21,761 $20,023 $9,205 -7.98%
Average CV1 0.40 0.30 -0.09 -23.44% 1.06 1.51 0.44 41.50%
Minimum 0.14 0.09 -0.73 -37.77% 0.54 0.51 -0.75 -6.69%
Maximum 1.41 0.73 0.05 -47.89% 2.74 8.19 5.45 198.79%
Average Minimum $30,157 $35,168 $5,011 16.62% -$10,318 -$9,979 $340 3.29%
Minimum -$1,341 $13,910 -$6,877 1137.47% -$34,758 -$36,465 -$8,067 -4.91%
Maximum $62,792 $59,042 $23,227 -5.97% $10,404 $4,931 $16,093 -52.60%
Average Maximum $87,141 $82,055 -$5,086 -5.84% $27,883 $25,366 -$2,517 -9.03%
Minimum $25,147 $24,332 -$8,564 -3.24% -$2,300 -$4,779 -$8,564 -107.77%
Maximum $248,226 $242,032 -$815 -2.50% $53,895 $49,112 $24,215 -8.87%
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 21 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
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Table 4.42  Summary statistics for 26 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of less than $100,000 with 
at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $48,320 $48,320 $0 0.00% $7,624 $7,624 $0 0.00%
Minimum $15,560 $19,372 -$6,333 24.50% -$10,968 -$8,930 -$6,333 18.58%
Maximum $82,102 $76,998 $14,298 -6.22% $29,156 $27,467 $14,298 -5.79%
Average Std Deviation $18,507 $13,832 -$4,675 -25.26% $12,967 $11,738 -$1,229 -9.48%
Minimum $6,509 $3,001 -$12,915 -53.91% $5,076 $3,177 -$6,327 -37.42%
Maximum $38,525 $32,093 -$184 -16.70% $21,761 $18,788 $9,205 -13.66%
Average CV1 0.41 0.29 -0.12 -30.38% 1.08 1.41 0.33 30.53%
Minimum 0.14 0.09 -0.73 -37.77% 0.54 0.51 -0.75 -6.69%
Maximum 1.41 0.72 0.03 -48.81% 2.74 8.19 5.45 198.79%
Average Minimum $25,158 $32,882 $7,725 30.71% -$11,038 -$9,265 $1,773 16.07%
Minimum -$1,341 $13,910 -$4,737 1137.47% -$34,758 -$36,465 -$8,067 -4.91%
Maximum $56,241 $59,042 $23,227 4.98% $10,404 $4,931 $16,093 -52.60%
Average Maximum $75,919 $70,914 -$5,005 -6.59% $25,967 $24,203 -$1,763 -6.79%
Minimum $25,147 $24,332 -$8,564 -3.24% -$2,300 -$4,779 -$8,564 -107.77%
Maximum $127,361 $122,774 -$815 -3.60% $53,895 $49,112 $24,215 -8.87%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 21 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.43  Summary statistics for 49 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of $100,000 to $249,999 
assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $130,301 $130,301 $0 0.00% $31,381 $31,381 $0 0.00%
Minimum $42,548 $42,548 $0 0.00% -$5,589 -$5,589 $0 0.00%
Maximum $210,642 $210,642 $0 0.00% $84,457 $84,457 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $44,214 $36,070 -$8,144 -18.42% $28,500 $24,698 -$3,803 -13.34%
Minimum $13,058 $11,811 -$27,505 -9.55% $10,550 $10,152 -$19,428 -3.77%
Maximum $103,254 $90,987 $6,328 -11.88% $57,201 $48,571 $16,902 -15.09%
Average CV1 0.35 0.28 -0.07 -19.49% 2.54 2.32 -0.22 -8.58%
Minimum 0.16 0.12 -0.28 -22.75% 0.22 0.23 -3.73 3.49%
Maximum 0.63 0.58 0.10 -8.00% 35.28 34.52 2.07 -2.18%
Average Minimum $66,041 $87,754 $21,713 32.88% -$9,480 -$1,141 $8,339 87.96%
Minimum $984 $18,499 -$13,416 1780.77% -$87,553 -$51,591 -$15,348 41.07%
Maximum $152,200 $156,526 $59,500 2.84% $62,800 $59,182 $57,044 -5.76%
Average Maximum $191,217 $185,119 -$6,097 -3.19% $72,545 $68,341 -$4,204 -5.80%
Minimum $79,215 $76,797 -$23,424 -3.05% $20,367 $21,017 -$22,413 3.19%
Maximum $301,725 $301,725 $13,381 0.00% $156,594 $147,087 $20,247 -6.07%
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 48 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
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Table 4.44  Summary by frequency of claim for 49 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of $100,000 to 
$249,999 assuming AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI 
Years With 
Indemnity
Number of 
Farms
Average 
Premium Rate1
Average AFPF 
Premium Paid2
Average AFAR 
Premium Paid3
Average AFARI 
Premium Paid4
Average 
Liability5
Mean Standard 
Deviation of 
Liability6
Average 
Indemnity/Farm/
Year7
0 5 0.00% $0 $7,940 $8,955 $97,634 $7,486 $0
1 16 4.59% $3,966 $7,023 $7,921 $86,357 $6,563 $27,760
2 11 7.01% $5,352 $6,213 $7,007 $76,391 $7,383 $18,731
3 11 11.56% $10,941 $7,701 $8,685 $94,685 $14,314 $25,530
4 3 17.73% $17,512 $8,031 $9,058 $98,751 $14,799 $30,646
5 2 17.36% $16,013 $7,504 $8,463 $92,268 $24,126 $22,418
6 0 - - - - - - -
7 1 30.52% $23,156 $6,171 $6,959 $75,874 $14,621 $23,156
1Average premium rate reflects the average premium rate calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for each frequency of indemnity
2Average Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) premium paid reflects the average paid premium resulting from AFPF such that premiums equal indemnities
3Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFAR (8.13%)
4Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFARI (9.17%)
5Average liability was computed by averaging the liability across farms for each frequency of claim
7Average indemnity per farm per year was calculated using the following formula: (((sum of indemnities)/(number of farms))/ years with indemnity)
6Mean standard deviation of liability was calculated by taking the average of the standard deviation of liability by farm
  
188 
 
 
Table 4.45  Summary statistics for 44 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of $100,000 to $249,999 
with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $125,575 $125,575 $0 0.00% $30,528 $30,528 $0 0.00%
Minimum $42,548 $42,548 $0 0.00% -$5,589 -$5,589 $0 0.00%
Maximum $197,059 $197,059 $0 0.00% $84,457 $84,457 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $43,961 $34,891 -$9,069 -20.63% $28,097 $23,862 -$4,235 -15.07%
Minimum $13,058 $11,811 -$27,505 -9.55% $10,550 $10,152 -$19,428 -3.77%
Maximum $103,254 $90,987 $6,328 -11.88% $57,201 $48,081 $16,902 -15.94%
Average CV1 0.36 0.28 -0.08 -21.14% 2.68 2.43 -0.24 -9.07%
Minimum 0.17 0.12 -0.28 -25.75% 0.22 0.23 -3.73 3.49%
Maximum 0.63 0.58 0.10 -8.00% 35.28 34.52 2.07 -2.18%
Average Minimum $60,277 $84,457 $24,181 40.12% -$9,762 -$476 $9,286 95.12%
Minimum $984 $18,499 -$13,416 1780.77% -$87,553 -$45,162 -$15,348 48.42%
Maximum $152,200 $156,526 $59,500 2.84% $62,800 $59,182 $57,044 -5.76%
Average Maximum $185,114 $178,324 -$6,790 -3.67% $71,717 $67,035 -$4,682 -6.53%
Minimum $79,215 $76,797 -$23,424 -3.05% $20,367 $21,017 -$22,413 3.19%
Maximum $301,677 $291,093 $13,381 -3.51% $156,594 $147,087 $20,247 -6.07%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 43 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.46  Summary statistics for 49 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of $100,000 to $249,999 
assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $130,301 $130,301 $0 0.00% $31,381 $31,381 $0 0.00%
Minimum $42,548 $59,534 -$8,755 39.92% -$5,589 -$3,891 -$8,755 30.37%
Maximum $210,642 $202,125 $17,055 -4.04% $84,457 $85,892 $17,055 1.70%
Average Std Deviation $44,214 $36,288 -$7,927 -17.93% $28,500 $24,655 -$3,846 -13.49%
Minimum $13,058 $12,701 -$25,605 -2.74% $10,550 $10,203 -$20,173 -3.28%
Maximum $103,254 $91,754 $4,854 -11.14% $57,201 $48,437 $15,906 -15.32%
Average CV1 0.35 0.28 -0.07 -20.37% 1.71 1.64 -0.08 -4.58%
Minimum 0.16 0.13 -0.31 -18.05% 0.22 0.17 -6.26 -22.33%
Maximum 0.63 0.56 0.04 -11.98% 10.42 15.11 11.00 45.02%
Average Minimum $66,041 $87,718 $21,678 32.82% -$9,480 -$1,015 $8,465 89.29%
Minimum $984 $35,856 -$8,929 3545.39% -$87,553 -$60,632 -$11,600 30.75%
Maximum $152,200 $149,078 $67,390 -2.05% $62,800 $52,795 $58,693 -15.93%
Average Maximum $191,217 $185,427 -$5,789 -3.03% $72,545 $68,357 -$4,188 -5.77%
Minimum $79,215 $92,313 -$11,393 16.54% $20,367 $23,779 -$11,393 16.75%
Maximum $301,725 $295,226 $20,571 -2.15% $156,594 $148,635 $32,143 -5.08%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 46 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.47  Summary statistics for 44 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of $100,000 to $249,999 
with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $125,575 $126,477 $902 0.72% $30,528 $31,431 $902 2.96%
Minimum $42,548 $59,534 -$7,489 39.92% -$5,589 -$3,891 -$7,489 30.37%
Maximum $197,059 $192,440 $17,055 -2.34% $84,457 $85,892 $17,055 1.70%
Average Std Deviation $43,961 $35,152 -$8,808 -20.04% $28,097 $23,838 -$4,258 -15.16%
Minimum $13,058 $12,701 -$25,605 -2.74% $10,550 $10,203 -$20,173 -3.28%
Maximum $103,254 $91,754 $4,854 -11.14% $57,201 $47,709 $15,906 -16.59%
Average CV1 0.36 0.28 -0.08 -22.47% 1.76 1.39 -0.37 -20.99%
Minimum 0.17 0.13 -0.31 -21.23% 0.22 0.17 -6.26 -22.33%
Maximum 0.63 0.56 0.04 -11.98% 10.42 13.94 4.28 33.82%
Average Minimum $60,277 $85,291 $25,014 41.50% -$9,762 $559 $10,322 105.73%
Minimum $984 $35,856 -$3,933 3545.39% -$87,553 -$46,843 -$11,600 46.50%
Maximum $152,200 $149,078 $67,390 -2.05% $62,800 $52,795 $58,693 -15.93%
Average Maximum $185,114 $179,563 -$5,551 -3.00% $71,717 $68,003 -$3,714 -5.18%
Minimum $79,215 $92,313 -$11,393 16.54% $20,367 $23,779 -$11,393 16.75%
Maximum $301,677 $295,226 $20,571 -2.14% $156,594 $148,635 $32,143 -5.08%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 41 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)
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Table 4.48  Summary statistics for 49 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of $100,000 to $249,999 
assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $130,301 $129,387 -$914 -0.70% $31,381 $30,468 -$914 -2.91%
Minimum $42,548 $58,745 -$9,873 38.07% -$5,589 -$4,576 -$9,873 18.12%
Maximum $210,642 $201,037 $16,241 -4.56% $84,457 $84,861 $16,241 0.48%
Average Std Deviation $44,214 $36,317 -$7,898 -17.86% $28,500 $24,652 -$3,848 -13.50%
Minimum $13,058 $12,817 -$25,358 -1.84% $10,550 $10,139 -$20,237 -3.90%
Maximum $103,254 $91,852 $4,669 -11.04% $57,201 $48,421 $15,779 -15.35%
Average CV1 0.35 0.28 -0.07 -19.75% 1.71 2.19 0.47 27.60%
Minimum 0.16 0.13 -0.31 -17.21% 0.22 0.17 -5.29 -21.17%
Maximum 0.63 0.56 0.04 -11.41% 10.42 24.08 18.92 131.20%
Average Minimum $66,041 $86,788 $20,747 31.42% -$9,480 -$1,913 $7,567 79.82%
Minimum $984 $35,115 -$10,070 3470.05% -$87,553 -$61,787 -$13,083 29.43%
Maximum $152,200 $147,567 $66,617 -3.04% $62,800 $51,516 $57,689 -17.97%
Average Maximum $191,217 $184,554 -$6,663 -3.48% $72,545 $67,453 -$5,092 -7.02%
Minimum $79,215 $91,337 -$12,849 15.30% $20,367 $22,922 -$12,849 12.55%
Maximum $301,725 $294,402 $19,529 -2.43% $156,594 $147,618 $31,167 -5.73%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 46 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.49  Summary statistics for 44 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of $100,000 to $249,999 
with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $125,575 $125,575 $0 0.00% $30,528 $30,528 $0 0.00%
Minimum $42,548 $58,745 -$8,689 38.07% -$5,589 -$4,576 -$8,689 18.12%
Maximum $197,059 $191,401 $16,241 -2.87% $84,457 $84,861 $16,241 0.48%
Average Std Deviation $43,961 $35,187 -$8,773 -19.96% $28,097 $23,838 -$4,258 -15.16%
Minimum $13,058 $12,817 -$25,358 -1.84% $10,550 $10,139 -$20,237 -3.90%
Maximum $103,254 $91,852 $4,669 -11.04% $57,201 $47,663 $15,779 -16.67%
Average CV1 0.36 0.28 -0.08 -21.85% 1.76 1.82 0.05 3.05%
Minimum 0.17 0.13 -0.31 -20.42% 0.22 0.17 -5.29 -21.17%
Maximum 0.63 0.56 0.04 -11.41% 10.42 24.08 14.43 131.20%
Average Minimum $60,277 $84,366 $24,089 39.96% -$9,762 -$326 $9,436 96.66%
Minimum $984 $35,115 -$4,864 3470.05% -$87,553 -$48,059 -$13,083 45.11%
Maximum $152,200 $147,567 $66,617 -3.04% $62,800 $51,516 $57,689 -17.97%
Average Maximum $185,114 $178,704 -$6,410 -3.46% $71,717 $67,116 -$4,600 -6.41%
Minimum $79,215 $91,337 -$12,849 15.30% $20,367 $22,922 -$12,849 12.55%
Maximum $301,677 $294,402 $19,529 -2.41% $156,594 $147,618 $31,167 -5.73%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 41 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.50  Summary statistics for 38 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of $250,000 to $500,000 
assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $291,674 $291,674 $0 0.00% $73,546 $73,546 $0 0.00%
Minimum $138,744 $138,744 $0 0.00% -$140 -$140 $0 0.00%
Maximum $563,674 $563,674 $0 0.00% $221,836 $221,836 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $110,022 $97,440 -$12,582 -11.44% $70,176 $62,107 -$8,069 -11.50%
Minimum $26,531 $25,083 -$57,563 -5.46% $18,572 $17,186 -$31,349 -7.46%
Maximum $254,595 $238,588 $0 -6.29% $180,551 $169,506 $0 -6.12%
Average CV1 0.37 0.33 -0.04 -11.62% 1.36 1.18 -0.18 -13.11%
Minimum 0.09 0.09 -0.18 0.00% 0.29 0.27 -0.96 -7.46%
Maximum 0.68 0.67 0.00 -1.02% 6.76 5.80 0.00 -14.27%
Average Minimum $149,621 $178,842 $29,221 19.53% -$21,010 -$2,296 $18,714 89.07%
Minimum $51,940 $60,501 -$5,150 16.48% -$148,408 -$110,881 -$9,968 25.29%
Maximum $248,863 $269,713 $112,808 8.38% $129,829 $129,829 $82,356 0.00%
Average Maximum $453,063 $442,697 -$10,367 -2.29% $181,553 $174,041 -$7,512 -4.14%
Minimum $228,266 $218,164 -$41,508 -4.43% $73,002 $58,554 -$35,628 -19.79%
Maximum $940,066 $931,517 $0 -0.91% $484,797 $476,248 $38,922 -1.76%
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 37 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
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Table 4.51 Summary by frequency of claim for 38 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of $250,000 to 
$500,000 assuming AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI 
Years With 
Indemnity
Number of 
Farms
Average 
Premium Rate1
Average AFPF 
Premium Paid2
Average AFAR 
Premium Paid3
Average AFARI 
Premium Paid4
Average 
Liability5
Mean Standard 
Deviation of 
Liability6
Average 
Indemnity/Farm/
Year7
0 5 0.00% $0 $7,908 $8,791 $136,219 $12,785 $0
1 16 3.09% $5,260 $9,894 $10,998 $170,423 $16,165 $36,820
2 10 6.80% $12,186 $10,407 $11,569 $179,261 $19,936 $42,652
3 5 10.05% $22,379 $12,934 $14,377 $222,783 $23,427 $52,219
4 2 16.14% $38,009 $13,671 $15,196 $235,476 $26,999 $66,516
5 0 - - - - - - -
6 0 - - - - - - -
7 0 - - - - - - -
1Average premium rate reflects the average premium rate calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for each frequency of indemnity
2Average Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) premium paid reflects the average paid premium resulting from AFPF such that premiums equal indemnities
3Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFAR (5.81%)
4Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFARI (6.45%)
5Average liability was computed by averaging the liability across farms for each frequency of claim
7Average indemnity per farm per year was calculated using the following formula: (((sum of indemnities)/(number of farms))/ years with indemnity)
6Mean standard deviation of liability was calculated by taking the average of the standard deviation of liability by farm
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Table 4.52  Summary statistics for 33 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of $250,000 to $500,000 
with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $292,904 $292,904 $0 0.00% $73,115 $73,115 $0 0.00%
Minimum $138,744 $138,744 $0 0.00% -$140 -$140 $0 0.00%
Maximum $563,674 $563,674 $0 0.00% $186,703 $186,703 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $114,526 $100,038 -$14,489 -12.65% $73,380 $64,088 -$9,292 -12.66%
Minimum $26,531 $25,083 -$57,563 -5.46% $18,572 $17,186 -$31,349 -7.46%
Maximum $254,595 $238,588 -$82 -6.29% $180,551 $169,506 -$99 -6.12%
Average CV1 0.38 0.33 -0.05 -12.91% 1.40 1.19 -0.21 -14.73%
Minimum 0.12 0.11 -0.18 -5.46% 0.29 0.27 -0.96 -7.46%
Maximum 0.68 0.67 0.00 -1.02% 6.76 5.80 0.00 -14.27%
Average Minimum $145,451 $179,099 $33,649 23.13% -$26,392 -$4,843 $21,550 81.65%
Minimum $51,940 $60,501 -$5,150 16.48% -$148,408 -$110,881 -$9,968 25.29%
Maximum $248,863 $269,713 $112,808 8.38% $64,569 $83,158 $82,356 28.79%
Average Maximum $463,849 $451,912 -$11,937 -2.57% $186,979 $178,328 -$8,650 -4.63%
Minimum $228,266 $218,164 -$41,508 -4.43% $73,002 $58,554 -$35,628 -19.79%
Maximum $940,066 $931,517 -$53 -0.91% $484,797 $476,248 $38,922 -1.76%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 32 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.53  Summary statistics for 38 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of $250,000 to $500,000 
assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $291,674 $291,674 $0 0.00% $73,546 $73,546 $0 0.00%
Minimum $138,744 $134,564 -$10,000 -3.01% -$140 $13,297 -$10,000 9569.22%
Maximum $563,674 $557,368 $28,028 -1.12% $221,836 $214,392 $28,028 -3.36%
Average Std Deviation $110,022 $97,528 -$12,493 -11.36% $70,176 $62,041 -$8,135 -11.59%
Minimum $26,531 $25,038 -$56,876 -5.63% $18,572 $17,531 -$31,250 -5.61%
Maximum $254,595 $239,048 -$285 -6.11% $180,551 $166,794 -$70 -7.62%
Average CV1 0.37 0.33 -0.04 -11.45% 1.36 1.10 -0.26 -19.15%
Minimum 0.09 0.10 -0.20 1.97% 0.29 0.30 -4.84 1.62%
Maximum 0.68 0.68 0.01 0.12% 6.76 3.79 1.39 -43.87%
Average Minimum $149,621 $179,372 $29,751 19.88% -$21,010 -$1,793 $19,217 91.46%
Minimum $51,940 $57,388 -$10,473 10.49% -$148,408 -$98,159 -$14,501 33.86%
Maximum $248,863 $261,181 $140,380 4.95% $129,829 $123,190 $91,306 -5.11%
Average Maximum $453,063 $443,176 -$9,888 -2.18% $181,553 $174,149 -$7,405 -4.08%
Minimum $228,266 $223,614 -$14,522 -2.04% $73,002 $66,241 -$21,281 -9.26%
Maximum $940,066 $930,101 -$4,652 -1.06% $484,797 $463,516 $66,113 -4.39%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 37 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.54  Summary statistics for 33 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of $250,000 to $500,000 
with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $292,904 $294,102 $1,198 0.41% $73,115 $74,313 $1,198 1.64%
Minimum $138,744 $134,564 -$10,000 -3.01% -$140 $18,272 -$10,000 13111.68%
Maximum $563,674 $557,368 $28,028 -1.12% $186,703 $181,530 $28,028 -2.77%
Average Std Deviation $114,526 $100,212 -$14,315 -12.50% $73,380 $64,052 -$9,327 -12.71%
Minimum $26,531 $25,038 -$56,876 -5.63% $18,572 $17,531 -$31,250 -5.61%
Maximum $254,595 $239,048 -$409 -6.11% $180,551 $166,794 -$358 -7.62%
Average CV1 0.38 0.33 -0.05 -12.97% 1.40 1.03 -0.37 -26.14%
Minimum 0.12 0.11 -0.20 -1.90% 0.29 0.30 -4.84 1.62%
Maximum 0.68 0.68 0.01 0.12% 6.76 1.97 0.44 -70.87%
Average Minimum $145,451 $180,785 $35,334 24.29% -$26,392 -$3,182 $23,211 87.95%
Minimum $51,940 $57,388 -$10,473 10.49% -$148,408 -$98,159 -$14,501 33.86%
Maximum $248,863 $261,181 $140,380 4.95% $64,569 $90,105 $91,306 39.55%
Average Maximum $463,849 $453,743 -$10,106 -2.18% $186,979 $179,668 -$7,311 -3.91%
Minimum $228,266 $223,614 -$14,522 -2.04% $73,002 $66,241 -$21,281 -9.26%
Maximum $940,066 $930,101 -$4,652 -1.06% $484,797 $463,516 $66,113 -4.39%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 32 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.55  Summary statistics for 38 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of $250,000 to $500,000 
assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $291,674 $290,517 -$1,157 -0.40% $73,546 $72,389 -$1,157 -1.57%
Minimum $138,744 $134,092 -$11,503 -3.35% -$140 $12,426 -$11,503 8948.96%
Maximum $563,674 $555,711 $26,524 -1.41% $221,836 $213,561 $26,524 -3.73%
Average Std Deviation $110,022 $97,539 -$12,482 -11.35% $70,176 $62,035 -$8,141 -11.60%
Minimum $26,531 $25,034 -$56,799 -5.64% $18,572 $17,569 -$31,237 -5.40%
Maximum $254,595 $239,105 -$317 -6.08% $180,551 $166,496 -$78 -7.78%
Average CV1 0.37 0.33 -0.04 -11.10% 1.36 1.13 -0.23 -16.59%
Minimum 0.09 0.10 -0.20 2.20% 0.29 0.30 -4.74 2.63%
Maximum 0.68 0.68 0.01 0.33% 6.76 4.06 1.65 -39.98%
Average Minimum $149,621 $178,275 $28,654 19.15% -$21,010 -$2,899 $18,111 86.20%
Minimum $51,940 $57,034 -$11,641 9.81% -$148,408 -$99,174 -$16,119 33.17%
Maximum $248,863 $259,523 $138,825 4.28% $129,829 $122,450 $90,418 -5.68%
Average Maximum $453,063 $442,075 -$10,989 -2.43% $181,553 $173,004 -$8,549 -4.71%
Minimum $228,266 $223,095 -$16,143 -2.27% $73,002 $64,907 -$23,655 -11.09%
Maximum $940,066 $928,989 -$5,171 -1.18% $484,797 $461,142 $64,516 -4.88%
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of 
negative observations 37 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
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Table 4.56  Summary statistics for 33 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of $250,000 to $500,000 
with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $292,904 $292,904 $0 0.00% $73,115 $73,115 $0 0.00%
Minimum $138,744 $134,092 -$11,503 -3.35% -$140 $17,056 -$11,503 12245.39%
Maximum $563,674 $555,711 $26,524 -1.41% $186,703 $180,636 $26,524 -3.25%
Average Std Deviation $114,526 $100,232 -$14,294 -12.48% $73,380 $64,050 -$9,330 -12.71%
Minimum $26,531 $25,034 -$56,799 -5.64% $18,572 $17,569 -$31,237 -5.40%
Maximum $254,595 $239,105 -$446 -6.08% $180,551 $166,496 -$377 -7.78%
Average CV1 0.38 0.33 -0.05 -12.61% 1.40 1.06 -0.34 -24.07%
Minimum 0.12 0.11 -0.20 -1.37% 0.29 0.30 -4.74 2.63%
Maximum 0.68 0.68 0.01 0.33% 6.76 2.04 0.56 -69.81%
Average Minimum $145,451 $179,641 $34,190 23.51% -$26,392 -$4,334 $22,058 83.58%
Minimum $51,940 $57,034 -$11,641 9.81% -$148,408 -$99,174 -$16,119 33.17%
Maximum $248,863 $259,523 $138,825 4.28% $64,569 $88,861 $90,418 37.62%
Average Maximum $463,849 $452,616 -$11,234 -2.42% $186,979 $178,485 -$8,494 -4.54%
Minimum $228,266 $223,095 -$16,143 -2.27% $73,002 $64,907 -$23,655 -11.09%
Maximum $940,066 $928,989 -$5,171 -1.18% $484,797 $461,142 $64,516 -4.88%
1Coefficient of variation (CV) results for NFI includes only those farms with positive values.  Negative values provide no economic interpretation.  Therefore following elimination of negative 
observations 32 farms remained for NFI CV analysis.
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.57  Summary statistics for 6 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of greater than $500,000 
assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $831,791 $831,791 $0 0.00% $197,236 $197,236 $0 0.00%
Minimum $463,960 $463,960 $0 0.00% $101,080 $101,080 $0 0.00%
Maximum $1,034,902 $1,034,902 $0 0.00% $264,961 $264,961 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $330,623 $314,493 -$16,130 -4.88% $165,742 $151,268 -$14,473 -8.73%
Minimum $199,883 $186,544 -$47,447 -6.67% $83,733 $83,733 -$62,315 0.00%
Maximum $529,292 $481,845 $0 -8.96% $250,775 $237,850 $0 -5.15%
Average CV 0.40 0.38 -0.02 -5.00% 0.92 0.84 -0.08 -8.72%
Minimum 0.29 0.28 -0.05 -4.82% 0.32 0.32 -0.32 0.00%
Maximum 0.54 0.49 0.00 -8.96% 1.56 1.49 0.00 -4.35%
Average Minimum $412,797 $468,010 $55,214 13.38% -$22,330 $5,636 $27,966 125.24%
Minimum $161,979 $318,433 $0 96.59% -$313,879 -$147,879 -$20,333 52.89%
Maximum $729,900 $729,900 $166,000 0.00% $168,481 $168,481 $166,000 0.00%
Average Maximum $1,321,228 $1,309,955 -$11,273 -0.85% $461,790 $450,516 -$11,273 -2.44%
Minimum $829,752 $816,078 -$27,667 -1.65% $381,777 $381,777 -$27,667 0.00%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,680,736 $0 -1.62% $686,230 $686,230 $0 0.00%
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.58 Summary by frequency of claim for 6 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of greater than 
$500,000 assuming AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI 
Years With 
Indemnity
Number of 
Farms
Average 
Premium Rate1
Average AFPF 
Premium Paid2
Average AFAR 
Premium Paid3
Average AFARI 
Premium Paid4
Average 
Liability5
Mean Standard 
Deviation of 
Liability6
Average 
Indemnity/Farm/
Year7
0 2 0.00% $0 $12,596 $20,072 $500,052 $47,187 $0
1 2 3.78% $16,817 $11,197 $17,842 $444,507 $43,581 $117,717
2 1 4.17% $20,333 $12,274 $19,558 $487,255 $37,333 $71,165
3 1 4.43% $13,674 $7,780 $12,397 $308,847 $15,064 $31,905
4 0 - - - - - - -
5 0 - - - - - - -
6 0 - - - - - - -
7 0 - - - - - - -
5Average liability was computed by averaging the liability across farms for each frequency of claim
6Mean standard deviation of liability was calculated by taking the average of the standard deviation of liability by farm
7Average indemnity per farm per year was calculated using the following formula: (((sum of indemnities)/(number of farms))/ years with indemnity)
1Average premium rate reflects the average premium rate calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for each frequency of indemnity
2Average Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) premium paid reflects the average paid premium resulting from AFPF such that premiums equal indemnities
3Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFAR (2.52%)
4Average Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) premium paid reflects the average paid premium by all farms resulting from AFARI (4.01%)
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Table 4.59  Summary statistics for 4 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of greater than $500,000 
with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $775,482 $775,482 $0 0.00% $167,011 $167,011 $0 0.00%
Minimum $463,960 $463,960 $0 0.00% $101,080 $101,080 $0 0.00%
Maximum $988,138 $988,138 $0 0.00% $197,331 $197,331 $0 0.00%
Average Std Deviation $323,702 $299,508 -$24,194 -7.47% $168,217 $146,507 -$21,710 -12.91%
Minimum $199,883 $186,544 -$47,447 -6.67% $122,971 $111,408 -$62,315 -9.40%
Maximum $529,292 $481,845 -$10,827 -8.96% $250,775 $188,460 -$6,099 -24.85%
Average CV 0.41 0.38 -0.03 -7.26% 1.07 0.95 -0.12 -11.29%
Minimum 0.29 0.28 -0.05 -4.82% 0.62 0.56 -0.32 -9.40%
Maximum 0.54 0.49 -0.01 -8.96% 1.56 1.49 -0.03 -4.35%
Average Minimum $330,482 $413,302 $82,820 25.06% -$75,925 -$33,976 $41,948 55.25%
Minimum $161,979 $318,433 $35,800 96.59% -$313,879 -$147,879 -$20,333 52.89%
Maximum $482,838 $554,192 $166,000 14.78% $70,438 $50,105 $166,000 -28.87%
Average Maximum $1,236,868 $1,219,958 -$16,910 -1.37% $425,683 $408,773 -$16,910 -3.97%
Minimum $829,752 $816,078 -$27,667 -1.65% $406,998 $386,665 -$27,667 -5.00%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,680,736 -$5,967 -1.62% $434,536 $421,019 -$5,967 -3.11%
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.60  Summary statistics for 6 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of greater than $500,000 
assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $831,791 $831,791 $0 0.00% $197,236 $197,236 $0 0.00%
Minimum $463,960 $469,854 -$16,376 1.27% $101,080 $95,656 -$16,376 -5.37%
Maximum $1,034,902 $1,018,525 $16,664 -1.58% $264,961 $256,145 $16,664 -3.33%
Average Std Deviation $330,623 $314,213 -$16,409 -4.96% $165,742 $150,879 -$14,863 -8.97%
Minimum $199,883 $186,641 -$48,657 -6.62% $83,733 $83,372 -$63,447 -0.43%
Maximum $529,292 $480,636 -$401 -9.19% $250,775 $237,044 -$361 -5.48%
Average CV 0.40 0.38 -0.02 -5.28% 0.92 0.85 -0.08 -8.25%
Minimum 0.29 0.28 -0.06 -4.23% 0.32 0.33 -0.41 3.00%
Maximum 0.54 0.48 0.00 -10.70% 1.56 1.58 0.06 0.93%
Average Minimum $412,797 $468,669 $55,872 13.54% -$22,330 $6,886 $29,216 130.84%
Minimum $161,979 $324,396 -$15,670 100.27% -$313,879 -$128,762 -$12,994 58.98%
Maximum $729,900 $714,230 $185,117 -2.15% $168,481 $160,463 $185,117 -4.76%
Average Maximum $1,321,228 $1,309,348 -$11,880 -0.90% $461,790 $449,891 -$11,899 -2.58%
Minimum $829,752 $821,773 -$16,734 -0.96% $381,777 $371,848 -$17,938 -2.60%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,695,774 -$7,979 -0.74% $686,230 $668,292 -$7,979 -2.61%
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.61  Summary statistics for 4 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of greater than $500,000 
with at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $775,482 $781,780 $6,298 0.81% $167,011 $173,309 $6,298 3.77%
Minimum $463,960 $469,854 -$5,424 1.27% $101,080 $95,656 -$5,424 -5.37%
Maximum $988,138 $1,004,801 $16,664 1.69% $197,331 $209,771 $16,664 6.30%
Average Std Deviation $323,702 $299,291 -$24,411 -7.54% $168,217 $146,215 -$22,002 -13.08%
Minimum $199,883 $186,641 -$48,657 -6.62% $122,971 $111,588 -$63,447 -9.26%
Maximum $529,292 $480,636 -$11,008 -9.19% $250,775 $187,327 -$6,101 -25.30%
Average CV 0.41 0.38 -0.03 -8.19% 1.07 0.94 -0.13 -12.38%
Minimum 0.29 0.28 -0.06 -4.23% 0.62 0.54 -0.41 -12.82%
Maximum 0.54 0.48 -0.01 -10.70% 1.56 1.58 0.01 0.93%
Average Minimum $330,482 $420,212 $89,730 27.15% -$75,925 -$26,848 $49,076 64.64%
Minimum $161,979 $324,396 $31,265 100.27% -$313,879 -$128,762 -$12,087 58.98%
Maximum $482,838 $561,286 $185,117 16.25% $70,438 $58,351 $185,117 -17.16%
Average Maximum $1,236,868 $1,225,714 -$11,155 -0.90% $425,683 $414,801 -$10,882 -2.56%
Minimum $829,752 $821,773 -$12,629 -0.96% $406,998 $394,323 -$12,675 -3.11%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,695,774 -$7,979 -0.74% $434,536 $426,557 -$7,979 -1.84%
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.62  Summary statistics for 6 SE Kansas crop farms with Value of Farm Production (VFP) of greater than $500,000 
assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $831,791 $825,100 -$6,691 -0.80% $197,236 $190,545 -$6,691 -3.39%
Minimum $463,960 $465,237 -$26,095 0.28% $101,080 $88,895 -$26,095 -12.05%
Maximum $1,034,902 $1,008,806 $10,133 -2.52% $264,961 $250,913 $10,133 -5.30%
Average Std Deviation $330,623 $314,049 -$16,574 -5.01% $165,742 $150,650 -$15,091 -9.11%
Minimum $199,883 $186,700 -$49,374 -6.60% $83,733 $83,159 -$64,118 -0.69%
Maximum $529,292 $479,918 -$634 -9.33% $250,775 $236,571 -$574 -5.66%
Average CV 0.40 0.38 -0.02 -4.56% 0.92 0.89 -0.04 -4.08%
Minimum 0.29 0.28 -0.05 -3.43% 0.32 0.33 -0.38 4.88%
Maximum 0.54 0.48 0.01 -10.25% 1.56 1.69 0.13 8.52%
Average Minimum $412,797 $462,361 $49,564 12.01% -$22,330 $937 $23,267 104.20%
Minimum $161,979 $319,821 -$24,969 97.45% -$313,879 -$133,837 -$20,706 57.36%
Maximum $729,900 $704,931 $180,042 -3.42% $168,481 $155,705 $180,042 -7.58%
Average Maximum $1,321,228 $1,302,297 -$18,931 -1.43% $461,790 $442,829 -$18,961 -4.11%
Minimum $829,752 $817,038 -$26,666 -1.53% $381,777 $365,956 -$28,585 -4.14%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,688,278 -$12,714 -1.18% $686,230 $657,645 -$12,714 -4.17%
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.63  Summary statistics for 4 SE Kansas crop farms with value of farm production (VFP) of greater than $500,000 with 
at least one claim assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average AGRC 
Change
AGRC Percent 
Change
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite
Average NFI 
Change
NFI Percent 
Change
Average Mean $775,482 $775,482 $0 0.00% $167,011 $167,011 $0 0.00%
Minimum $463,960 $465,237 -$12,185 0.28% $101,080 $88,895 -$12,185 -12.05%
Maximum $988,138 $998,271 $10,133 1.03% $197,331 $203,241 $10,133 2.99%
Average Std Deviation $323,702 $299,163 -$24,539 -7.58% $168,217 $146,043 -$22,174 -13.18%
Minimum $199,883 $186,700 -$49,374 -6.60% $122,971 $111,699 -$64,118 -9.17%
Maximum $529,292 $479,918 -$11,114 -9.33% $250,775 $186,656 -$6,102 -25.57%
Average CV 0.41 0.38 -0.03 -7.45% 1.07 0.98 -0.09 -8.09%
Minimum 0.29 0.28 -0.05 -3.43% 0.62 0.56 -0.38 -9.52%
Maximum 0.54 0.48 -0.01 -10.25% 1.56 1.69 0.13 8.52%
Average Minimum $330,482 $414,264 $83,783 25.35% -$75,925 -$32,654 $43,271 56.99%
Minimum $161,979 $319,821 $25,033 97.45% -$313,879 -$133,837 -$19,260 57.36%
Maximum $482,838 $553,379 $180,042 14.61% $70,438 $51,178 $180,042 -27.34%
Average Maximum $1,236,868 $1,219,093 -$17,775 -1.44% $425,683 $408,343 -$17,340 -4.07%
Minimum $829,752 $817,038 -$20,125 -1.53% $406,998 $386,801 -$20,197 -4.96%
Maximum $1,708,403 $1,688,278 -$12,714 -1.18% $434,536 $421,822 -$12,714 -2.93%
Note:  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC), Net Farm Income (NFI)  
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Table 4.64 Summary statistics of rates and premiums for SE Kansas farms by farm 
category 
Dairy Beef Livestock Crop Total
Total Number of Farms 13 64 93 126 219
AFPFa $4,926 $6,773 $6,621 $8,778 $8,224
AFARb 0.70% 3.06% 2.41% 6.24% 4.54%
Average Premiumc $1,516 $3,493 $3,275 $7,454 $5,745
Average Premium with claimsd $1,837 $3,444 $3,047 $7,358 $5,474
AFARIe 1.88% 6.01% 5.23% 7.45% 6.82%
Average Premiumf $4,064 $6,869 $7,117 $8,892 $8,632
Average Premium with claimsg $4,926 $6,773 $6,621 $8,778 $8,224
Average Liability $216,084 $114,337 $136,141 $119,435 $126,477
Number of Farms with claimsh 4 33 46 107 153
(30.77) (51.56) (49.46) (84.92) (69.86)
Average Indemnityi $19,703 $23,707 $22,924 $27,056 $26,213
Frequency of claimsj 1.75 2.00 2.02 2.27 2.20
(25.00) (28.57) (28.88) (32.44) (31.37)
jFrequency of claims reflects the average number of claims each category generated excluding farms with zero claims with percentages in parentheses 
below
eActuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) is the average rate computed using farms which genearted a minimum of one 
indemnity over the seven year period
hNumber of farms with claims presents the number of farms from the total which generated a minimum of one claim over the seven year period with 
percentages reported in parentheses below
iAverage indemnity computes the average indeminty for farms which received a minimum of one indemnity over the seven year period
gAverage premium with claims is the average paid premium, assuming AFARI, using solely farms which generated a minimum of one indemnity over 
the seven year period
fAverage premium calculates the average premium paid resulting from the applied AFARI from all farms
aActuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) averages farms which paid a premium excluding farms with zero premiums
bActuairally Fair Average Rate (AFAR) was calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities including all farms within the category
cAverage premium calculates the average paid premium resulting from AFAR
dAverage Premium with claims is the average paid premium, assuming AFAR, using solely farms which received a minimum of one indemnity over the 
seven year period
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Table 4.65 Summary statistics of rates and premiums for SE Kansas crop farms by 
Value of Farm Production (VFP) 
<100 100-249 250-500 >500
Total Number of Farms 33 49 38 6
AFPFa $5,393 $7,963 $11,937 $16,910
AFARb 11.04% 8.13% 5.81% 2.52%
Average Premiumc $4,249 $7,151 $10,367 $11,273
Average Premium with claimsd $4,272 $7,061 $10,739 $10,612
AFARIe 13.93% 9.17% 6.45% 4.01%
Average Premiumf $5,364 $8,065 $11,523 $17,964
Average Premium with claimsg $5,393 $7,963 $11,937 $16,910
Average Liability $38,499 $87,926 $178,562 $447,536
Number of Farms with claimsh 26 44 33 4
(78.79) (89.80) (86.84) (66.67)
Average Indemnityi $12,746 $24,527 $46,738 $67,640
Frequency of claimsj 2.962 2.273 1.788 1.750
(42.31) (32.47) (25.45) (25.00)
iAverage indemnity computes the average indeminty for farms which received a minimum of one indemnity over the seven year period
jFrequency of claims reflects the average number of claims each category generated excluding farms with zero claims with percentages in parentheses 
below
-------------------------(in thousands of dollars)-----------------------------
hNumber of farms with claims presents the number of farms from the total which generated a minimum of one claim over the seven year period with 
percentages reported in parentheses below
eActuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) is the average rate computed using farms which genearted a minimum of one 
indemnity over the seven year period
fAverage premium calculates the average premium paid resulting from the applied AFARI from all farms
gAverage premium with claims is the average paid premium, assuming AFARI, using solely farms which generated a minimum of one indemnity over 
the seven year period
aActuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) averages farms which paid a premium excluding farms with zero premiums
bActuairally Fair Average Rate (AFAR) was calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities including all farms within the category
cAverage premium calculates the average paid premium resulting from AFAR
dAverage Premium with claims is the average paid premium, assuming AFAR, using solely farms which received a minimum of one indemnity over the 
seven year period
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Table 4.66  Certainty Equivalent (CE) analysis assuming a logarithmic utility 
function for AFPF for all farms and farms with at least one claim 
Dairy Beef Livestock Crop Total
Number of farms2 13 62 91 125 216
Mean AGRC w/o AGR-Lite $337,798 $185,560 $217,856 $192,445 $203,236
Mean AGRC w/ AGR-Lite $337,798 $185,560 $217,856 $192,445 $203,236
Standard Deviation w/o AGR-Lite3 $65,604 $53,685 $55,682 $71,536 $64,803
Standard Deviation w/ AGR-Lite4 $63,723 $50,229 $52,348 $62,941 $58,380
CE w/out AGR-Lite $331,784 $182,416 $214,262 $179,414 $194,095
CE w/ AGR-Lite $332,299 $183,897 $215,775 $183,993 $197,407
CE Change5 $1,674 $2,962 $3,129 $5,400 $4,769
(0.50) (1.60) (1.44) (2.81) (2.35)
Min Change $0 -$3,955 -$3,955 -$1,358 -$3,955
Max Change $2,989 $22,895 $22,895 $64,610 $64,610
Percent w/ positive change 31% 47% 46% 83% 68%
Number of farms2 4 31 44 106 150
Mean AGRC w/o AGR-Lite $393,455 $161,763 $182,809 $182,705 $182,736
Mean AGRC w/ AGR-Lite $393,455 $161,763 $182,809 $182,705 $182,736
Standard Deviation w/o AGR-Lite3 $103,222 $54,622 $57,182 $69,997 $66,144
Standard Deviation w/ AGR-Lite4 $97,110 $47,920 $50,442 $59,875 $56,949
CE w/out AGR-Lite $381,702 $160,293 $179,938 $169,377 $172,475
CE w/ AGR-Lite $383,376 $163,255 $183,066 $174,777 $177,243
CE Change5 $1,674 $2,962 $3,129 $5,400 $4,769
(0.43) (1.83) (1.71) (2.96) (2.61)
Min Change $248 -$3,955 -$3,955 -$1,358 -$3,955
Max Change $2,989 $22,895 $22,895 $64,610 $64,610
Percent w/ positive change 100% 94% 95% 98% 97%
3 Standard deviation w/o AGR-Lite computes the average of the standard deviation by farm without participation in AGR-Lite
6Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) farms with claims reflects the CE results of those farms who received at least one indemnity over the seven year period
AFPF farms with claims 6
AFPF all farms 1 
1Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) was calculated for each farm by dividing total indemnities (over the seven years) by 7.  These results reflect all farms 
within each category.
2The discrepancy between farm numbers is a direct result of some farms generating negative Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) which are problematic to a 
logaritmic utility function.  Therefore, these farms were ommitted from the Certainty Equivalent (CE) analysis.
4 Standard deviation w/ AGR-Lite computes the average of the standard deviation by farm with participation in AGR-Lite
5Certainty Equivalent (CE) changes were calculated excluding farms with a zero change in CE.  Therefore these results reveal the change in CE for those farms with 
changes.  CE changes were calculated  as a percent of initial Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) by dividing CE change by inital AGRC and are located in 
parentheses below.
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Table 4.67  Certainty Equivalent (CE) analysis assuming a logarithmic utility 
function for Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) for all farms and farms with at 
least one claim 
Dairy Beef Livestock Crop Total
Number of farms2 13 62 91 125 216
Average Rate 0.70% 3.06% 2.41% 6.24% 4.54%
Mean AGRC w/o AGR-Lite $337,798 $185,560 $217,856 $192,445 $203,236
Mean AGRC w/ AGR-Lite $337,798 $185,560 $217,856 $192,445 $203,236
Standard Deviation w/o AGR-Lite3 $65,604 $53,685 $55,682 $71,536 $64,803
Standard Deviation w/ AGR-Lite4 $63,729 $50,173 $52,322 $62,997 $58,380
CE w/out AGR-Lite $331,784 $182,416 $214,262 $179,414 $194,095
CE w/ AGR-Lite $332,309 $183,414 $215,456 $183,842 $197,218
CE Change5 $525 $998 $1,194 $4,428 $3,123
(0.16) (0.54) (0.55) (2.30) (1.54)
Min Change -$2,606 -$21,189 -$16,679 -$41,624 -$31,482
Max Change $9,450 $34,359 $40,576 $67,043 $75,050
Percent w/ positive change 31% 37% 38% 58% 48%
Number of farms2 4 31 44 106 150
Average Rate 0.70% 3.06% 2.41% 6.24% 4.54%
Mean AGRC w/o AGR-Lite $393,455 $161,763 $182,809 $182,705 $182,736
Mean AGRC w/ AGR-Lite $396,544 $165,092 $186,383 $184,124 $185,486
Standard Deviation w/o AGR-Lite3 $103,222 $54,622 $57,182 $69,997 $66,144
Standard Deviation w/ AGR-Lite4 $97,131 $47,878 $50,434 $59,995 $57,001
CE w/out AGR-Lite $381,702 $160,293 $179,938 $169,377 $172,475
CE w/ AGR-Lite $386,530 $165,915 $186,215 $176,082 $179,843
CE Change5 $4,828 $5,621 $6,278 $6,705 $7,368
(1.23) (3.47) (3.43) (3.67) (4.03)
Min Change $1,476 -$8,341 -$7,690 -$18,957 -$23,530
Max Change $9,450 $34,359 $40,576 $67,043 $75,050
Percent w/ positive change 100% 74% 80% 69% 69%
3 Standard deviation w/o AGR-Lite computes the average of the standard deviation by farm without participation in AGR-Lite
4 Standard deviation w/ AGR-Lite computes the average of the standard deviation by farm with participation in AGR-Lite
5Certainty Equivalent (CE) changes were calculated excluding farms with a zero change in CE.  Therefore these results reveal the change in CE for those farms 
with changes.  CE changes were calculated  as a percent of initial AGRC by dividing CE change by inital AGRC and are located in parentheses below.
6Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) farms with claims reflects the CE results of those farms who received at least one indemnity over the seven year period
2The discrepancy between farm numbers is a direct result of some farms generating negative Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) which are problematic to 
a logaritmic utility function.  Therefore, these farms were ommitted from the Certainty Equivalent (CE) analysis.
AFAR all farms 1
AFAR farms with claims 6
1Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) all farms reflects the average rate calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for all farms.  These results 
reflect an average rate for all farms regardless of whether and indemnity was received.
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Table 4.68  Certainty Equivalent (CE) analysis assuming a logarithmic utility 
function for Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) for 
all farms and farms with at least one claim 
Dairy Beef Livestock Crop Total
Number of farms2 13 62 91 125 216
Average Rate 1.88% 6.01% 5.23% 7.45% 6.82%
Mean AGRC w/o AGR-Lite $337,798 $185,560 $217,856 $192,445 $203,236
Mean AGRC w/ AGR-Lite $335,250 $182,184 $214,014 $191,007 $200,349
Standard Deviation w/o AGR-Lite3 $65,604 $53,685 $55,682 $71,536 $64,803
Standard Deviation w/ AGR-Lite4 $63,740 $50,123 $52,295 $63,009 $58,383
CE w/out AGR-Lite $331,784 $182,416 $214,262 $179,414 $194,095
CE w/ AGR-Lite $329,718 $179,873 $211,461 $182,328 $194,199
CE Change5 -$2,066 -$2,543 -$2,801 $2,914 $104
(0.61) (1.37) (1.29) (1.51) (0.05)
Min Change -$6,987 -$41,700 -$36,270 -$49,665 -$47,323
Max Change $8,267 $27,942 $36,035 $61,359 $64,290
Percent w/ positive change 23% 26% 23% 52% 41%
Number of farms2 4 31 44 106 150
Average Rate 1.88% 6.01% 5.23% 7.45% 6.82%
Mean AGRC w/o AGR-Lite $393,455 $161,763 $182,809 $182,705 $182,736
Mean AGRC w/ AGR-Lite $393,455 $161,763 $182,809 $182,705 $182,736
Standard Deviation w/o AGR-Lite3 $103,222 $54,622 $57,182 $69,997 $66,144
Standard Deviation w/ AGR-Lite4 $97,166 $47,843 $50,429 $60,019 $57,031
CE w/out AGR-Lite $381,702 $160,293 $179,938 $169,377 $172,475
CE w/ AGR-Lite $383,357 $162,340 $182,422 $174,584 $176,939
CE Change5 $1,656 $2,046 $2,484 $5,207 $4,464
(0.42) (1.26) (1.36) (2.85) (2.44)
Min Change -$3,782 -$16,619 -$28,653 -$24,596 -$40,480
Max Change $8,267 $27,942 $36,035 $61,359 $64,290
Percent w/ positive change 75% 52% 48% 61% 59%
2The discrepancy between farm numbers is a direct result of some farms generating negative Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) which are problematic to a 
logaritmic utility function.  Therefore, these farms were ommitted from the Certainty Equivalent (CE) analysis.
5Certainty Equivalent (CE) changes were calculated excluding farms with a zero change in CE.  Therefore these results reveal the change in CE for those farms with 
changes.  CE changes were calculated  as a percent of initial AGRC by dividing CE change by inital AGRC and are located in parentheses below.
6Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) farms with claims reflects the Certainty Equivalent (CE) results of those farms who received at 
least one indemnity over the seven year period
AFARI all farms 1
AFARI farms with claims 6
1Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) was calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for farms who received at least 
one indemnity over the seven year period.  These results reflect an average rate determined from only those with at least one indemnity payment over the seven year 
period
3 Standard deviation w/o AGR-Lite computes the average of the standard deviation by farm without participation in AGR-Lite
4 Standard deviation w/ AGR-Lite computes the average of the standard deviation by farm with participation in AGR-Lite
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Table 4.69  Certainty Equivalent (CE) analysis of crop farms assuming a 
logarithmic utility function under Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) by 
Value of Farm Production (VFP) for all farms and farms with at least one claim 
<100 100-249 250-500 >500
Number of farms2 32 49 38 6
Mean AGRC w/o AGR-Lite $54,210 $130,301 $291,674 $831,791
Mean AGRC w/ AGR-Lite $54,210 $130,301 $291,674 $831,791
Standard Deviation w/o AGR-Lite3 $20,682 $44,214 $110,022 $330,623
Standard Deviation w/ AGR-Lite4 $17,034 $36,070 $97,440 $314,493
CE w/out AGR-Lite $51,204 $121,088 $270,331 $763,724
CE w/ AGR-Lite $52,738 $125,519 $276,300 $777,719
CE Change5 $1,964 $4,935 $6,873 $20,992
(3.62) (3.79) (2.36) (2.52)
Min Change $0 -$1,358 $0 $0
Max Change $8,680 $35,514 $30,551 $64,610
Percent w/ positive change 78% 86% 87% 67%
Number of farms2 25 44 33 4
Mean AGRC w/o AGR-Lite $48,320 $125,575 $292,904 $775,482
Mean AGRC w/ AGR-Lite $48,320 $125,575 $292,904 $775,482
Standard Deviation w/o AGR-Lite3 $18,507 $43,961 $114,526 $323,702
Standard Deviation w/ AGR-Lite4 $13,877 $34,891 $100,038 $299,508
CE w/out AGR-Lite $45,445 $115,949 $270,152 $700,254
CE w/ AGR-Lite $47,410 $120,884 $277,025 $721,246
CE Change5 $1,964 $4,935 $6,873 $20,992
(4.07) (3.93) (2.35) (2.71)
Min Change $79 -$1,358 $53 $4,023
Max Change $8,680 $35,514 $30,551 $64,610
Percent w/ positive change 100% 95% 100% 100%
5Certainty Equivalent (CE) changes were calculated excluding farms with a zero change in CE.  Therefore these results reveal the change in CE for those 
farms with changes.  CE changes were calculated  as a percent of initial Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) by dividing CE change by inital 
AGRC and are located in parentheses below.
6Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) farms with claims reflects the CE results of those farms who received at least one indemnity over the seven 
year period
AFPF all farms 1
4 Standard deviation w/ AGR-Lite computes the average of the standard deviation by farm with participation in AGR-Lite
3 Standard deviation w/o AGR-Lite computes the average of the standard deviation by farm without participation in AGR-Lite
1Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF) was calculated for each farm by dividing total indemnities (over the seven years) by 7.  These results reflect all 
farms within each category.
---------------------------(in thousands of dollars)----------------------------
2The discrepancy between farm numbers is a direct result of some farms generating negative Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) which are 
problematic to a logaritmic utility function.  Therefore, these farms were ommitted from the Certainty Equivalent (CE) analysis.
AFPF farms with claims 6
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Table 4.70  Certainty Equivalent (CE) analysis for crop farms assuming a 
logarithmic utility function under Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) by Value 
of Farm Production (VFP) for all farms and farms with at least one claim 
<100 100-250 250-500 >500
Number of farms2 32 49 38 6
Average Rate 11.04% 8.13% 5.81% 2.52%
Mean AGRC w/o AGR-Lite $54,210 $130,301 $291,674 $831,791
Mean AGRC w/ AGR-Lite $54,210 $130,301 $291,674 $831,791
Standard Deviation w/o AGR-Lite3 $20,682 $44,214 $110,022 $330,623
Standard Deviation w/ AGR-Lite4 $16,972 $36,288 $97,528 $314,213
CE w/out AGR-Lite $51,204 $121,088 $270,331 $763,724
CE w/ AGR-Lite $52,237 $125,514 $276,282 $778,169
CE Change5 $1,033 $4,426 $5,951 $14,445
(1.91) (3.40) (2.04) (1.74)
Min Change -$5,867 -$8,925 -$9,126 -$16,787
Max Change $10,986 $40,898 $59,616 $84,573
Percent w/ positive change 44% 59% 50% 50%
Number of farms2 25 44 33 4
Average Rate 11.04% 8.13% 5.81% 2.52%
Mean AGRC w/o AGR-Lite $48,320 $125,575 $292,904 $775,482
Mean AGRC w/ AGR-Lite $49,441 $126,477 $294,102 $781,780
Standard Deviation w/o AGR-Lite3 $18,507 $43,961 $114,526 $323,702
Standard Deviation w/ AGR-Lite4 $13,836 $35,152 $100,212 $299,291
CE w/out AGR-Lite $45,445 $115,949 $270,152 $700,254
CE w/ AGR-Lite $47,983 $121,804 $278,239 $728,479
CE Change5 $2,537 $5,854 $8,088 $28,225
(5.25) (4.66) (2.76) (3.64)
Min Change -$5,070 -$7,246 -$9,126 -$1,543
Max Change $10,986 $40,898 $59,616 $84,573
Percent w/ positive change 56% 66% 58% 75%
5Certainty Equivalent (CE) changes were calculated excluding farms with a zero change in CE.  Therefore these results reveal the change in CE for those 
farms with changes.  CE changes were calculated  as a percent of initial Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) by dividing CE change by inital 
AGRC and are located in parentheses below.
6Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) farms with claims reflects the Certainty Equivalent (CE) results of those farms who received at least one 
indemnity over the seven year period
3 Standard deviation w/o AGR-Lite computes the average of the standard deviation by farm without participation in AGR-Lite
4 Standard deviation w/ AGR-Lite computes the average of the standard deviation by farm with participation in AGR-Lite
1Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) all farms reflects the average rate calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for all farms.  These 
results reflect an average rate for all farms regardless of whether and indemnity was received.
2The discrepancy between farm numbers is a direct result of some farms generating negative Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) which are 
problematic to a logaritmic utility function.  Therefore, these farms were ommitted from the Certainty Equivalent (CE) analysis.
AFAR all farms 1
AFAR farms with claims 6
---------------------------(in thousands of dollars)----------------------------
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Table 4.71  Certainty Equivalent (CE) analysis for crop farms assuming a 
logarithmic utility function under Actuarially Fair Average Rate for Farms with 
Indemnities (AFARI) by Value of Farm Production (VFP) for all farms and farms 
with at least one claim 
<100 100-250 250-500 >500
Number of farms2 32 49 38 6
Average Rate 13.93% 9.17% 6.45% 4.01%
Mean AGRC w/o AGR-Lite $54,210 $130,301 $291,674 $831,791
Mean AGRC w/ AGR-Lite $53,095 $129,387 $290,517 $825,100
Standard Deviation w/o AGR-Lite3 $20,682 $44,214 $110,022 $330,623
Standard Deviation w/ AGR-Lite4 $16,961 $36,317 $97,539 $314,049
CE w/out AGR-Lite $51,204 $121,088 $270,331 $763,724
CE w/ AGR-Lite $51,086 $124,562 $275,068 $771,116
CE Change5 -$118 $3,474 $4,738 $7,392
(0.22) (2.67) (1.62) (0.89)
Min Change -$7,416 -$10,068 -$10,670 -$26,758
Max Change $10,183 $40,073 $58,032 $77,539
Percent w/ positive change 41% 59% 45% 50%
Number of farms2 25 44 33 4
Average Rate 13.93% 9.17% 6.45% 4.01%
Mean AGRC w/o AGR-Lite $48,320 $125,575 $292,904 $775,482
Mean AGRC w/ AGR-Lite $48,320 $125,575 $292,904 $775,482
Standard Deviation w/o AGR-Lite3 $18,507 $43,961 $114,526 $323,702
Standard Deviation w/ AGR-Lite4 $13,832 $35,187 $100,232 $299,163
CE w/out AGR-Lite $45,445 $115,949 $270,152 $700,254
CE w/ AGR-Lite $46,830 $120,862 $276,980 $721,797
CE Change5 $1,384 $4,913 $6,829 $21,543
(2.86) (3.91) (2.33) (2.78)
Min Change -$6,527 -$8,474 -$10,670 -$8,533
Max Change $10,183 $40,073 $58,032 $77,539
Percent w/ positive change 52% 66% 52% 75%
5Certainty Equivalent (CE) changes were calculated excluding farms with a zero change in CE.  Therefore these results reveal the change in CE for those 
farms with changes.  CE changes were calculated  as a percent of initial Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) by dividing CE change by inital 
AGRC and are located in parentheses below.
6Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) farms with claims reflects the Certainty Equivalent (CE) results of those farms who 
received at least one indemnity over the seven year period
---------------------------(in thousands of dollars)----------------------------
AFARI farms with claims 6
AFARI all farms 1
3 Standard deviation w/o AGR-Lite computes the average of the standard deviation by farm without participation in AGR-Lite
4 Standard deviation w/ AGR-Lite computes the average of the standard deviation by farm with participation in AGR-Lite
1Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) was calculated by dividing total indemnities by total liabilities for farms who received 
at least one indemnity over the seven year period.  These results reflect an average rate determined from only those farms receiving at least one indemnity 
payment over the seven year period and applied to all farms
2The discrepancy between farm numbers is a direct result of some farms generating negative Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) which are 
problematic to a logaritmic utility function.  Therefore, these farms were ommitted from the Certainty Equivalent (CE) analysis.
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Table 4.72  Downside Risk (DR) analysis for all farms assuming Actuarially Fair 
Average Rate (AFAR) 
Dairy Beef Livestock Crop Total
Average w/out AGR-Lite $29,155 $13,158 $15,810 $9,126 $11,964
Minimum w/out AGR-Lite -$47,236 -$56,383 -$56,383 -$53,531 -$56,383
Maximum w/out AGR-Lite $264,963 $195,804 $264,963 $213,096 $264,963
Average w/ AGR-Lite $29,155 $13,158 $15,810 $9,126 $11,964
Minimum w/ AGR-Lite -$44,627 -$57,339 -$57,136 -$50,737 -$57,803
Maximum w/ AGR-Lite $267,201 $181,427 $254,965 $172,521 $239,656
Average Change $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Minimum Change -$2,577 -$20,603 -$16,220 -$40,575 -$30,602
Maximum Change $6,302 $25,039 $25,495 $27,017 $30,961
Total Number of Farms 13 64 93 126 219
Number Decreased DR1 4 22 33 59 91
(30.77) (34.38) (35.48) (46.83) (41.55)
Average Decrease in DR2 $3,089 $5,993 $5,996 $6,402 $6,891
(10.59) (45.55) (37.93) (70.15) (57.60)
Number Increased DR1 9 42 60 67 128
(69.23) (65.63) (64.52) (53.17) (58.45)
Average Increase in DR2 -$1,373 -$3,139 -$3,298 -$5,637 -$4,899
(4.71) (23.86) (20.86) (61.77) (40.95)
Note:  Downside Risk (DR) was calculated using Net Farm Income (NFI), average family living cost obtained from KFMA, and the number of 
farm operators.  The formula for Downside Risk (DR) is as follows: DR = NFI - (family living cost x # of farm operators)
2Average increase/decrease reflects the average change in Downside Risk (DR) excluding farms with a zero change.  Dividing average 
increase/decrease by average w/out AGR-Lite reveals the increase/decrease as a percent of average w/out AGR-Lite, located in parentheses below.
1Number Increase/Decrease in Downside Risk (DR) reflect the farm numbers with increase/decrease for each category as a result of AGR-Lite, 
with their respective percentages in parentheses below
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Table 4.73  Downside Risk (DR) analysis for farms with at least on claim assuming 
Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) 
Dairy Beef Livestock Crop Total
Average w/out AGR-Lite $50,827 $13,584 $14,766 $6,995 $9,331
Minimum w/out AGR-Lite -$47,236 -$43,737 -$47,236 -$53,531 -$53,531
Maximum w/out AGR-Lite $264,963 $142,585 $264,963 $160,020 $264,963
Average w/ AGR-Lite $53,916 $16,913 $18,340 $8,414 $12,081
Minimum w/ AGR-Lite -$44,627 -$43,746 -$47,351 -$50,737 -$50,761
Maximum w/ AGR-Lite $267,201 $151,206 $254,965 $156,201 $239,656
Average Change1 $3,089 $3,329 $3,574 $1,419 $2,750
(6.08) (24.51) (24.21) (20.29) (29.47)
Minimum Change $1,206 -$8,294 -$9,998 -$22,256 -$25,307
Maximum Change $6,302 $25,039 $25,495 $27,017 $30,961
Total Number of Farms 4 33 46 107 153
Number Decreased DR2 4 22 33 59 91
(100) (66.67) (71.74) (55.14) (59.48)
Average Decrease in DR3 $3,089 $5,993 $5,996 $6,402 $6,891
(6) (44.12) (40.61) (91.52) (73.85)
Number Increased DR2 0 11 13 48 62
(0) (33.33) (28.26) (44.86) (40.52)
Average Increase in DR3 $0 -$1,998 -$2,574 -$4,705 -$3,328
(0) (14.71) (17.43) (67.26) (35.67)
Note:  Downside Risk (DR) was calculated using Net Farm Income (NFI), average family living cost obtained from KFMA, and the number of 
farm operators.  The formula for Downside Risk (DR) is as follows: DR = NFI - (family living cost x # of farm operators)
2Number Increase/Decrease in Downside Risk (DR) reflect the farm numbers with increase/decrease for each category as a result of AGR-Lite, 
with their respective percentages in parentheses below
1Average change reflects the average Downside Risk (DR) change for each farm category.  For a comparison measure average change was 
calculated as a percent of average without AGR-Lite by dividing average change by average without AGR-Lite, located in parentheses below.
3Average increase/decrease reflects the average change in Downside Risk (DR) excluding farms with a zero change.  Dividing average 
increase/decrease by average w/out AGR-Lite reveals the increase/decrease as a percent of average w/out AGR-Lite, located in parentheses below.
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Table 4.74  Downside Risk (DR) analysis for all farms assuming Actuarially Fair 
Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
Dairy Beef Livestock Crop Total
Average w/out AGR-Lite $29,155 $13,158 $15,810 $9,126 $11,964
Minimum w/out AGR-Lite -$47,236 -$56,383 -$56,383 -$53,531 -$56,383
Maximum w/out AGR-Lite $264,963 $195,804 $264,963 $213,096 $264,963
Average w/ AGR-Lite $26,607 $9,782 $11,968 $7,688 $9,078
Minimum w/ AGR-Lite -$46,510 -$58,264 -$58,019 -$51,590 -$58,517
Maximum w/ AGR-Lite $258,744 $167,527 $234,708 $164,694 $223,291
Average Change1 -$2,548 -$3,376 -$3,842 -$1,438 -$2,886
(8.74) (25.66) (24.30) (15.76) (24.12)
Minimum Change -$6,909 -$40,521 -$35,250 -$48,402 -$45,976
Maximum Change $5,147 $22,968 $23,516 $24,222 $25,662
Total Number of Farms 13 64 93 126 219
Number Decreased DR2 3 14 19 52 70
(23.08) (21.88) (20.43) (41.27) (31.96)
Average Decrease in DR3 $2,073 $5,086 $6,426 $6,070 $6,262
(7.11) (38.66) (40.64) (66.52) (52.34)
Number Increased DR2 10 50 74 74 149
(76.92) (78.13) (79.57) (58.73) (68.04)
Average Increase in DR3 -$3,935 -$5,746 -$6,478 -$6,714 -$7,184
(13.50) (43.67) (40.98) (73.57) (60.05)
Note:  Downside Risk (DR) was calculated using Net Farm Income (NFI), average family living cost obtained from KFMA, and the number of 
farm operators.  The formula for Downside Risk (DR) is as follows: DR = NFI - (family living cost x # of farm operators)
2Number Increase/Decrease in Downside Risk (DR) reflect  the farm numbers with increase/decrease for each category as a result of AGR-Lite, 
with their respective percentages in parentheses below
3Average increase/decrease reflects the average change in Downside Risk (DR) excluding farms with a zero change.  Dividing average 
increase/decrease by average w/out AGR-Lite reveals the increase/decrease as a percent of average w/out AGR-Lite, located in parentheses below.
1Average change reflects the average Downside Risk (DR) change for each farm category.  For a comparison measure average change was 
calculated as a percent of average without AGR-Lite by dividing average change by average without AGR-Lite, located in parentheses below.
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Table 4.75  Downside Risk (DR) analysis for farms with at least one claim assuming 
Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
Dairy Beef Livestock Crop Total
Average w/out AGR-Lite $50,827 $13,584 $14,766 $6,995 $9,331
Minimum w/out AGR-Lite -$47,236 -$43,737 -$47,236 -$53,531 -$53,531
Maximum w/out AGR-Lite $264,963 $142,585 $264,963 $160,020 $264,963
Average w/ AGR-Lite $50,827 $13,584 $14,766 $6,995 $9,331
Minimum w/ AGR-Lite -$46,510 -$44,563 -$51,862 -$51,590 -$54,405
Maximum w/ AGR-Lite $258,744 $144,276 $234,708 $150,942 $223,291
Average Change $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Minimum Change -$6,219 -$16,470 -$30,255 -$27,701 -$41,672
Maximum Change $5,147 $22,968 $23,516 $24,222 $25,662
Total Number of Farms 4 33 46 107 153
Number Decreased DR1 3 14 19 52 70
(75.00) (42.42) (41.30) (48.60) (45.75)
Average Decrease in DR2 $2,073 $5,086 $6,426 $6,070 $6,262
(4.08) (37.45) (43.52) (86.79) (67.11)
Number Increased DR1 1 19 27 55 83
(25.00) (57.58) (58.70) (51.40) (54.25)
Average Increase in DR2 -$6,219 -$3,748 -$4,522 -$5,739 -$5,281
(12.24) (27.59) (30.62) (82.05) (56.60)
Note:  Downside Risk (DR) was calculated using Net Farm Income (NFI), average family living cost obtained from KFMA, and the number of 
farm operators.  The formula for Downside Risk (DR) is as follows: DR = NFI - (family living cost x # of farm operators)
1Number Increase/Decrease in Downside Risk (DR) reflect the farm numbers with increase/decrease for each category as a result of AGR-Lite, 
with their respective percentages in parentheses below
2Average increase/decrease reflects the average change in Downside Risk (DR) excluding farms with a zero change.  Dividing average 
increase/decrease by average w/out AGR-Lite reveals the increase/decrease as a percent of average w/out AGR-Lite, located in parentheses 
 
  219
 
Table 4.76  Downside Risk (DR) analysis for crop farms assuming Actuarially Fair 
Average Rate (AFAR) by Value of Farm Production (VFP) 
<100 100-249 250-500 >500
Average w/out AGR-Lite -$18,533 -$4,911 $30,244 $142,139
Minimum w/out AGR-Lite -$48,278 -$53,531 -$37,451 $68,981
Maximum w/out AGR-Lite $16,663 $38,437 $149,392 $213,096
Average w/ AGR-Lite -$18,533 -$4,911 $30,244 $142,139
Minimum w/ AGR-Lite -$44,707 -$52,078 -$24,013 $63,557
Maximum w/ AGR-Lite $16,986 $37,021 $144,219 $196,720
Average Change $0 $0 $0 $0
Minimum Change -$5,364 -$8,755 -$10,000 -$16,376
Maximum Change $15,478 $17,055 $28,028 $16,664
Total Number of Farms 33 49 38 6
Number Decreased DR1 15 23 11 3
(45.45) (46.94) (28.95) (50.00)
Average Decrease in DR2 $3,662 $5,203 $13,362 $10,206
(19.76) (105.94) (44.18) (7.18)
Number Increased DR1 18 26 27 3
(54.55) (53.06) (71.05) (50.00)
Average Increase in DR2 -$3,052 -$4,602 -$5,444 -$10,206
(16.47) (93.71) (18.00) (7.18)
1Number Increase/Decrease in Downside Risk (DR) reflect the farm numbers with increase/decrease for each category as a result of AGR-
Lite, with their respective percentages in parentheses below
2Average increase/decrease reflects the average change in Downside Risk (DR) excluding farms with a zero change.  Dividing average 
increase/decrease by average w/out AGR-Lite reveals the increase/decrease as a percent of average w/out AGR-Lite, located in parentheses 
Note:  Downside Risk (DR) was calculated using Net Farm Income (NFI), average family living cost obtained from KFMA, and the 
number of farm operators.  The formula for Downside Risk (DR) is as follows: DR = NFI - (family living cost x # of farm operators)
---------------------(in thousands of dollars)---------------------
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Table 4.77  Downside Risk (DR) analysis for crop farms with at least one claim 
assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR) by Value of Farm Production 
(VFP) 
<100 100-249 250-500 >500
Average w/out AGR-Lite -$18,498 -$5,648 $30,036 $121,676
Minimum w/out AGR-Lite -$48,278 -$53,531 -$37,451 $68,981
Maximum w/out AGR-Lite $16,663 $38,437 $149,392 $160,020
Average w/ AGR-Lite -$17,377 -$4,746 $31,234 $127,974
Minimum w/ AGR-Lite -$44,707 -$52,078 -$19,038 $63,557
Maximum w/ AGR-Lite $16,986 $37,021 $144,219 $172,461
Average Change1 $1,121 $902 $1,198 $6,298
(6.06) (15.97) (3.99) (5.18)
Minimum Change -$4,940 -$7,489 -$10,000 -$5,424
Maximum Change $15,478 $17,055 $28,028 $16,664
Total Number of Farms 26 44 33 4
Number Decreased DR2 15 23 11 3
(57.69) (52.27) (33.33) (75.00)
Average Decrease in DR3 $3,662 $5,203 $13,362 $10,206
(19.80) (92.11) (44.49) (8.39)
Number Increased DR2 11 21 22 1
(43.21) (47.73) (66.67) (25.00)
Average Increase in DR3 -$2,344 -$3,808 -$4,884 -$5,424
(12.67) (67.41) (16.26) (4.46)
3Average increase/decrease reflects the average change in Downside Risk (DR) excluding farms with a zero change.  Dividing average 
increase/decrease by average w/out AGR-Lite reveals the increase/decrease as a percent of average w/out AGR-Lite, located in parentheses 
below.
Note:  Downside Risk (DR) was calculated using Net Farm Income (NFI), average family living cost obtained from KFMA, and the 
number of farm operators.  The formula for Downside Risk (DR) is as follows: DR = NFI - (family living cost x # of farm operators)
---------------------(in thousands of dollars)---------------------
1Average change reflects the average Downside Risk (DR) change for each farm category.  For a comparison measure average change was 
calculated as a percent of average without AGR-Lite by dividing average change by average without AGR-Lite, located in parentheses 
below.
2Number Increase/Decrease in Downside Risk (DR) reflect  the farm numbers with increase/decrease for each category as a result of AGR-
Lite, with their respective percentages in parentheses below
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Table 4.78  Downside Risk (DR) analysis for crop farms assuming Actuarially Fair 
Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) by Value of Farm Production 
(VFP) 
<100 100-249 250-500 >500
Average w/out AGR-Lite -$18,533 -$4,911 $30,244 $142,139
Minimum w/out AGR-Lite -$48,278 -$53,531 -$37,451 $68,981
Maximum w/out AGR-Lite $16,663 $38,437 $149,392 $213,096
Average w/ AGR-Lite -$19,648 -$5,825 $29,087 $135,448
Minimum w/ AGR-Lite -$46,240 -$52,814 -$24,884 $56,797
Maximum w/ AGR-Lite $15,820 $35,989 $143,326 $187,001
Average Change1 -$1,115 -$914 -$1,157 -$6,691
(6.02) (18.61) (3.82) (4.71)
Minimum Change -$6,771 -$9,873 -$11,503 -$26,095
Maximum Change $14,298 $16,241 $26,524 $10,133
Total Number of Farms 33 49 38 6
Number Decreased DR2 11 21 11 3
(33.33) (42.86) (28.95) (50.00)
Average Decrease in DR3 $3,748 $4,732 $12,044 $4,062
(20.22) (96.35) (39.82) (2.86)
Number Increased DR2 22 28 27 3
(66.67) (57.14) (71.05) (50.00)
Average Increase in DR3 -$3,546 -$5,148 -$6,535 -$17,443
(19.13) (104.82) (21.61) (12.27)
------------------------(in thousands of dollars)------------------------
Note:  Downside Risk (DR) was calculated using Net Farm Income (NFI), average family living cost obtained from KFMA, and the 
number of farm operators.  The formula for Downside Risk (DR) is as follows: DR = NFI - (family living cost x # of farm operators)
2Number Increase/Decrease in Downside Risk (DR) reflect  the farm numbers with increase/decrease for each category as a result of AGR-
Lite, with their respective percentages in parentheses below
3Average increase/decrease reflects the average change in Downside Risk (DR) excluding farms with a zero change.  Dividing average 
increase/decrease by average w/out AGR-Lite reveals the increase/decrease as a percent of average w/out AGR-Lite, located in parentheses 
below.
1Average change reflects the average Downside Risk (DR) change for each farm category.  For a comparison measure average change was 
calculated as a percent of average without AGR-Lite by dividing average change by average without AGR-Lite, located in parentheses 
below.
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Table 4.79  Downside Risk (DR) analysis for crop farms with at least one claim 
assuming Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) by 
Value of Farm Production (VFP) 
<100 100-249 250-500 >500
Average w/out AGR-Lite -$18,498 -$5,648 $30,036 $121,676
Minimum w/out AGR-Lite -$48,278 -$53,531 -$37,451 $68,981
Maximum w/out AGR-Lite $16,663 $38,437 $149,392 $160,020
Average w/ AGR-Lite -$18,498 -$5,648 $30,036 $121,676
Minimum w/ AGR-Lite -$46,240 -$52,814 -$20,255 $56,797
Maximum w/ AGR-Lite $15,820 $35,989 $143,326 $165,930
Average Change $0 $0 $0 $0
Minimum Change -$6,333 -$8,689 -$11,503 -$12,185
Maximum Change $14,298 $16,241 $26,524 $10,133
Total Number of Farms 26 44 33 4
Number Decreased DR1 11 21 11 3
(42.31) (47.73) (33.33) (75.00)
Average Decrease in DR2 $3,748 $4,732 $12,044 $4,062
(20.26) (83.77) (40.10) (3.34)
Number Increased DR1 15 23 22 1
(57.69) (52.27) (66.67) (25.00)
Average Increase in DR2 -$2,748 -$4,320 -$6,022 -$12,185
(14.86) (76.49) (20.05) (10.01)
Note:  Downside Risk (DR) was calculated using Net Farm Income (NFI), average family living cost obtained from KFMA, and the 
number of farm operators.  The formula for Downside Risk (DR) is as follows: DR = NFI - (family living cost x # of farm operators)
1Number Increase/Decrease in Downside Risk (DR) reflect the farm numbers with increase/decrease for each category as a result of AGR-
Lite, with their respective percentages in parentheses below
2Average increase/decrease reflects the average change in Downside Risk (DR) excluding farms with a zero change.  Dividing average 
increase/decrease by average w/out AGR-Lite reveals the increase/decrease as a percent of average w/out AGR-Lite, located in parentheses 
below.
------------------------(in thousands of dollars)------------------------
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4.8 Sensitivity Analysis 
A number of assumptions were necessary in order to evaluate AGR-Lite as a 
stand-alone product.  One assumption in particular was that for expected income (EI).  
Without the essential information to generate EI, it was assumed EI would equal AGRA.  
The logic behind setting EI equal to AGRA is that it was expected producers would not 
want to submit an EI less than AGRA as it would lower the overall guarantee, reducing 
the amount of protection.  Sensitivity analysis was conducted to evaluate the impact of 
varying EI.  Perhaps the most interesting result was revealed when EI was set equal to 
AFI for the current year (assuming the farm manager possessed perfect forecasting 
knowledge).  Even with a guarantee linked directly to actual AFI, farms still received 
claims.  The intuition for generating claims with perfect knowledge is attributed to the 
required accrual adjustments of inventories and accounts receivable.  These adjustments 
weigh heavily in determining whether a claim results in an indemnity.  A second scenario 
set EI to 80% of AGRA.  Continuing with AGR-Lite procedures the guarantee would be 
based on EI since now EI is less than AGRA.  Ultimately this results in a lower liability, 
which in turn decreases the magnitude of the indemnity payments and in some instances 
the frequency. 
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CHAPTER 5 - Summary and Conclusions 
5.1 Summary 
A panel data set of actual farm level income data was compiled to evaluate the 
impact of AGR-Lite on adjusted gross revenue to count (AGRC) and net farm income 
(NFI) variability for 219 southeast Kansas farms.  Although actual income tax records 
were not available annual data over the period 1993 to 2005 from the Kansas Farm 
Management Association was used to reproduce the essential information a farm 
manager would need from IRS form 1040 schedule F and inventory records to purchase 
AGR-Lite (Langemeier, 2003).  Five years of historical data were required to perform the 
necessary calculations for the revenue guarantee and to purchase AGR-Lite each year.  
The data set allowed us to calculate the impact of the whole-farm revenue insurance for 
the years 1999-2005.  Income distributions for each farm over this 7 year period were 
calculated for two strategies; the farm manager did not insure and the manager insured 
each year using AGR-Lite as a stand-alone product.  Furthermore each strategy was 
evaluated using three premium rate calculation methods.  There were an Actuarially Fair 
Premium by Farm (AFPF), an Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR), and an Actuarially 
Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) for each category.  Although 
farm managers could enroll in alternative insurance products each year and the farm level 
data did contain premium and indemnity payments the data did not contain enough detail 
to identify which products these farms purchased.  Necessary adjustments were made to 
examine the impact of purchasing AGR-Lite as a stand alone product. 
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The 219 farms were examined as an entire group and also categorized into four 
separate groups for analysis by determining which farms had more than 50% of their 
income from crops, livestock, beef, and dairy.  There were 127 crop farms, 93 livestock 
farms that included beef, swine, dairy, poultry, and other animals.  There were 64 beef 
farms and 13 dairy farms.  The number of beef and dairy farms do not add to 93 because 
16 farms had greater than 50% of their combined income from beef, dairy, swine, and 
other animals, but none had greater than 50% from either beef or dairy alone. Analysis 
was also conducted by grouping crop farms by Value of Farm Production (VFP) 
categories.  There were 33 farms with VFP of less than $100,000, 49 farms with VFP of 
$100,000 to $249,999, 38 farms with VFP of $250,000 to $500,000, and 6 farms with 
VFP of greater than $500,000. 
 Income distributions of seven observations based on the years 1999-2005 for each 
strategy were calculated.  The AGR-Lite strategy initially assumed a 75% coverage level 
and 90% payment rate.  The income distributions were compared under AFPF, AFAR, 
and AFARI for each farm category.  Statistics that indicate how effective AGR-Lite is at 
reducing income risk including changes in standard deviation, Coefficient of Variation 
(CV), and minimum outcomes of income were reported for AGRC and NFI.  Certainty 
Equivalents (CE) and Downside Risk (DR) were also used to evaluate the risk reduction 
effectiveness of AGR-Lite. 
5.2 Discussion of Results 
5.2.1 Summary and Results by farm category 
In general, for NFI only, this study indicates that participation in AGR-Lite 
reduced standard deviation and CV when evaluating all farms and farms with at least one 
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claim.  Conversely beef farms were the lone farm category to report a constant increase in 
NFI standard deviation across premium scenarios.  This was a direct result of AGR-Lite 
generating claims in more favorable years and less so in unfavorable (low) years.  This 
leads to an increase in the range of the income distribution ultimately increasing absolute 
variability.  Crop farms tallied the largest percent reductions to average NFI standard 
deviation followed by total, dairy, livestock, and beef for all farms and farms with claims.  
Relative risk reductions, for NFI, were largest for total, crop, and livestock and 
lowest for beef and dairy, however there were no definitive rankings across categories.  
Surprisingly beef farms, which reported increases in absolute variability, indicated a 
slight reduction in relative risk.  These conflicting results are attributed to the elimination 
of farms with negative CV, which cannot be interpreted, and were eliminated for analysis 
with CV statistics. 
Overall each of the five categories (total, crop, livestock, beef, and dairy) 
increased the average minimum for NFI.  The total category had the largest percent 
increase, in average minimum, followed by crop, livestock, beef, and dairy.  However, 
following exclusion of farms with zero claims beef surpassed all others achieving the 
largest average minimum increase followed by total or livestock, crop, and dairy.  In 
most farm categories, average maximums declined with AGR-Lite, which was expected.  
Beef farms did report increases to average maximums, which contributed to increased 
standard deviations. 
On the whole crop farms generated the largest average premiums for AFPF, 
AFAR, and AFARI.  As expected, premium rates increased when eliminating farms with 
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zero claims.  Ranking farm categories from highest to lowest by premium rates resulted 
in crop farms as the highest followed by total, beef, livestock, and dairy. 
A summary by frequency of claims ranks crop farms the highest followed by 
total, livestock, beef, and dairy.  Consistent across farm categories was the increase in 
average liability as claims became more frequent.  Additionally, as claims became more 
frequent, the variability in liability increased.   
The previously discussed results reflect the general performance of the AGR-Lite 
product.  However, the magnitude of change for standard deviation, CV, minimums, CE, 
and DR vary by premium scenario.  Use of AFAR, which resulted in the lowest 
premiums, generally resulted in more favorable results, especially when excluding farms 
with zero claims.  These are expected especially when compared against AFARI and 
AFPF, as AFAR resulted in the smallest premium rate.  Results for risk reduction also 
varied when analyzing categories by all farms in comparison to those excluding farms 
with zero claims.  Typically risk reduction results for farms with claims were more 
beneficial comparatively to all farms due to elimination of farms with lowered income 
distributions due to associated costs of insurance.  Application of AFAR, to only farms 
with claims, on average, resulted in increases in average NFI.  On the contrary, 
application of AFARI, to all farms, on average, resulted in reductions in average NFI.  
The remaining subsections will briefly discuss and summarize major findings by 
individual farm categories for NFI.  Refer to Tables 5.1 and 5.2 which are used in the 
following summaries.  Additionally Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present a summary of risk 
measures for the crop farm VFP categories. 
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Total 
For 219 farms standard deviations declined with participation in AGR-Lite, on average, 
6.96% and 9.93% for all farms and farms with claims, across premium scenarios, 
illustrated in Table 5.1 and 5.2.  Average AFPF, AFAR and AFARI were $8,224, 4.54%, 
and 6.82% (Table 4.64).  Under AFPF and AFAR standard deviations declined however 
AFARI resulted in an increase.  Similar results were found for relative risk or CV. 
 AFAR generated the largest CV decrease for all farms and farms with at least on claim at 
6.66% and 27.24%.  AFARI generated the only CV increase, which is counter intuitive 
considering every farm category (crop, livestock, beef, and dairy), which are included in 
the all farm category, generated relative risk reductions.  Therefore it is expected that, on 
average, the entire group would reduce relative risk.  The CV increase in all farms can be 
explained by an individual crop farm being removed from the crop category but included 
in the all farm category for NFI CV analysis due to corresponding premium rates of 
categories crop and total.  This individual farm generated an abnormally large CV 
increase (7.6 to 71) due to a low NFI average and high standard deviation.  Table 4.64 
indicates that crop farms resulted in a higher AFARI (7.45%) relative to all farms 
(6.82%).  Therefore when evaluating only crop farms the individual farm was removed 
from CV analysis because the higher AFARI, compared to all farms, generated a larger 
average premium which consequently resulted in a negative average NFI.  As a result, 
using a negative average NFI the CV statistic was negative and thus removed for CV 
analysis.  However, looking at the same farm only now applying the 6.82% rate for all 
farms, with a lower average premium the seven year average NFI remained positive. 
 Since the average was not negative this farm was included for CV analysis for the all 
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farm category.  By including this farm, the abnormally large CV change greatly 
influenced the overall average resulting in an average CV increase (11.91%).  When 
removing the individual farm from the all farm category, average CV reduction for the 
remaining farms was 20.88% compared to the 11.91% increase when including the farm. 
Average minimum increased for every premium scenario with AFAR having the largest 
positive impact (105.77% and 116.33%) for all farms and farms with claims.  Of the 219 
farms, 153 generated at least one claim with an average indemnity of $26,213 (Table 
4.64).  These farms generated claims 31.37% of the time on average. 
Crop 
 For the 126 crop farms, participation in AGR-Lite reduced standard deviation, on 
average, 11.25% and 13.16% for all farm and farms with at least one claim (Table 5.1 
and 5.2).  Reductions to CV ranged from 2.45% to 20.28% for all farms and farms with 
claims.  Average minimums increased with participation in AGR-Lite on average, 
75.72% and 74.83%, for all farms and farms with claims.  For the 126 crop farms, 
average AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI were $8,778, 6.24%, and 7.45% (Table 4.64).  
Almost 85% of crop farms generated claims with an average indemnity and frequency of 
$27,056 and 32.44% (Table 4.64).   
Livestock 
 With the participation of 93 livestock farms, AGR-Lite reduced standard 
deviation, on average, 0.31% and 0.63% for all farms and farms with claims, across 
premium scenarios (Table 5.1 and 5.2).  Relative risk was also reduced with an average 
range of 1.26% to 26.96% for all farms and farms with claims.  AFARI, for all farms, 
resulted in the only increase to CV.  Average minimum increased under all premium 
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scenarios, except AFARI for all farms, ranging from 62.64% to 160.94%.  These 93 
farms yielded an average AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI of $6,621, 2.41%, and 5.23% (Table 
4.64).  Nearly 50% (46) of the 93 farms received at least one claim with an average 
indemnity and frequency of $22,924 and 28.88% (Table 4.64). 
Beef 
Participation in AGR-Lite for 64 beef farms resulted in increases to average 
standard deviation, across premium scenarios, on average, 0.85% and 2% for all farms 
and farms with claims (Tables 5.1 and 5.2).  Interestingly, despite increases in standard 
deviation, relative risk declined under every premium scenario for all farms and farms 
with claims, except AFARI for all farms.  This seems logical given AFARI resulted in 
the largest premium rate comparatively to AFPF and AFAR.  Excluding AFARI for all 
farms, average CV reductions ranged from 0.72% to 26.80%.  Average minimums 
increased, as a result of participation in AGR-Lite, for all premium scenarios except 
AFARI for all farms.  Average increase for farms with claims ranged from 388.35% to 
787.99%.  Average AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI for 64 beef farms were $6,773, 3.06%, 
and 6.01%.  With an average indemnity and frequency of $23,707 and 28.57%, 33 or 
51.56% of farms generated claims (Table 4.64). 
Dairy 
 With the smallest sample, 13 dairy farms were evaluated with participation in 
AGR-Lite.  Overall average standard deviations declined, indicated in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, 
on average, 2.58% and 5.11% for all farms and farms with claims across premium 
scenarios.  Likewise, relative risk was reduced under all premium scenarios, except 
AFARI for all farms, for all farms and farms with at least one claim.  CV declines ranged 
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from 1.58% to 13.22%.  Average minimums increased under all scenarios ranging from 
0.60% to 23.57%.  These 13 farms resulted in an average AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI of 
$4,926, 0.70%, and 1.88% (Table 4.64).  Four farms received at least one claim with an 
average indemnity of $19,703 with a 25% frequency.  
Certainty equivalent  
CEs indicate how effective a risk management program is at reducing the 
variability within a given distribution.  Ideally producers would prefer CE increases in the 
presence of insurance.  In general, participation in AGR-Lite increased CEs across farm 
categories.  Crop farms, again, generated the largest CE increase with dairy generating 
the least.  This makes sense when considering crop farms generated a greater frequency 
of claims relative to dairy farms.  Refer to CE summary Table 5.5 for the subsequent 
discussions. 
All farms 
Under AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI category crop generated the largest CE increase 
when calculated as a percent of initial AGRC.  The absolute CE change ranged from 
$1,674 to $5,400 for AFPF, $525 to $4,428 for AFAR, and -$2,801 to $2,914 for AFARI.  
It was only under AFARI that dairy, beef, and livestock reported a negative average CE 
change.  Farm categories crop and total reported positive increases.  Under every 
premium rate scenario dairy marked the smallest increase in CE, with the exception of 
AFARI, to which livestock was smallest.  For CE increases, measured as a percent of 
initial AGRC, dairy farms remained the lowest with the exception of AFARI to which 
beef was lowest.  Percent of farms with increases in CE shrunk going from AFPF to 
AFAR to AFARI.  Category crop reported the largest percent of farms with increases at 
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83%, 58%, and 52% for AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI.  Conversely category dairy was last 
with 31%, 31%, and 23% respectively. 
Farms with claims 
After excluding farms with zero claims, little change occurs for ordinal ranking 
by CE increase as a percent of initial AGRC.  Category crop ranked first in CE change 
for AFPF and AFARI; however under AFAR category crop ranked second to category 
total.  Similar to category total, dairy ranked lowest for each premium scenario.  
Excluding farms with zero claims percent of farms with positive CE increases increased 
for each premium rate scenario.  Under AFPF category dairy reported 100% of farms 
with increases followed by crop, total, livestock, and beef with 98%, 97%, 95%, and 94% 
respectively.  Similar to category total results, moving from AFPF to AFAR to AFARI, 
percent of farms with increases declines.  Category dairy remained the highest with most 
farms with increases for every premium scenario.  Under AFAR, categories crop and 
total generated the smallest at 69%.  Under AFARI category livestock reported only 48% 
with increases. 
 Downside Risk 
Examination of DR reveals how effective a risk management program is at 
minimizing the greatest loss facing a producer.  Ideally producers want to decrease DR 
through insurance.  Participation in AGR-Lite resulted, in most instances, reduced initial 
DR revealing the products effectiveness in risk reduction.  Crop farms exhibited the 
greatest initial DR (lowest average NFI) and on most occasions sustained the largest 
decrease (positive impact) in DR.  Again, due to crop farms yielding the greatest 
frequency and magnitude of claims, it makes sense they sustained the largest decrease in 
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DR.  Dairy farms, conversely, had the least initial DR (highest average NFI) 
comparatively, and generated the smallest decrease in DR, attributed to generating the 
lowest frequency and magnitude of claims.  Refer to DR summary Table 5.7 for the 
following discussions. 
All farms 
Under AFAR and AFARI crop farms yield the largest decrease in DR, or greatest 
benefit, as a percent of initial DR.  The remaining categories were arranged as follows; 
total, beef, livestock, and dairy.  However, under AFARI beef and livestock rankings 
were interchanged.  Average DR change, under AFARI, ranged from -$1,438 to -$2,842, 
which suggests an increase (negative impact) in DR.  A comparison of categories 
including all farms reveals crop farms reported the largest percent of farms with 
decreased DR followed by total, livestock, beef, and dairy respectively for AFAR.  
Ranking under AFARI reveals farm category crop as highest followed by total, dairy, 
beef, and livestock.  Although crop farms generated the largest decrease in DR, analysis 
solely on farms with increased DR (negatively affecting farms), indicates category crop 
reported the largest DR increase as a percent of initial DR.  Conversely category dairy 
reported the smallest percent of farms with decreased DR under AFAR while livestock 
was lowest for AFARI.  This suggests the ineffectiveness of AGR-Lite at benefiting dairy 
and livestock farms in DR.  
Farms with claims 
Excluding farms with zero claims initial DR increased, negatively impacting 
categories crop, total, and livestock, while categories beef and dairy decreased, positively 
impacting initial DR.  Average change under AFAR ranged from $1,419 to $3,574, 
  234
indicating the presence of AGR-Lite benefited each farm category.  For farms with 
decreased DR, crop farms, again, reported the greatest decrease, largest benefit, as a 
percent of initial DR followed by total, beef, livestock, and dairy.  On the contrary crop 
farms reported the smallest percent of farms with decreased DR for AFAR, indicating a 
greater proportion of farms were adversely affected with participation in AGR-Lite,  but 
ranked second behind dairy for AFARI.  As such, crop farms had the largest percent of 
farms with increased DR for AFAR and the fourth lowest for AFARI.  Furthermore crop 
farms tallied the largest increase in DR as a percent of initial DR for farms with increased 
DR followed by total, livestock, beef, and dairy for AFAR.  Under AFARI livestock and 
beef were interchanged.  These results, again, suggest that participation in AGR-Lite not 
only provides the most upside (beneficial) potential but the largest downside 
(detrimental) impact for crop farms. 
5.2.2 Summary and Results by VFP category 
In general, further analysis of farms by VFP levels, reveals participation in AGR-
Lite reduced initial absolute variability for all farms and farms with claims for NFI, 
across premium scenarios.  On average, VFP of $100,000 to $249,999 showed the 
greatest percent reduction, for all farms and farms with claims, in standard deviation 
followed by VFP of greater than $500,000, $250,000 to $500,000, and less than 
$100,000. 
Relative risk reductions, with participation in AGR-Lite were consistent in NFI 
for all farms and farms with claims, for VFP categories greater than $250,000.  VFP of 
less than $250,000 resulted in increases to relative risk for all farms.  The greatest relative 
risk reductions were greatest for VFP of $250,000 to $500,000 for all farms and farms 
  235
with claims.  Just the opposite VFP of less than $100,000 resulted in the largest increase 
to relative risk for both all farms and farms with at least one claim. 
In the presence of AGR-Lite average minimums for all farms and farms with at 
least one claim increased, on average, for each VFP category under each premium 
scenario.  VFP of greater $500,000 generated the largest average percent minimum 
increase for all farms.  As for farms with at least one claim, VFP $100,000 to $249,999 
generated the largest increase in average minimum. 
Average AFPF increased as VFP categories increase in size which suggests 
higher VFP levels generated larger indemnities, confirmed in Table 4.65, relative to 
smaller VFP categories.  Just the opposite, average AFAR and AFARI were highest for 
VFP of less than $100,000 and decrease as VFP levels increase.  Given VFP of less than 
$100,000 generated the greatest frequency of claims it makes sense they correspond to 
the highest rate in comparison to other VFP categories. 
A summary by frequency of claims ranks VFP of less than $100,000 the highest 
followed by VFP of $100,000 to $249,999, $250,000 to $500,000, and greater than 
$500,000.  As claims became more frequent for VFP categories less than $500,000, 
average liability generally increased.  Additionally, VFP categories less than $500,000 
increased liability as claims became more frequent. 
As was the case for all farm categories, elimination of farms with zero claims 
revealed greater benefits from participation in AGR-Lite.  This is expected as results are 
no longer influenced by farms with lowered income distributions due only to premium 
costs.  Refer to Tables 5.3 and 5.4 for the following summaries by VFP categories which 
discuss results from varying premiums. 
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VFP less than $100,000 
 There were 33 farms evaluated with participation in AGR-Lite for VFP of less 
than $100,000.  Across premium scenarios, for all farms and farms with at least one 
claim, standard deviations declined, on average, 7.2% and 9.34% respectively (Tables 5.3 
and 5.4).  Despite reductions to absolute variability for each premium scenario, relative 
risk only declined under AFPF.  Similar to standard deviation, minimums increased under 
each premium scenario, on average, 9.77% and 18.85% for all farms and farms with at 
least one claim, indicating AGR-Lite reduced downside risk.  These 33 farms generated 
an average AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI of $5,393, 11.04%, and 13.93%.  With an average 
indemnity of $12,746, 26 farms, on average, generated claims 42.31% of the time (Table 
4.65). 
VFP $100,000 to $249,999 
 With participation in AGR-Lite, 49 farms with an average VFP of $162,538, 
generated reductions to standard deviations, implying AGR-Lite reduced income 
variability.  Standard deviations declined, on average, 13.45% and 15.13% for all farms 
and farms with at least one claim (Tables 5.3 and 5.4).  Relative risk declined for 
premium scenarios AFPF and AFAR, however increased under AFARI, credited to the 
higher premium rate for all farms and farms with at least one claim.  AGR-Lite was 
effective in increasing the average minimum, on average, 85.69% and 99.17% for all 
farms and farms with at least one claim.  The 49 farms generated an average AFPF, 
AFAR, and AFARI of $7,963, 8.13%, and 9.17%.  Only 5 farms received zero claims.  
The remaining 44 generated an average indemnity and frequency of $24,527 and 32.47%. 
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VFP $250,000 to $500,000 
 With an average VFP of $328,798, 38 farms were examined with participation in 
AGR-Lite.  Overall, AGR-Lite proved effective in reducing absolute variability with 
average reductions of 11.56% and 12.70% for all farms and farms with at least one claim.  
Generating the largest relative risk reduction, in comparison to all VFP categories, the 38 
farms reduced relative risk, on average, 16.28% and 21.65% for all farms and farms with 
at least one claim.  Average minimums also benefited from AGR-Lite with average 
increases of 88.91% and 84.39% for all farms and farms with at least one claim.  Average 
AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI were $11,937, 5.81% and 6.45%.  With an average indemnity 
of $46,738, 33 farms generated claims, on average, 25.45% of the time. 
VFP greater than $500,000 
 Participation in AGR-Lite, for the 6 farms, effectively reduced absolute 
variability, on average, 8.94% and 13.06% for all farms and farms with at least one claim.  
Relative risk declined an average 7.02% and 10.59% for all farms and farms with at least 
one claim.  Average minimums benefited from AGR-Lite with average increases of 
120.09% and 58.96% for all farms and farms with claims.  Average AFPF, AFAR, and 
AFARI were $16,910, 2.52%, and 4.01%.  Average indemnity for the group was $67,640 
with an average frequency of claim of 25%. 
Certainty Equivalents (CE) 
 In most cases, participation in AGR-Lite generated the greatest CE increase, 
indicating a reduction in variability over the seven years, for VFP of $100,000 to 
$249,999.  In general each premium scenario resulted in a CE increase, positive impact, 
across VFP categories with the exception of VFP of less than $100,000.  On average, 
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over 50% of the farms within each VFP category yielded positive CE increases.  Refer to 
CE summary Table 5.6 for the following discussions. 
All Farms 
 Across AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI, VFP of $100,000 to $249,999 generated the 
largest CE increase, indicating a reduction in variability over the seven years, measured 
as a percent of initial AGRC.  Additionally this VFP category generated the greatest 
percent of farms with CE increases.  VFP of less than $100,000 was the only category to 
generate an average reduction in CE for AFARI.  Moving from AFPF to AFAR to 
AFARI, farms with positive CEs decline, due to increased premium rates resulting in 
higher overall premiums. 
Farms with claims 
 Under AFPF and AFAR VFP of less than $100,000 generated the largest CE 
increases, as a percent of initial AGRC, compared to other VFP categories.  It was VFP 
of $100,000 to $249,999 which reported the largest average CE increase, as a percent of 
initial AGRC, for VFP categories.  As expected, percent of farms increase when 
excluding farms with zero claims, however moving to AFAR and AFARI result in fewer 
farms with positive CE changes attributed to increased premium rates. 
Downside Risk 
 This study indicates smaller farms, lowest VFP, bear the greatest initial DR across 
VFP categories.  For farms with decreased DR, benefiting producers, VFP of $100,000 to 
$249,999 generated the greatest decrease followed by VFP of $250,000 to $500,000, less 
than $100,000, and greater than $500,000.  Along with generating the largest DR benefit, 
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VFP $100,000 to $249,999 also yielded the largest increase, negatively impacting DR, 
across VFP categories.  Refer to DR summary Table 5.8 for the following discussions. 
All Farms 
 Under AFAR and AFARI VFP of $100,000 to $249,999 generated the greatest 
benefit to DR with average decreases exceeding those compared to all VFP categories.  
Likewise this category proved most detrimental to DR with average increases of -$4,602 
and -$5,148.  VFP of greater than $500,000 generated both the smallest increase and 
decrease in DR across VFP categories.  Furthermore VFP of greater than $500,000 
generated the largest percent of farms with decreased DR. 
Farms with claims 
 Similar results were found when eliminating farms with zero claims.  VFP of 
$100,000 to $249,999 yielded the greatest benefit across categories decreasing DR 
$5,203 and $4,732 for AFAR and AFARI.  Additionally this category proved most 
detrimental with average DR increases of $3,808 and $4,320 for AFAR and AFARI.  
Again VFP of greater than $500,000 reported the smallest DR decrease and increase 
compared to other VFP categories. 
Overall Summary 
It is difficult to advise a producer whether AGR-Lite will be beneficial to his or 
her operation given the complexity of the product.  Many assumptions were made to 
examine the AGR-Lite insurance program.  It should also be mentioned these results 
reflect participation in AGR-Lite as a stand-alone product.  That said, the findings of this 
study do indicate that participation in AGR-Lite, on average, was most beneficial to crop 
farms.  This is attributed to generating the greatest frequency in claims of any category.  
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Furthermore, crop farms reported the largest AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI across all 
categories.  Dairy farms generated expected findings (reduced standard deviations, 
relative risk and DR, increased minimums and CE, however the impacts were rather 
minimal in comparison to other farm categories.  Keep in mind dairy farm results were 
computed with a rather small sample including only 13 farms.  Beef farms yielded the 
poorest results for standard deviations with increases ranging between 0.8% and 2%.  
However it was beef farms which generated the largest minimum increase of any 
category.  It appears beef and livestock farms generated claims in more favorable years 
and less so in unfavorable years.  Therefore the product may prove less beneficial to beef 
and livestock farms. 
This research reveals evidence that farm size impacts the effectiveness of the 
program.  It appears crop farms with VFP of $100,000 to $249,999 generated the greatest 
benefit from participation in AGR-Lite with the largest CE increases and decreased DRs 
compared to other VFP categories.  Furthermore this VFP category yielded standard 
deviation and CV reductions that ranked near the top relative to other VFP categories.   
5.3 Future Research 
This work is one of the preliminary attempts to conduct an evaluation of the 
AGR-Lite risk management program.  As such future research is needed to validate the 
findings of this study.  Additional research to reveal the effectiveness of a whole-farm 
adjusted gross revenue program could investigate the impact of varying coverage levels, 
payment rates, and the use of AGR-Lite as a “wrap around” program, for which it was 
originally intended. 
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Analysis of AGR-Lite was conducted with the use of many assumptions.  
Therefore future research could explore the effect of altering the various assumptions to 
appraise the influence of such changes, potentially providing interesting comparisons to 
this study.  Expected income was assumed to equal AGRA, which through sensitivity 
analysis, proved influential in both the frequency and magnitude of indemnity payments. 
Other areas of exploration may delve into analyzing the impact of altering the 
current provisions of the policy.  Farmers and policy makers alike have expressed 
concern surrounding purchased feed, exclusion of crop insurance indemnity payments 
when figuring AFI, and breeding livestock issues.  Others have uttered concern that the 
policy covers “gross” not “net” revenue and as such limits the effectiveness of the 
program.   
Although there are limitless research areas within the product itself, future 
research may consider comparing AGR-Lite to other FCIC products for risk reduction 
effectiveness.  These, as well as others, offer great potential for discussion and further 
research of the AGR-Lite program. 
5.4 Conclusions 
Despite AGR-Lite being touted as easy to understand, due to its design, it was 
through this research which highlights its inherent complexity.  Proponents contend that 
given the use of IRS Schedule F form 1040 minimal additional record keeping is 
required.  However, as seen throughout this study, thorough records (inventories, 
accounts receivables, prepaid expenses, and accounts payable) in addition to Schedule F 
copies should and must be maintained for filing purposes.  This preliminary research 
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draws attention to potential problem areas in addition to existing concerns with purchased 
feed, exclusion of crop insurance payments, and breeding livestock.   
Purchased feed causes concern specifically for livestock producers.  In years of 
drought or unfavorable yields, producers will likely resort to purchasing feed from 
external sources.  Such purchases will not surface in figuring AGRC, which is used to 
determine the indemnity, however they will result in a reduction to net income but not 
gross, which AGR-Lite covers.  Therefore the individual will effectively not be covered 
for such losses.  Suggestions have been to classify livestock farms as strictly cattle sales 
and cattle sales with feed costs.  This would then provide coverage to those farms which 
purchase feed.  Currently AGR-Lite uses AFI as the revenue measure to establish the 
guarantee.  Correlation coefficients between AFI and NFI reveal a weak to negligible 
correlation which suggests AFI to be a poor indicator of NFI behavior.  Therefore AGRC 
was used for the risk analysis, due to higher correlations.  Although AGRC does exhibit 
higher correlations they are still weak, thus a poor indicator of NFI variability.  
Preliminary correlation coefficients between NFI and VFP indicate a much stronger 
correlation, thus future research should consider analysis using VFP as the revenue 
measure.  Use of VFP will also address current issues with purchased feed. 
Exclusion of crop insurance payments in calculating AGRA but subtracting them 
from AGRC raises concern that the product fails to address multiple year losses.  When 
so many farmers today rely on crop insurance payments this issue requires attention.  The 
inability to include crop insurance payments in AGRA does not impact the current year 
however the guarantee will decline in years to come, which effectively reduce the level of 
guarantee offered by AGR-Lite.  Subtracting crop insurance payments from AGRC 
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seems logical as it prevents producers from collecting for the same loss twice.  
Suggestions are to require that crop insurance payments be included in figuring AGRA 
and AGRC.  In doing so this may be of some assistance to farmers experiencing multiple 
year losses, which as discussed earlier is a concern that has confounded many. 
Currently the AGR-Lite policy includes cull cows in figuring AGRA and AGRC.  
However if cows are sold as part of herd reduction any receipts are thereby excluded 
from AGRC.  This raises the question, when do cow sales switch from culls to herd 
reduction because of reduced pasture or feed resulting from drought conditions?  
Suggestions have been to establish a clear distinction between cull cows and herd 
reduction. 
Other areas for concern deal with AGR-Lite guaranteeing gross revenue not net, 
thus high expense years due to increased fuel, fertilizer, chemical, and other energy costs 
do not necessarily trigger indemnity payments, especially when gross revenue remains 
relatively unchanged.  These issues and others beg for further research to accurately and 
effectively evaluate participation in the AGR-Lite program.   
Finally, certain components of this policy have potential to establish AGR-Lite as 
an effective risk management mechanism in the agricultural arena.  With few programs 
offering protection for the whole farm, AGR-Lite is a step in the right direction.  The 
findings of this study do indicate risk reduction however increased standard deviation, 
albeit rather small, of beef farms do draw concern.  Additionally use of AFARI, which is 
believed to most accurately reflect actual premium rates, indicates heighten variability 
from a relative risk standpoint.  However, with rather limited market exposure, AGR-Lite 
remains in the early stages of removing the inherent kinks of a novel program.  Finally 
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producers must consider that factors which lead to increased variability in NFI but not 
gross income (which the policy covers) ultimately limit the effectiveness of AGR-Lite as 
a risk management tool.  Therefore AGR-Lite may not be a viable risk management 
solution for some farms.  AGR-Lite has undergone several revisions due to these 
concerns and additional criticisms and will likely continue to do so as it is more fully 
implemented.
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Table 5.1  Summary of risk measures for AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI by farm 
category including all farms for Net Farm Income (NFI) 
AFPF AFAR AFARI Average1 
Total (219 Farms)
Average Stdev. -6.89% -6.97% -7.01% -6.96%
Average CV -6.00% -6.66% 18.94% 2.09%
Average Minimum 104.12% 105.77% 62.93% 90.94%
Crop (126 Farms)
Average Stdev. -11.12% -11.31% -11.34% -11.25%
Average CV -7.93% -2.45% -9.52% -6.63%
Average Minimum 77.26% 79.95% 69.97% 75.72%
Livestock (93 Farms)
Average Stdev. -0.32% -0.31% -0.29% -0.31%
Average CV -1.26% -8.10% 17.12% 2.59%
Average Minimum 64.55% 62.64% -65.07% 20.70%
Beef (64 Farms)
Average Stdev. 0.90% 0.85% 0.81% 0.85%
Average CV -0.72% -5.18% 53.84% 15.98%
Average Minimum 57.46% 57.20% -57.03% 19.21%
Dairy (13 Farms)
Average Stdev. -2.63% -2.59% -2.52% -2.58%
Average CV -2.35% -1.58% 3.19% -0.25%
Average Minimum 8.54% 8.39% 0.60% 5.84%
1Average calculates the simple average of the average standard deviation, Coefficient of Variation (CV), and minimum values 
from Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF), Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR), and Actuarially Fair Average Rate for 
farms with Indemnities (AFARI) by farm category
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Table 5.2  Summary of risk measures for AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI by farm 
category for farms with at least one claim for Net Farm Income (NFI) 
AFPF AFAR AFARI Average1 
Total (153 Farms)
Average Stdev. -9.90% -9.94% -9.95% -9.93%
Average CV -8.45% -27.24% 11.91% -7.93%
Average Minimum 90.19% 116.33% 91.64% 99.39%
Crop (107 Farms)
Average Stdev. -13.10% -13.21% -13.22% -13.17%
Average CV -10.24% -8.95% -20.28% -13.16%
Average Minimum 70.97% 80.65% 72.88% 74.83%
Livestock (46 Farms)
Average Stdev. -0.69% -0.64% -0.56% -0.63%
Average CV -2.32% -26.96% -17.17% -15.48%
Average Minimum 85.74% 160.94% 82.58% 109.75%
Beef (33 Farms)
Average Stdev. 2.02% 1.99% 1.98% 2.00%
Average CV -1.31% -26.80% -14.49% -14.20%
Average Minimum 393.83% 787.99% 388.35% 523.39%
Dairy (4 Farms)
Average Stdev. -5.19% -5.12% -5.01% -5.11%
Average CV -8.20% -13.22% -10.90% -10.77%
Average Minimum 17.83% 23.57% 17.45% 19.62%
1Average calculates the simple average of the average standard deviation, Coefficient of Variation (CV), and minimum values 
from Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF), Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR), and Actuarially Fair Average Rate for 
farms with Indemnities (AFARI) by farm category  
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Table 5.3 Summary of risk measures for AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI for crop farms 
by Value of Farm Production (VFP) for all farms for NFI 
AFPF AFAR AFARI Average1
<$100,000 (33 Farms)
Average Stdev -6.95% -7.30% -7.35% -7.20%
Average CV -1.66% 107.24% 41.50% 49.03%
Average Minimum 12.27% 13.74% 3.29% 9.77%
$100,000-$249,999 (49 Farms)
Average Stdev -13.34% -13.49% -13.50% -13.45%
Average CV -8.58% -4.58% 27.60% 4.81%
Average Minimum 87.96% 89.29% 79.82% 85.69%
$250,000-$500,000 (38 Farms)
Average Stdev -11.50% -11.59% -11.60% -11.56%
Average CV -13.11% -19.15% -16.59% -16.28%
Average Minimum 89.07% 91.46% 86.20% 88.91%
>$500,000 (6 Farms)
Average Stdev -8.73% -8.97% -9.11% -8.94%
Average CV -8.72% -8.25% -4.08% -7.02%
Average Minimum 125.24% 130.84% 104.20% 120.09%
1Average calculates the simple average of the average standard deviation, Coefficient of Variation (CV), and minimum values from Actuarially 
Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF), Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR), and Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
by Value of Farm Production (VFP) category  
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Table 5.4 Summary of risk measures for AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI for crop farms 
by Value of Farm Production (VFP) for farms with at least one claim for Net Farm 
Income (NFI) 
AFPF AFAR AFARI Average1
<$100,000 (26 Farms)
Average Stdev -9.10% -9.44% -9.48% -9.34%
Average CV -5.01% 121.72% 30.53% 49.08%
Average Minimum 14.55% 25.94% 16.07% 18.85%
$100,000-$249,999 (44 Farms)
Average Stdev -15.07% -15.16% -15.16% -15.13%
Average CV -9.07% -20.99% 3.05% -9.00%
Average Minimum 95.12% 105.73% 96.66% 99.17%
$250,000-$500,000 (33 Farms)
Average Stdev -12.66% -12.71% -12.71% -12.70%
Average CV -14.73% -26.14% -24.07% -21.65%
Average Minimum 81.65% 87.95% 83.58% 84.39%
>$500,000 (4 Farms)
Average Stdev -12.91% -13.08% -13.18% -13.06%
Average CV -11.29% -12.38% -8.09% -10.59%
Average Minimum 55.25% 64.64% 56.99% 58.96%
1Average calculates the simple average of the average standard deviation, Coefficient of Variation (CV), and minimum values from Actuarially 
Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF), Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR), and Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) 
by Value of Farm Production (VFP) category  
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Table 5.5  Certainty Equivalent (CE) summary by farm category for all farms and 
farms with at least one claim for AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI 
Dairy Beef Livestock Crop Total
AFPF all farms
CE Change1 $1,674 $2,962 $3,129 $5,400 $4,769
(0.50) (1.60) (1.44) (2.81) (2.35)
Percent w/ positive change2 31% 47% 46% 83% 68%
AFPF farms with claims
CE Change1 $1,674 $2,962 $3,129 $5,400 $4,769
(0.43) (1.83) (1.71) (2.96) (2.61)
Percent w/ positive change2 100% 94% 95% 98% 97%
AFAR all farms
CE Change1 $525 $998 $1,194 $4,428 $3,123
(0.16) (0.54) (0.55) (2.30) (1.54)
Percent w/ positive change2 31% 37% 38% 58% 48%
AFAR farms with claims
CE Change1 $4,828 $5,621 $6,278 $6,705 $7,368
(1.23) (3.47) (3.43) (3.67) (4.03)
Percent w/ positive change2 100% 74% 80% 69% 69%
AFARI all farms
CE Change1 -$2,066 -$2,543 -$2,801 $2,914 $104
(0.61) (1.37) (1.29) (1.51) (0.05)
Percent w/ positive change2 23% 26% 23% 52% 41%
AFARI farms with claims
CE Change1 $1,656 $2,046 $2,484 $5,207 $4,464
(0.42) (1.26) (1.36) (2.85) (2.44)
Percent w/ positive change2 75% 52% 48% 61% 59%
1Certainty Equivalent (CE) changes were calculated excluding farms with a zero change in CE.  Therefore these results reveal the change in CE for those 
farms with changes.  CE changes were calculated  as a percent of initial Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) by dividing CE change by inital AGRC 
and are located in parentheses below.
2Percent with positive change indicates the percent of farms with increased CE, indicating a reduction in income variability over the seven year period.
Note:  Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF), Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR), Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI)  
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Table 5.6 Certainty Equivalent (CE) summary for VFP categories for all farms and 
farms with at least one claim for AFPF, AFAR, and AFARI 
<100 100-249 250-500 >500
AFPF all farms
CE Change1 $1,964 $4,935 $6,873 $20,992
(3.62) (3.79) (2.36) (2.52)
Percent w/ positive change2 78% 86% 87% 67%
AFPF farms with claims
CE Change1 $1,964 $4,935 $6,873 $20,992
(4.07) (3.93) (2.35) (2.71)
Percent w/ positive change2 100% 95% 100% 100%
AFAR all farms
CE Change1 $1,033 $4,426 $5,951 $14,445
(1.91) (3.40) (2.04) (1.74)
Percent w/ positive change2 44% 59% 50% 50%
AFAR farms with claims
CE Change1 $2,537 $5,854 $8,088 $28,225
(5.25) (4.66) (2.76) (3.64)
Percent w/ positive change2 56% 66% 58% 75%
AFARI all farms
CE Change1 -$118 $3,474 $4,738 $7,392
(0.22) (2.67) (1.62) (0.89)
Percent w/ positive change2 41% 59% 45% 50%
AFARI farms with claims
CE Change1 $1,384 $4,913 $6,829 $21,543
(2.86) (3.91) (2.33) (2.78)
Percent w/ positive change2 52% 66% 52% 75%
1Certainty Equivalent (CE) changes were calculated excluding farms with a zero change in CE.  Therefore these results reveal the change in CE for those 
farms with changes.  CE changes were calculated  as a percent of initial Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) by dividing CE change by inital 
AGRC and are located in parentheses below.
---------------------------(in thousands of dollars)----------------------------
2Percent with positive change indicates the percent of farms with increased CE, indicating a reduction in income variability over the seven year period.
Note:  Actuarially Fair Premium by Farm (AFPF), Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR), Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities 
(AFARI), Value of Farm Production (VFP)  
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Table 5.7  Downside Risk (DR) summary by farm category for all farms and farms 
with at least one claim for AFAR and AFARI* 
Dairy Beef Livestock Crop Total
AFAR All farms
Number Decreased DR2 4 22 33 59 91
(30.77) (34.38) (35.48) (46.83) (41.55)
Average Decrease in DR3 $3,089 $5,993 $5,996 $6,402 $6,891
(10.59) (45.55) (37.93) (70.15) (57.60)
Average Increase in DR3 -$1,373 -$3,139 -$3,298 -$5,637 -$4,899
(4.71) (23.86) (20.86) (61.77) (40.95)
AFAR farms with claims
Average Change1 $3,089 $3,329 $3,574 $1,419 $2,750
(6.08) (24.51) (24.21) (20.29) (29.47)
Number Decreased DR2 4 22 33 59 91
(100) (66.67) (71.74) (55.14) (59.48)
Average Decrease in DR3 $3,089 $5,993 $5,996 $6,402 $6,891
(6) (44.12) (40.61) (91.52) (73.85)
Average Increase in DR3 $0 -$1,998 -$2,574 -$4,705 -$3,328
(0) (14.71) (17.43) (67.26) (35.67)
AFARI all farms
Average Change1 -$2,548 -$3,376 -$3,842 -$1,438 -$2,886
(8.74) (25.66) (24.30) (15.76) (24.12)
Number Decreased DR2 3 14 19 52 70
(23.08) (21.88) (20.43) (41.27) (31.96)
Average Decrease in DR3 $2,073 $5,086 $6,426 $6,070 $6,262
(7.11) (38.66) (40.64) (66.52) (52.34)
Average Increase in DR3 -$3,935 -$5,746 -$6,478 -$6,714 -$7,184
(13.50) (43.67) (40.98) (73.57) (60.05)
AFARI farms with claims
Number Decreased DR2 3 14 19 52 70
(75.00) (42.42) (41.30) (48.60) (45.75)
Average Decrease in DR3 $2,073 $5,086 $6,426 $6,070 $6,262
(4.08) (37.45) (43.52) (86.79) (67.11)
Average Increase in DR3 -$6,219 -$3,748 -$4,522 -$5,739 -$5,281
(12.24) (27.59) (30.62) (82.05) (56.60)
*Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR), Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI)
Note:  Downside risk (DR) was calculated using Net Farm Income (NFI), average family living cost obtained from KFMA, and the number of 
farm operators.  The formula for Downside Risk (DR) is as follows: DR = NFI - (family living cost x # of farm operators)
1Average change reflects the average Downside Risk (DR) change for each farm category.  For a comparison measure average change was 
calculated as a percent of average without AGR-Lite by dividing average change by average without AGR-Lite, located in parentheses below.
2Number Decrease in Downside Risk (DR) reflect the farm numbers with decreases for each category as a result of AGR-Lite, with the respective 
percentage in parentheses below
3Average increase/decrease reflects the average change in Downside Risk (DR) excluding farms with a zero change.  Dividing average 
increase/decrease by average w/out AGR-Lite reveals the increase/decrease as a percent of average w/out AGR-Lite, located in parentheses below.
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Table 5.8  Downside Risk (DR) summary of crop farms for all farms and farms with 
at least one claim for AFAR and AFARI for VFP categories* 
<100 100-249 250-500 >500
AFAR all farms
Number Decreased DR2 15 23 11 3
(45.45) (46.94) (28.95) (50.00)
Average Decrease in DR3 $3,662 $5,203 $13,362 $10,206
(19.76) (105.94) (44.18) (7.18)
Average Increase in DR3 -$3,052 -$4,602 -$5,444 -$10,206
(16.47) (93.71) (18.00) (7.18)
AFAR farms with claims
Average Change1 $1,121 $902 $1,198 $6,298
(6.06) (15.97) (3.99) (5.18)
Number Decreased DR2 15 23 11 3
(57.69) (52.27) (33.33) (75.00)
Average Decrease in DR3 $3,662 $5,203 $13,362 $10,206
(19.80) (92.11) (44.49) (8.39)
Average Increase in DR3 -$2,344 -$3,808 -$4,884 -$5,424
(12.67) (67.41) (16.26) (4.46)
AFARI all farms
Average Change1 -$1,115 -$914 -$1,157 -$6,691
(6.02) (18.61) (3.82) (4.71)
Number Decreased DR2 11 21 11 3
(33.33) (42.86) (28.95) (50.00)
Average Decrease in DR3 $3,748 $4,732 $12,044 $4,062
(20.22) (96.35) (39.82) (2.86)
Average Increase in DR3 -$3,546 -$5,148 -$6,535 -$17,443
(19.13) (104.82) (21.61) (12.27)
AFARI farms with claims
Number Decreased DR2 11 21 11 3
(42.31) (47.73) (33.33) (75.00)
Average Decrease in DR3 $3,748 $4,732 $12,044 $4,062
(20.26) (83.77) (40.10) (3.34)
Average Increase in DR3 -$2,748 -$4,320 -$6,022 -$12,185
(14.86) (76.49) (20.05) (10.01)
*Actuarially Fair Average Rate (AFAR), Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI), Value of Farm Production (VFP)
3Average increase/decrease reflects the average change in Downside Risk (DR) excluding farms with a zero change.  Dividing average 
increase/decrease by average w/out AGR-Lite reveals the increase/decrease as a percent of average w/out AGR-Lite, located in parentheses below.
Note:  Downside risk (DR) was calculated using net farm income (NFI), average family living cost obtained from KFMA, and the number of farm 
operators.  The formula for Downside risk is as follows: DR = NFI - (family living cost x # of farm operators)
---------------------(in thousands of dollars)---------------------
1Average change reflects the average Downside Risk (DR) change for each farm category.  For a comparison measure average change was 
calculated as a percent of average without AGR-Lite by dividing average change by average without AGR-Lite, located in parentheses below.
2Number Decrease in Downside Risk (DR) reflect the farm numbers with decreases for each category as a result of AGR-Lite, with the respective 
percentage in parentheses below
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Appendix A - STATA Code 
Appendix A presents the STATA code used to generate critical variables AFI, AE, PE 
(beginning and ending), AR (beginning and ending), and IN (beginning and ending).  The 
code also provides formulas used to generate NFI and establish enterprise categories used 
for analysis.  Additionally code was included that was used to derive VFP categories for 
crop farms. 
 
#delimit ; 
 
format farm %8.0f; 
 
/*Allowable Income Derivation*/ 
 
gen AFI = ((v079 + v083 + v087 + v091 + v099 + v165) - (v103 + v107 + v111 + v115 + 
v123 + v167)) +(v601 + v604 + v607 + v610 + v613 + v616 + v619 + v622 + v628 + 
v631 + v634 + v637 + v640 + v643 + v646 + v649 + v652 + v655 + v658 + v661 + v664 
+ v667 + v670 + v673 + v676 + v679 + v682 + v685 + v688 + v039 + v043 + v047 + 
v051 + v055 + v157 + v280 + v281) + (v161) + (v285 + (v288 - v159 - v161 - v163) - 
(v482 + v483 - v171) + (v095 - v119) + (v839 - v869)); 
 
/*Expense Derivation*/ 
 
gen AE = (v103 + v107 + v111 + v115 + v123 + v167) + (v309 + v307 + v308 + v296 + 
v293 + v295 + v301 + v514 + v304 + v289 + v290 + v291 + v294 + v299 + v305 + v298 
+ v300 + v515 + v297 + v071); 
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/*Prepaid Expenses*/ 
 
gen PPBeg = (v546 + v548 + v552 + v554 + v556 + v558 + v560 + v562 + v568 + 
v570); 
 
gen PPEnd = (v547 + v549 + v553 + v555 + v557 + v559 + v561 + v563 + v569 + 
v571); 
 
gen APPEnd  =  PPBeg[_n+1] if year< 105; 
replace APPEnd  =  PPEnd if year == 105; 
 
/*Accounts Receivable*/ 
gen ARBeg = (v458 + v460 + v477); 
gen AREnd = (v459+ v461 + v478); 
gen AAREnd  =  ARBeg[_n+1] if year < 105; 
replace AAREnd  =  AREnd if year == 105; 
 
/*Inventories*/ 
 
gen INBeg =(v182 + v200 + v212 + v224 + v230 + v236 + v242 + v248 + v254 + v258 + 
v260+ v496 + v498 + v500 + v502 + v504); 
 
gen INEnd = (v185 + v203 + v215 + v227 + v233 + v239 + v245 + v251 + v257 + v259 
+ v261 + v497 + v499 + v501 + v503 + v505); 
 
gen AINEnd  =  INBeg[_n+1] if year < 105; 
 
replace AINEnd  =  INEnd if year == 105; 
 
/* Dropping Farms with Negative values for AFI AE PP AP and IN */ 
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/* Dropping farms because AE <0 */     
       
drop if farm == 11802300; 
drop if farm == 14089100; 
drop if farm == 14783100;      
drop if farm == 20601300; 
drop if farm == 20640500;       
drop if farm == 33505600;   
drop if farm == 33540000; 
drop if farm == 39305600; 
drop if farm == 39395700; 
drop if farm == 43988100;   
drop if farm == 44691300;      
drop if farm == 45440104;        
drop if farm == 46200800;   
drop if farm == 46201400;   
drop if farm == 59930900;      
drop if farm == 63103600;      
drop if farm == 64490900;        
drop if farm == 64980200;   
drop if farm == 66390100;      
drop if farm == 66801000;      
drop if farm == 67294200;      
     
/* Dropping farms because AE <0 */ 
 
drop if farm == 23340302;   
drop if farm == 41903000;  
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/* Dropping farms because PPBeg <0 */        
      
 drop if farm == 57706400;    
 drop if farm == 57860100;    
 drop if farm == 58050400;    
 drop if farm == 59909000;    
 drop if farm == 59970200;   
 drop if farm == 59980300;    
 drop if farm == 60590300;   
 drop if farm == 60803000;      
 drop if farm == 60809300;    
 drop if farm == 60811600;    
 drop if farm == 60850104;    
 drop if farm == 60889000;    
 drop if farm == 62187000;    
 drop if farm == 65282000;     
 drop if farm == 66389000;    
 drop if farm == 66803500;     
 
/* Dropping farms because PPEnd <0 */ 
       
drop if farm == 40704000;    
drop if farm == 57706400;    
drop if farm == 57860100;    
drop if farm == 59909000;    
drop if farm == 59970200;   
drop if farm == 59980300;    
drop if farm == 59980300;    
drop if farm == 60590300;   
drop if farm == 60803000;      
drop if farm == 60809300;    
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drop if farm == 60811600;    
drop if farm == 60850104;    
drop if farm == 60889000;    
drop if farm == 62103600;   
drop if farm == 62187000;    
drop if farm == 62187100;    
drop if farm == 62191800;    
drop if farm == 63187000;     
drop if farm == 64970100;    
drop if farm == 64980100;   
drop if farm == 65282000;     
drop if farm == 66389000;    
drop if farm == 66803500; 
     
/* Dropping farms because ARBeg <0 */   
       
drop if farm == 22806100;   
drop if farm == 44500700;      
drop if farm == 57400500;    
drop if farm == 58060100;   
drop if farm == 58210500;   
drop if farm == 58270100; 
 
/* Dropping farms because AREnd <0*/  
       
drop if farm == 22806100;   
drop if farm == 57400500;    
drop if farm == 58210500;   
drop if farm == 58270100;         
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/* Adjusted NFI without Crop Insurance*/ 
 
gen NFI = v006 - (v625 + v529 - v528) + v598; 
egen aNFI = mean(NFI), by(farm); 
 
/*Crop Income*/ 
 
gen CI = v095 + v099  + (v288 - v159 - v161 - v163) + v601 + v604 + v607 + v610 + 
v613 + v616 + v619 + v622 + v628 + v631 + v634 + v637 + v640 + v643 + v646 + v649 
+ v652 + v655 + v658 + v661+ v664 + v667 + v670 + v673 + v676 + v679 + v682 + 
v685 + v688; 
 
/* Dropping farms because v288 other income <0*/       
 
drop if farm == 62903800;   
drop if farm == 66370100;    
 
/*gen CI = (v095 -  v119) + (v099 - v123) + (v288 - v159 - v161 - v163) + v601 + v604 
+ v607 + v610 + v613 + v616 + v619 + v622 + v628 + v631 + v634 + v637 + v640 + 
v643 + v646 + v649 + v652 + v655 + v658 + v661+ v664 + v667 + v670 + v673 + v676 
+ v679 + v682 + v685 + v688;*/  
 
egen aCI = mean(CI), by(farm); 
 
/*Livestock Income*/ 
 
gen LI = v039 + v043 + v047 + v051 + v055 + v079 + v083 + v087 + v091 + v157 + 
v165 + v280 + v281 + v839; 
 
/*gen LI = v039 + v043 + v047 + v051 + v055 + (v079 - v103) + (v083 - v107) + (v087 - 
v111) + (v091 - v115) + v157 + (v165 - v167) + v280 + v281 + (v839 - v869);*/ 
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egen aLI = mean(LI), by(farm); 
 
/*Beef Income*/ 
gen BI = v039 + v079; 
 
/*gen BI = v039 + (v079 - v103);*/ 
egen aBI = mean(BI), by(farm); 
 
/*Dairy Income*/ 
gen DI = v043 + v083 + v280; 
 
/*gen DI = v043 + (v083 - v107) + v280;*/ 
egen aDI = mean(DI), by(farm); 
 
/*Swine Income*/ 
gen SI = v051 + v091; 
 
/*gen SI = v051 + (v091 - v115);*/ 
egen aSI = mean(SI), by(farm); 
 
/*Total Crop and Livestock Income*/ 
gen TI = CI + LI; 
 
/*Wheat Income*/ 
gen WheatI = v616; 
egen aWheatI = mean(v616), by(farm); 
drop if farm == 59990200; /*negative wheat income*/  
 
/*Bean Income*/ 
gen BeanI = v661; 
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egen aBeanI = mean(v661), by(farm); 
 
/*Corn Income*/ 
gen CornI = v604; 
egen aCornI = mean(v604), by(farm); 
drop if farm == 63103900; /*negative corn income*/ 
 
/*Sorghum Income*/ 
gen SorghI = v607; 
egen aSorghI = mean(v607), by(farm); 
 
/*Major Crop Income*/ 
gen MCropI = v616+v661+v604+v607; 
egen aMCropI = mean(MCropI), by(farm); 
 
/* Percent Incomes*/ 
 
gen CIper = CI/TI; 
egen aCIper = mean(CIper), by(farm); 
 
gen LIper = LI/TI; 
egen aLIper = mean(LIper), by(farm); 
 
gen BIper = BI/TI; 
egen aBIper = mean(BIper), by(farm); 
 
gen BIperLI = BI/LI; 
egen aBIperLI = mean(BIperLI), by(farm); 
 
gen DIper = DI/TI; 
egen aDIper = mean(DIper), by(farm); 
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gen DIperLI = DI/LI; 
egen aDIperLI = mean(DIperLI), by(farm); 
 
gen SIper = SI/TI; 
egen aSIper = mean(SIper), by(farm); 
 
gen SIperLI = SI/LI; 
egen aSIperLI = mean(SIperLI), by(farm); 
 
gen Wheatper = WheatI/TI; 
egen aWheatper = mean(Wheatper), by(farm); 
 
gen WheatperCI = WheatI/CI; 
egen aWheatCI = mean(WheatperCI), by(farm); 
 
gen Beanper = BeanI/TI; 
egen aBeanper = mean(Beanper), by(farm); 
 
gen BeanperCI = BeanI/CI; 
egen aBeanCI = mean(BeanperCI), by(farm); 
 
gen Cornper = CornI/TI; 
egen aCornper = mean(Cornper), by(farm); 
 
gen CornperCI = CornI/CI; 
egen aCornCI = mean(CornperCI), by(farm); 
 
gen Sorghper = SorghI/TI; 
egen aSorghper = mean(Sorghper), by(farm); 
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gen SorghperCI = SorghI/CI; 
egen aSorghCI = mean(SorghperCI), by(farm); 
 
gen MCropper = MCropI/TI; 
egen aMCropper = mean(MCropper), by(farm); 
 
gen MCropperCI = MCropI/CI; 
egen aMCropCI = mean(MCropperCI), by(farm); 
 
generate FamLiv =  unpaid; 
 
/* Value of Farm Production (VFP)*/ 
 
gen VFP = v005; 
egen aVFP = mean(VFP), by(farm); 
 
/* Keep Southeast KS Farms*/ 
 
drop if farm < 60000000; 
drop if farm == 60403500; /* large v071 poultry purchase value*/ 
 
/*Sorting by Farm Type and size Size*/ 
 
keep if aCIper >.50; 
 
keep if aVFP < 100000;  
 
keep if aVFP >= 100000 & aVFP < 250000; 
 
keep if aVFP >= 250000 & aVFP < 500000; 
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keep if aVFP >= 500000; 
 
gen NumFarms = _N/13; 
 
sum; 
 
/*Keeping only relevant variables for spreadsheet*/ 
 
keep farm year AFI - NFI FamLiv aVFP; 
 
sum; 
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Appendix B - Total Farmer Paid Premium 
Appendix B presents the equation to be used if AGR-Lite were being evaluated as a 
umbrella (wrap around) policy. 
 
(21) TFPPkj = [AGRLkj – MIN{∑ (LOIPkj), 0.5(AGRLkj}x PRRkj] x  (1- SRkj*) + 
$301 
TFPPkj Total Farmer Paid Premium for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
LOIPkj Liability from Other Insured Products for insurance year k = 0 for farm 
j 
  *The AGR Liability (AGRL) will be reduced by the accumulated liability from 
other insurance products offered under the authority of the ACT which 
compensates producers for damage or loss.  Total reduction is capped at 50 
percent of AGRL. 
 
PRRkj Premium Rate for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
SRkj Subsidy Rate for insurance year k = 0 for farm j 
*Government will pay (subsidize) a portion of premium for AGR-Lite policy 
corresponding to producer elected coverage level: 
¾ 65% Coverage Level =  59% Subsidy 
¾ 75% Coverage Level =  55% Subsidy 
¾ 80% Coverage Lev el =  48% Subsidy 
1Each AGR-Lite contract includes an administrative fee equal to $30. 
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Appendix C - Southeast Kansas Farms 
Appendix C summarizes SE Kansas farms by county number, county name, and the 
corresponding farm number by county. 
 
04 Crawford - 15 
05 Montgomery - 10 
08 Cowley - 24 
09 Butler - 5 
10 Cherokee - 15 
11 Labette - 12 
17 Bourbon - 10 
21 Franklin - 20 
22 Neosho - 11 
24 Allen - 11 
27 Wilson - 13 
29 Osage - 10 
31 Miami - 13 
32 Greenwood - 5 
44 Coffey - 5 
49 Linn - 10 
52 Anderson - 11 
63 Chautauqua - 11 
68 Elk - 15 
72 Woodson – 22 
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Appendix D - AGR Worksheets 
The following figures include worksheets to be used as an aid to producers in the 
AGR-Lite filing process.  Figures D.1, D.2, D.3, and D.4 provide worksheets for figuring 
AFI, AE, EI, and eligibility of agricultural program payments. 
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Figure D. 1  Allowable farm income worksheet for calculating AGR 
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Figure D. 2  Allowable expense worksheet for calculating AE 
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Figure D. 3  Annual farm report to be submitted at the beginning of each insurance year 
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Figure D. 4  Agricultural program payment eligibility 
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Appendix E - Table Interpretation 
The following provides an explanation for each row and column of Table 4.1 and 
similar tables.  Titles for each statistic in there have been bolded for ease of 
identification.   
Average Mean  
Equals the average of the 219 farms mean calculated for each farm from the seven 
year distribution.  In Table 4.1 the average AGRC for across 219 farms was 
$203,236.   
Minimum  is the lowest average across 219 farms.  In Table 4.1 the farm that had 
the lowest average AGRC was $15,560.   
Maximum is the largest average across 219 farms.  In Table 4.1 the farm that had 
the largest average AGRC was $1,160,123. 
Average Standard Deviation 
Equals the average of the 219 farms standard deviations calculated using the seven 
year distribution.   
Minimum is the lowest standard deviation of the 219 farms.   
Maximum is the largest standard deviation from the 219 farms 
Average CV 
Equals the average of the 219 farms CVs calculated for each farm using the mean 
and standard deviation from the seven year distribution 
Minimum is the lowest CV from the 219 farms 
Maximum is the largest CV from the 219 farms 
Average Minimum  
Calculates the average of the 219 farms minimum observations identified in the 
seven year distribution 
Minimum is the lowest minimum from the 219 farms 
Maximum is the largest minimum from the 219 farms 
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Average Maximum  
Equals the average of the 219 farms maximum observations identified in the seven 
year distribution 
Minimum is the smallest maximum observation from the 219 farms  
Maximum is the largest maximum observation from the 219 farms 
 
The following discussion explains the headings for Table 4.1 and similar tables. 
 
AGRC w/o AGR-Lite  
Reports the previously mentioned statistics assuming AGRC without AGR-Lite, 
from Equation 18. 
 NFI w/o AGR-Lite 
Reports the previously mentioned statistics assuming use of NFI without 
participation in AGR-Lite, calculated in Equation 22. 
AGRC w/ AGR-Lite 
Reports the previously mentioned statistics assuming use of AGRC with 
consideration to AGR-Lite premiums and indemnities, located in Equation 24. 
NFI w/ AGR-Lite 
Reports the previously mentioned statistics for NFI with consideration to AGR-Lite 
premiums and indemnities, illustrated in Equation 23. 
Average AGRC Change 
Equlas the average of the 219 farms AGRC changes (with AGR-Lite minus without 
AGR-lite) in each statistic (mean, standard deviation, CV, minimum, and 
maximum) calculated using the results from the seven year distribution.  
Average NFI Change 
Equals the average of the 219 farms NFI changes (with AGR-Lite minus without 
AGR-Lite) in each statistic (mean, standard deviation, CV, minimum, and 
maximum) calculated using the results from the seven year distribution. 
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AGRC Percent Change 
 Equals the percent change in AGRC (1-(AGRC w/ AGR-Lite / AGRC w/o AGR-
Lite)) for each statistic in the table. 
NFI Percent Change 
Equals the percent change in NFI (1-(NFI w/ AGR-Lite / NFI w/o AGR-Lite)) for 
each statistic in the table. 
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Appendix F - Beef Standard Deviation Explanation 
This appendix provides an example of the increase in standard deviations 
observed in beef farms.  Tables F.1 and F.2 provide an example of a beef farm which, 
with participation in AGR-Lite, increased standard deviation for Adjusted Gross Revenue 
to Count (AGRC) and Net Farm Income (NFI).  The first two columns provide AFI and 
inventory adjustments which generate AGRC prior to participation in AGR-Lite.  The 
fourth column reports AGRC for each year with participation in AGR-Lite with 
consideration to indemnities and corresponding premium costs.  All remaining columns 
(Expected Income (EI), Expense Reduction (ER), liability, Loss Inception Point (LIP), 
Indemnity (ID), and premium) were included to provide the necessary detail to illustrate 
how participation in AGR-Lite can in fact lead to standard deviation increases.  Evident 
in Table F.1 is the increase in standard deviation with participation in AGR-Lite from 
$77,828 to $94,634.  As discussed in earlier text AGR-Lite is not necessarily resulting in 
the largest impact to low years, which would be expected.  Over the seven years, 2001 
marked the lowest year ($185,820).  An indemnity was received in 2001, which is 
intuitive given it was the lowest year; however the indemnity received was completely 
offset by the corresponding cost of insurance (premium).  That said the lowest year will 
fall even lower which contradicts the essence of insurance.  To illustrate, consider the 
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) income distribution in Figure F.1.  It is expected 
that the presence of insurance will truncate the CDF by shrinking the distribution to fall 
inside of the CDF without AGR-Lite.  As the CDF reveals, participation in AGR-Lite 
(dotted line) moves further to the left, increasing the downside potential.  On the other 
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hand 2000 marked the highest year and surprisingly generated a $47,830 claim which 
increased the overall maximum.  Figure F.1 illustrates the increase in maximum as the 
dotted line moves beyond (shift to the right) the solid line (without AGR-Lite).  This is 
partially justified by the much higher LIP in 2000 compared to 2001.  Nevertheless, by 
lowering the initial minimum and increasing the initial maximum it is intuitive that as the 
overall range of the distribution widens, we would expect an increase in standard 
deviation.  Similar findings are found when looking at NFI (Table F.2 and corresponding 
Figure F.2). 
Figures F.3 and F.4 illustrate what would be expected to occur with the presence 
of insurance.  Using actual farm data from beef farms, AGRC and NFI distributions were 
used to generate CDFs with and without AGR-Lite.  These graphs clearly indicate CDFs 
with AGR-Lite fall within the CDFs without AGR-Lite.  This suggests an increase in 
minimum and reduction in maximum, which is expected from insurance.  Furthermore 
the probability of generating lower values, located on the vertical axis, decline for AGRC 
and NFI (Figures F.3 and F.4), compared to Figures F.1 and F.2.  Tables F.3 and F.4 were 
included to reveal AGRC and NFI distributions used to generate CDFs.
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Table F. 1  Standard deviation increase example for Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) 
AFI1
Inventory 
Adjustment2
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite3
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite4
AGRC 
Change EI5 ER6 Liability7 LIP8 ID9 Premium10
1999 $486,788 -$130,610 $356,178 $436,978 $80,800 $632,661 $0 $427,046 $474,496 $106,486 $25,686
2000 $548,477 -$147,734 $400,743 $424,002 $23,259 $605,183 $0 $408,499 $453,887 $47,830 $24,571
2001 $374,320 -$188,500 $185,820 $180,425 -$5,395 $567,236 $293,351 $382,884 $205,414 $17,635 $23,030
2002 $352,826 -$4,800 $348,026 $325,879 -$22,147 $545,497 $264,137 $368,211 $211,020 $0 $22,147
2003 $283,834 -$32,750 $251,084 $230,856 -$20,228 $498,233 $235,066 $336,307 $197,375 $0 $20,228
2004 $245,352 $116,230 $361,582 $343,266 -$18,316 $451,125 $175,280 $304,509 $206,883 $0 $18,316
2005 $351,163 $28,050 $379,213 $362,597 -$16,616 $409,249 $99,527 $276,243 $232,292 $0 $16,616
Average $377,537 -$51,445 $326,092 $329,143 $3,051 $529,883 $152,480 $357,671 $283,052 $24,564 $21,513
Standard Deviation $107,025 $108,997 $77,828 $94,634 $37,738 $81,271 $121,762 $54,858 $124,345 $40,237 $3,300
Coefficient of Variation 0.28 -2.12 0.24 0.29 12.37 0.15 0.80 0.15 0.44 1.64 0.15
Minimum $245,352 -$188,500 $185,820 $180,425 -$22,147 $409,249 $0 $276,243 $197,375 $0 $16,616
Maximum $548,477 $116,230 $400,743 $436,978 $80,800 $632,661 $293,351 $427,046 $474,496 $106,486 $25,686
5Expected Income (EI) reflects the projected income for the upcoming insurance year and is reported on the annual farm report Figure D.3.  Due to KFMA data limitations EI was assumed to equal the 5-year average AGR 
(AGRA).  As such the EI became the Approved Adjusted Gross Revenue (AAGR)
6Expense Reduction (ER) is the amount by which Approved Adjusted Gross Revenue (AAGR) will be reduced because Allowable Expenses (AE) for the current year fell below 70%.  Refer to Equations 13, 14, and 15 for a 
mathematical explanation.
1Allowable Farm Income (AFI) reflects AFI for each year calculated using Equation 1 in the mathematical explanation.
2Inventory adjustment was calculated by adding accrual adjustments of Inventories (IN) and Accounts Receviable (AR)
3Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) w/o AGR-Lite calculates AGRC by subtracting Inventory adjustments from AFI.
4Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) w/ AGR-Lite calculates AGRC with consideration to AGR-Lite indemnities and premium costs.  Refer to Equation 24 for the mathematical explanation
10Reflects the associated cost of AGR-Lite assuming application of Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) (6.0% rate).  Multiply AFARI by liability to obtain the resulting premium.
7Liability was calculated using Approved Adjusted Gross Revenue (AAGR), 75% coverage level, and 90% payment rate.  Refer to Equation 6 for the mathematical explanation.
8Loss Inception Point (LIP) identifies the point at which indemnification occurs.  Refer to Equation 17 for the mathematical explanation.
9Indemnity (ID) reports the indemnity for each year given the coverage level and payment rate.  Refer to Equation 20 for the mathematical explanation.  The difference between Loss Inception Point (LIP) and Adjusted Gross 
Revenue to Count (AGRC), if positive, is the amount eligible for indemnification.  Multiply the eligible amount by the selected payment rate (90% in this scenario) to determine the indemnity amount.
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Table F. 2 Standard deviation increase example for Net Farm Income (NFI) 
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite1 Change Liability2 LIP3 ID4 Premium5
1999 $15,023 $95,823 $80,800 $427,046 $474,496 $106,486 $25,686
2000 $82,793 $106,052 $23,259 $408,499 $453,887 $47,830 $24,571
2001 -$69,360 -$74,755 -$5,395 $382,884 $205,414 $17,635 $23,030
2002 -$19,221 -$41,368 -$22,147 $368,211 $211,020 $0 $22,147
2003 -$51,347 -$71,575 -$20,228 $336,307 $197,375 $0 $20,228
2004 $56,946 $38,630 -$18,316 $304,509 $206,883 $0 $18,316
2005 $117,061 $100,445 -$16,616 $276,243 $232,292 $0 $16,616
Average $18,842 $21,893 $3,051 $357,671 $283,052 $24,564 $21,513
Standard Deviation $69,950 $82,743 $37,738 $54,858 $124,345 $40,237 $3,300
Coefficient of Variation 3.712 3.779 12.369 0.153 0.439 1.638 0.153
Minimum -$69,360 -$74,755 -$22,147 $276,243 $197,375 $0 $16,616
Maximum $117,061 $106,052 $80,800 $427,046 $474,496 $106,486 $25,686
5Reflects the associated cost of AGR-Lite assuming application of Actuarially Fair Average Rate for farms with Indemnities (AFARI) (6.0% rate).  Multiply AFARI by 
liability to obtain the resulting premium.
1Net Farm Income (NFI) w/ AGR-Lite calculates NFI with consideration to AGR-Lite indemnities and premium costs.  Refer to Equation 24 for the mathematical 
2Liability was calculated using Approved Adjusted Gross Revenue (AAGR), 75% coverage level, and 90% payment rate.  Refer to Equation 6 for the mathematical 
explanation.
3Loss Inception Point (LIP) identifies the point at which indemnification occurs.  Refer to Equation 17 for the mathematical explanation.
4Indemnity (ID) reports the indemnity for each year given the coverage level and payment rate.  Refer to Equation 20 for the mathematical explanation.  The difference 
between Loss Inception Point (LIP) and Net Farm Income (NFI), if positive, is the amount eligible for indemnification.  Multiply the eligible amount by the selected 
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Figure F. 1  Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of Adjusted Gross Revenue to 
Count (AGRC) with and without participation in AGR-Lite 
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Figure F. 2 Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of Net Farm Income (NFI) 
with and without participation in AGR-Lite 
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Figure F. 3 Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of Adjusted Gross Revenue to 
Count (AGRC) with and without participation in AGR-Lite (Expected) 
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Table F. 3  Adjusted Gross Revenue to Count (AGRC) distributions with and 
without AGR-Lite over 1999 to 2005 period (Expected) 
AGRC w/o 
AGR-Lite
AGRC w/ 
AGR-Lite Change
1999 $79,030 $76,024 -$3,007
2000 $72,506 $69,108 -$3,398
2001 $69,532 $66,637 -$2,895
2002 $51,829 $49,899 -$1,930
2003 $79,894 $77,028 -$2,865
2004 $48,378 $50,549 $2,172
2005 $24,290 $33,164 $8,874
Average $60,780 $60,344 -$436
Standard Deviation $20,322 $16,250 -$4,072
Coefficient of Variation 0.334 0.269 -0.065
Minimum $24,290 $33,164 $8,874
Maximum $79,894 $77,028 -$2,865
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Figure F. 4 Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of Net Farm Income (NFI) 
with and without participation in AGR-Lite (Expected) 
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Table F. 4  Net Farm Income (NFI) distributions with and without AGR-Lite over 
1999 to 2005 period (Expected) 
NFI w/o 
AGR-Lite
NFI w/ 
AGR-Lite Change
1999 $25,488 $22,481 -$3,007
2000 $31,270 $27,872 -$3,398
2001 $8,846 $5,951 -$2,895
2002 $1,472 -$458 -$1,930
2003 $27,729 $24,864 -$2,865
2004 -$1,249 $923 $2,172
2005 -$21,548 -$12,674 $8,874
Average $10,287 $9,851 -$436
Standard Deviation $19,157 $15,375 -$3,782
Coefficient of Variation 1.862 1.561 -0.302
Minimum -$21,548 -$12,674 $8,874
Maximum $31,270 $27,872 -$3,398  
